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Introduction
One of the most significant tendencies in corporate organisation over the last three 
decades has been a tendency to vertical  disintegration1 through outsourcing and 
subcontracting.  Organisations  both  in  the  private  and in  the  public  sector  have 
outsourced  ever  larger  segments  of  their  activities  and  increasingly focused on 
what they define as their core business (Bonazzi and Negrelli 2003, Marchington et 
al. 2005a,  OECD  2004).  This  has  given  rise  to  complex  inter-organisational 
relationship for the production of goods and services, that often extend over the 
boundaries  of  national  countries,  which  have  been  variously  named  inter-
organisational networks (Grimshaw and Rubery 2005), global value chains (Gereffi 
and  Korzeniewicz  1994,  Gereffi  et  al.  2005),  and  global  production  networks 
(Henderson et al. 2002).
Even  though,  as  argued  by  Grimshaw  and  Rubery,  the  employment  relations 
literature has largely neglected the issue of inter-organisational relations in shaping 
industrial  and  employment  relations  (Grimshaw  and  Rubery  2005:  1028),  a 
growing  range  of  literature  has  investigated  the  impact  of  these  organisational 
transformations  on  working  condition,  industrial  relations  structures  and  trade 
union power (Flecker et al. 2008,  Marchington et al. 2005b,  Doellgast and Greer 
2007, Kalleberg  2003).  Recent  studies  have  argued  that  the  consequences  of 
organisational restructuring on working conditions are not uniform, but are shaped 
by a variety of factors: Power relations between different organisations inside the 
value chain (Flecker et al. 2008); the bargaining position of particular groups of 
workers and their control over skills (Kalleberg 2003); the operation of different 
1 Though the term is not always used with the same meaning, the basic definition of vertical 
disintegration for this research's purpose is “the creation of new intermediate markets in a 
previously integrated production process” (Jacobides 2005: 465). It entails a process whereby an 
organisation ceases to carry out internally various functions, and instead purchases the services 
or products concerned from outside parties. This may happen through the creation of 
autonomous subsidiaries or spin-offs within the same business group, contracting-out to other 
companies, or the use of agency work. 
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institutional  regimes  (Doellgast  2008,  Doellgast  et  al.  2009a).  Still,  the  vast 
majority of these analyses has highlighted a negative impact of these reorganisation 
processes on labour.
First,  vertical  disintegration  usually  entails  the  movement  of  jobs  out  of  well 
organised sectors to more fragile and less powerful sectors. Indeed, one of the main 
motivators for outsourcing has been recognised in employers' attempts to exploit 
differentials between countries, sectors and workplaces (Flecker et al. 2008). This 
is  particularly evident  when organisations  create  subsidiaries  applying  different 
collective agreements. Vertical disintegration, thus, contributes to a deterioration of 
working condition in outsourced occupations, such as reduction of wages, work 
intensification,  increased  job  insecurity  and  higher  reliance  on  non-standard 
employment (Grimshaw and Rubery 2005,  Wills  2009,  Flecker  and Meil  2010, 
Gautié  and  Schmitt  2010).  Moreover,  these  processes  produce  an  increased 
variation  of  working conditions  along  value  chains,  often  with  the  situation  of 
people working side by side having different employment conditions.
A second point regards the existence of power differentials among different nodes 
of the value chain. Indeed, vertical disintegration sets up competitive markets for 
the provision of goods and services, enabling firms at higher levels of the value 
chain to  exploit  competition between different  suppliers  or service providers to 
pressure for cost reduction (Appay 1998). Often suppliers pass down these cost 
reduction pressures to other organisations (a mechanism which is well described by 
the  metaphor  of  cascade  subcontracting,  see  Appay  1998)  or  to  their  own 
employees,  producing  a  deterioration  of  wage  levels,  work  intensification,  and 
increased insecurity.
Lastly,  these  processes  have  important  consequences  for  industrial  relations 
structures  and trade  unions  power  (Doellgast  and Greer  2007).  Several  authors 
have  argued  that  vertical  disintegration  produces  a  weakening  of  workers' 
possibility to  exercise their  voice,  especially at  lower levels  of the value chain 
(Marchington et  al.  2005b).  There are  two reasons for  this:  first,  suppliers  and 
service providers are less likely to be covered by industrial relations institutions 
(both collective agreements and workplace representation) (Hendrix et al. 2003). 
Secondly,  the same effectiveness of the bargaining process gets weaker moving 
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down the  value  chain:  given  the  strong  economic  pressures  that  chain  leaders 
exercise on its subsidiaries and sub-contractors, employers itself get less and less 
autonomous the lower the company is positioned in the value chain (Appay 1998, 
Perraudin  et  al.  2013),  with  the  effect  of  rendering  negotiations  whit  direct 
employers  ineffective  (Wills  2009).  Even  at  higher  levels  of  the  value  chain, 
however, processes of restructuring impact on social partners' bargaining position 
(Caprile 2000,  Marchington et al.  2005b). The threat to outsource production to 
other organisations or other countries has been a strong managerial instrument to 
force concessions on the workforce and a key trigger of concession bargaining in 
advanced  capitalist  economies  (Bronfenbrenner  2000,  Flecker  2009).  Finally, 
outsourcing  and  subcontracting  affect  trade  unions'  organisational  resources. 
Vertical  disintegration  usually  moves  jobs  out  of  large  and  towards  small  and 
medium enterprises,  traditionally  more  difficult  for  unions  to  organise  (Caprile 
2000,  Moore et  al.  2007), and from unions'  strongholds (manufacturing and the 
public sector) to private services, where they have much weaker bindings.
1.1. Trade unions in a dilemma?
Taken into account all the negative consequences vertical disintegration produces 
on working conditions, workers' bargaining power, and trade unions' organisational 
resources, it comes with no surprise that the relationship between trade unions and 
vertical disintegration has been portrayed at best as complicated (Pulignano 2005: 
157).  Unions  have  been  said  to  be  generally  against  these  kind  of  processes 
(Bonazzi  and  Negrelli  2003:  9,  Murray  1993,  Anderson  and  Holmes  1995, 
Pulignano 2003: 202) and several contributions have analysed the strategies they 
have  deployed  in  order  to  resist  them  and  their  varying  degree  of  success 
(Doellgast 2008, Pulignano 2005).
However, a more recent strand of literature has somewhat complicated this picture. 
Stressing  the  differential  effects  that  vertical  disintegration  processes  have  on 
workers located at different levels of the value chain, several authors have argued 
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that opposition may not be the sole answer trade unions may adopt if confronted 
with  employers'  pressures  for  outsourcing  and  subcontracting.  Indeed,  scholars 
referring to the dualisation literature have argued that trade unions may accept this 
form of restructuring as a way to shelter core workers and let negative externalities 
of employers' search for flexibility and cost containment spill over to the outside 
(Palier and Thelen 2010, Hassel 2014). Thereby, trade unions have been considered 
as partially responsible for the fact that  “vertical disintegration often results in a 
‘dualism’ between  a  relatively  stable  core  of  secure  workplaces  and  a  slowly 
growing periphery of precarious and vulnerable jobs” (Holst 2014: 4).
The idea that outsourcing and subcontracting may pose trade unions in front of a 
dilemma was present in the literature since the mid Eighties (Goldthorpe 1984, 
Atkinson 1985). As far as 1984, Goldthorpe highlighted the presence of contrasting 
imperatives  for  trade  unions  in  segmented  labour  markets  (Goldthorpe  1984). 
Confronted with the threat of segmentation, he argues, trade unions may “strive to 
uphold class orientation, which must entail as far as possible opposing dualism – 
for  example,  by  seeking  legislation  which  can  check  employers'  attempts  to 
generate it and by regarding secondary workers, even if not union members, as still 
forming  part  of  the  unions'  constituency;  or  (…)  they  [may]  in  effect  accept 
dualism and fall  back on the defence of the specific  sectional interests  of their 
enrolled members, in the hope that these interests may be then as much protected as 
undermined by dualism through the “shock absorber” function that the secondary-
workforce performs” (Goldthorpe 1984: 149)”.
By now, however, there are relatively few studies trying to systematically identify 
under  which  conditions  do  trade  unions  decide  to  adopt  the  one  or  the  other 
strategy.  This  research  will  contribute  to  this  debate  by  analysing  trade  union 
strategies towards vertical  disintegration processes  in  the German chemical  and 
metal sectors. We will trace which strategies have been adopted by trade unions in 
these two sectors since the 1990s, identify which interests they have given priority 
to and the reasons explaining their behaviour. We will argue that different factors 
influence trade unions' strategies, but two elements stand out as most significant: 
ideological legacies and members' interests, understood as the interplay between 
the internal and the external labour market and the effects it has on core workers.
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This issue is particularly relevant for it intersects different debates currently taking 
place in the literature on industrial relations and comparative political economy.
First,  by focusing on the role  of trade unions in segmented labour  market,  this 
thesis contributes to discussions related to trade unions' position in our societies. 
Indeed, over the last decade, a strong debate has grown with regard to trade unions' 
role in processes of dualisation (for a review see  Davidsson and Nakzyc 2009). 
Several authors have argued that trade unions have plaid an ambiguous role in the 
development of labour market dualisms and increased segmentation (Emmenegger 
et  al.  2012:  310,  Palier  and  Thelen  2010).  Indeed,  dualisation  theorists  have 
considered  trade  unions  as  “consenters”  of  these  processes:  Even  though  their 
preferred  option  would  have  been  to  resist  employers'  pressures  towards 
dualisation, their weakness has pushed trade unions representing workers in core 
sectors in a defensive position. Thus, they have increasingly looked inwards and 
concentrated exclusively on their core members (Palier and Thelen 2010), allowing 
for  organisational  measures  and  reforms  which  have  protected  insiders,  but 
negatively affected outsiders (Emmenegger et al. 2012: 310).
On the contrary, authors referring to the power-resource theory have argued that it 
has been the weakening of trade unions to have contributed to increasing market 
inequalities,  because  union  weakness  has  impeded  them  to  oppose  employers' 
pushes to dualisation (Korpi 2006).  In these accounts, employees representatives 
have been much less involved in liberalisation processes and have mostly came 
under employers' offensive (Streeck 2009). In some cases they have tried to resist 
employers'  segmentation  strategies  by  means  of  organising  campaigns  and 
collective bargaining targeted to the outsiders (Turner 2009,  Benassi and Dorigatti 
in progress), but with mixed results.
These two different approaches have also important policy implications. If trade 
unions are blamed to increasingly represent solely the interests of the “better-off” 
among working people, “at the expense both of the common good and of other less 
privileged  workers”  (Pontusson  2013:  24),  their  role  in  society  is  strongly 
challenged.  On the other hand, as Pontusson recently argued, if inequality comes 
out as a side-effect of trade unions'  weakness, “any political project aspiring to 
redress  the  growth  of  inequalities  in  the  OECD  countries  ought  to  promote 
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unionisation”, since the sole trade unions do not have the resources to tackle the 
issues alone (Pontusson 2013: 24).
This  research is  relevant  also for  theoretical  reasons.  Indeed,  a  lively debate is 
currently  going  on  regarding  trajectories  of  change  in  contemporary  political 
economies  and  most  of  all  Continental  coordinated  market  economies  (CMEs) 
(Hassel 2014, Thelen 2012). The issue at hand is the nature of institutional change 
these countries are undergoing and which are the actors sustaining this change. On 
the  one  hand,  there  is  an  emerging  stream  of  literature  calling  for  redressing 
theories of comparative political economies, recognising the common neo-liberal 
trajectory undertaken by all  advanced political  economies (Baccaro and Howell 
2011). According to liberalisation theorists, employers are increasingly departing 
from  the  post-war  compromise  between  labour  and  capital  and  increasingly 
challenging its institutional configurations (Streeck 2013). In these accounts, what 
has been known under the label of “coordination” was not a product of employers' 
search for economic efficiency, but something imposed to capital agents by virtue 
of the countervailing power exercised by labour and the state. Thus, under changed 
power relationship, employers cannot be expected to pursue voluntary coordination 
with  labour  but  will,  as  it  is  currently  happening,  escape  from  its  institutional 
configurations (Streeck 2009). On the contrary, a large bulk of literature is arguing 
that, far from being dismissed, coordination between employers and workers is still 
central for the comparative advantage of CMEs. What has changed, is the capacity 
of  these  institutions  (at  least  in  continental  political  economies)  to  provide 
egalitarian  outcomes  for  all  the  economy  (Thelen  2012).  According  to  these 
scholars, the old model is still fully in place in core sectors of CMEs, but at the 
expense of liberalisation at  the margins (Palier and Thelen 2010, Hassel 2014). 
Understanding how trade unions behave under vertical disintegration is key for this 
debate, because vertical disintegration has been considered a crucial instrument to 
draw new (and more dualistic) equilibria. However, if distinctions between core 
and peripheral  sectors,  as  I  hypothesise,  are  far  less stable  than the dualisation 
literature  suggests,  and  the  periphery  produces  competition  over  the  core,  the 
hypothesis of a long lasting equilibrium between core and peripheral sectors will be 
strongly undermined.
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1.2 Structure of the thesis
The  thesis  is  structured  as  follows.  The  next  chapter  reviews  the  literature 
concerning  trade  unions'  strategies  in  outsourcing  processes.  First,  we  identify 
which are the constituencies involved in processes of outsourcing. Secondly, we 
review the different responses given by trade unions when confronted with vertical 
disintegration and classify them on base of their inclusiveness. Lastly, we identify 
which  factors  have  been  considered  relevant  in  order  to  explain  trade  union 
orientation. On the one hand, we present theories based on trade unions' attempt to 
defend their  members.  These  theories  are  based  on the  presence  or  absence  of 
competition between internal and external workers. Other theories, instead, have 
highlighted  trade  union  ideology  and  trade  unions'  organisational  interests  as 
relevant variables for explaining trade unions' attitudes towards outsourcing. The 
literature  review enables  us  to  formulate  the  hypotheses  guiding  the  empirical 
research, which will be sketched out in the concluding paragraph of this chapter, 
and to identify proper cases for the analysis, as explained in the next chapter.
Chapter 3 discusses the case selection and the methodology used for the analysis. 
The research focuses on the behaviour of trade unions in two core sectors of the 
German economy: the chemical and the metal sectors. Germany is a crucial case 
for debates on trade unions and labour market segmentation. This for two reasons: 
First, Germany belongs to the cluster of continental market economies, which have 
been  said  to  be  particularly affected  by dualisation  (Emmenegger  et  al.  2012). 
Moreover, German trade unions (especially those representing core manufacturing 
workers) have been said to be particularly concentrated on insiders, because their 
membership composition is skewed to this group of workers (Palier and Thelen 
2010, Hassel 2014). Therefore, the German chemical and metal sectors are crucial 
cases for the dualisation literature. Moreover, the two sectors vary with regard to 
how outsourcing has taken place (concerning peripheral activities in the chemical 
and  both  peripheral  and  core  activities  in  the  metal  sector)  and  trade  unions' 
identities.
Since we are looking for identifying mechanisms driving trade unions to undertake 
more or less inclusive strategies towards non-core employees, we have chosen to 
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rely on a case study methodology. Even though this method does not provide for 
the possibility to develop generalisations beyond the cases at hand, it is particularly 
well  suited  for  shedding light  on causal  mechanisms.  Data  collection  has  been 
based  on  interviews  with  key  informants  (trade  unionists,  works  councillors, 
employers  and  officials  of  employers'  associations),  the  analysis  of  collective 
bargaining agreements and of secondary materials (like trade union newspapers, 
leaflets, etc.).
Chapter 4 and 5 present the empirical evidence. For each of the two sectors, we 
first  present  a  sectoral  analysis  describing  vertical  disintegration  patterns,  their 
effects on working conditions across different workforce groups and the way these 
processes  have  been  dealt  with  by  industrial  relation  actors.  Secondly,  we 
concentrate on specific plant level case studies. We identify which functions are 
performed by external workers (through outsourcing or the use of agency workers) 
and how they relate with functions performed by core workers; we reconstruct pay 
structures  between  different  workforce  groups;  we  map  how  workers' 
representatives at plant level have dealt with the issue of vertical disintegration and 
whether  and  how  it  has  been  regulated,  looking  at  the  specific  contents  of 
regulation in  order  to  identify the  concerns  and the motivations  underlying  the 
choices made by employees representatives.
Chapter 6 compares the two case studies. We show how both union identities and 
the presence or absence of competition between core and peripheral employees are 
important in order to understand the different approaches undertaken by workers' 
representatives in the chemical and metal sector with regard to the issue of external 
employment. Lastly, chapter 7 concludes highlighting the contribution of the study 
to the theories of industrial relations and comparative political economy.
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Chapter two
Inclusion and exclusion in segmented labour markets
As we have highlighted in the introduction, the issue of which constituencies do 
trade unions represent has acquired a new relevance within debates on trade unions' 
role  towards  atypical  and  precarious  workers.  Before  the  rise  of  atypical 
employment, the claim of trade unions “to be  representative of labour was rarely 
regarded sceptically” (Hyman 1992: 150). Surely, trade unions never represented 
all workers. This was evident both in terms of their agenda, which has (usually not 
explicitly)  reflected the interests  of specific segments of the workforce (Hyman 
1994:  121),  and of  membership  levels,  which  never  reached the  totality  of  the 
workforce (Regalia 2009: 43ff.). However, trade unions were generally considered 
as  being  the  “genuine  and  legitimate  intermediators  of  working-class  interests” 
(Hyman 1992: 150).
On the contrary,  today it  is  commonplace to  find in the literature contributions 
highlighting  the  presence  of  diverging  interests  within  the  working  class  and 
arguing that trade unions tend to represent solely the interests of a specific segment 
of  the  workforce.  Within  the  dualisation   literature,  the  divide  is  usually  set 
between so called  insiders (i.e. workers in a stable employment relationship with 
good working conditions and career prospects) and outsiders (usually defined as 
the  unemployed  or  precariously  employed)  (Schwander  and  Häusermann  2013, 
Rueda 20072). Other authors (Palier and Thelen 2010, Thelen 2012, Hassel 2014), 
instead,  have  identified  the  insider/outsider  divide  with  regard  to  different  job 
prospects  in  different  labour  market  segments.  Indeed,  they  have  identified  a 
2 Following the approach first developed by Lindbeck and Snower (1988) and extending it to 
include new forms of employment, these authors argue that the insider/outsider cleavage is 
“related to the unemployment vulnerability of different actors in the labour market” (Rueda 
2007). Indeed, according to Rueda, “insiders (are) workers with highly protected jobs and 
outsiders (are) either unemployed or in jobs characterised by low levels of protection and 
employment rights, lower salaries, and precarious levels of benefits and social security 
regulations” (Rueda 2007: 2).
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distinction between “core workers” belonging to the primary labour market (the 
insiders) and “peripheral workers” belonging to the secondary labour market (the 
outsiders)3. Still others identify different divides for defining insiders and outsiders, 
such as workers' ethnic origin (Emmenegger and Careja 2012) or gender (Kroos 
and Gottschall 2012). In all these cases trade unions are considered to represent the 
strongest part of the workforce (the insiders) at the expense of the weakest one (the 
outsiders), thereby strengthening, instead of mildering, labour market inequalities.
Trade unions' focus on insiders4 has been found to be differently strong in different 
institutional  systems  (Schwander  and  Haeusermann  2013),  but  it  is  held  as  a 
common feature in all advanced political economies. According to the dualisation 
literature, this is due to the fact that trade unions represent the interests of their 
current members, which are overwhelmingly represented among insiders (Rueda 
2007,  Palier  and Thelen  2010).  Still,  this  hypothesis  is  not  able  to  account  for 
examples of trade unions' attempts and efforts to include outsiders, especially in 
those cases  where membership composition is  strongly biased towards  insiders. 
Indeed,  several  scholars  have  highlighted  that  trade  unions'  strategies  are  not 
always purely sectionalist or segmentalist (Clegg et al. 2010, Clegg 2012, Benassi 
and Dorigatti in progress, Turner 2009), but may have also inclusive orientations 
towards outsiders. How can we explain these inclusive strategies?
We argue that the dualisation literature has adopted a too narrow understanding of 
the relationship between trade unions' membership composition and their strategic 
3 These authors rely on segmentation theories from the 1970s and early 1980s that have first 
pointed out the segmented nature of labour markets (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Berger and Piore 
1980, Reich et al. 1973). According to these theories, the labour market is divided into a primary 
segment (or internal labour market), where jobs are characterised by “relatively high wages, 
good working conditions, chances of advancement, (...) and above all, employment stability” 
(Piore 1975: 126), and a secondary segment (or external labour market). The latter is 
characterised by unstable, dead-end jobs, with low wage levels and poor career prospects. 
Segmentation is produced by mechanisms – such as job ladders, ports of entry and training 
programs – which insulate the primary or internal labour market from the external labour market 
and protects it from market fluctuations. Thereby, “in the primary (...) market, wages and 
promotion are governed by administrative work rules rather than market allocation mechanisms, 
whereas the secondary (...) market follows the rules of perfectly competitive markets” 
(Davidsson and Nackzyc 2009: 3).
4 As other have noted, the terms “insiders” and “outsiders” are problematic with regard to their 
conceptual and empirical specifications (see Pontusson 2013). However, I am not interested here 
in a clear identification of the two groups within particular national contexts. In this work I will 
use those terms solely in order to refer to the debate which sees a divide between trade unions' 
traditional constituencies and other groups of workers which have been considered as 
marginalised in trade unions' agendas (Rueda 2007, Ichino 2006).
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orientation,  one that implies  that trade unions'  actions are solely determined by 
their current membership composition. On the contrary, other factors may play a 
role in determining which constituencies will be represented by trade unions.
In the following paragraphs, we will highlight how this debate unfolds in cases of 
vertical disintegration. First, we sketch out why do we talk about constituencies in 
the case of vertical disintegration, i.e. which are the different groups of workers 
involved  and  how they are  affected  by outsourcing  and  subcontracting.  In  the 
second paragraph, we conceptualise the issue of trade union inclusiveness, review 
the literature on trade unions'  responses to vertical disintegration and categorise 
them with regard to their inclusiveness. The third paragraph  presents arguments 
related to why trade unions are expected to adopt an inclusive exclusive orientation 
towards peripheral workforce groups.
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify that this discussion adopts an approach 
which sees trade unions'  as strategic  actors  (Kochan et al.  1986),  i.e.  as  actors 
capable  of  undertaking choices  which  are  relevant  for  their  present  and future. 
Definitions  of  what  constitute  a  trade  union strategy have  been various.  In  his 
classical  book,  Regini  defines  trade  union  strategies  as  “the  bulk  of  the  final 
solutions given to the dilemma of trade union action” (Regini 1981: 21). Similarly, 
Boxall and Haynes define a strategy as  “a framework of critical enacted choices 
about the ends and means of an organisation” (Boxall and Haynes 1997: 567). This 
conception implies two important points. First, the idea that trade unions' behaviour 
is not the inevitable result of external factors, but that trade unions maintain a realm 
of autonomy in defining their behaviour. Indeed, even though trade unions do not 
operate in a vacuum, but within set external conditions which pose them challenges 
and offer them resources, the choices they make are not entirely determined by the 
external environment. On the contrary, these choices depend on decisions taken by 
the organisation in order to balance the costs and advantages of alternative options 
over trade unions goals and means (Zan 1992). Secondly, conceiving strategies as 
choices between and solutions to different dilemmas implies that they are never set 
once  and  for  all  (Regini  1981,  Zan  1992).  Indeed,  strategies  are  only  partial 
responses, which might be challenged and redefined as a consequence of changing 
circumstances. 
Still, this approach does not conceive choices as implying rational calculations as 
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in the “rational choice” approach. Indeed, limits to the exercise of pure rationality 
are at hand, which derive from limited capabilities of actors involved in the choice, 
stickiness  deriving  from past  choices  and  their  legacy  and  the  fact  that  these 
choices are framed within cultural and ideological lenses (Regini 1981: 32).
2.1. Of constituencies and outsourcing
In order to answer the question guiding this research, i.e. which constituencies do 
trade unions represent in cases of vertical disintegration, we have to examine the 
specific  dilemma  confronting  trade  unions  in  cases  of  outsourcing  and 
subcontracting.  A first issue we have to clarify is why do we talk about different 
constituencies  in  cases  of  outsourcing.  Talking  about  constituencies,  indeed, 
implies assuming the presence of different groups of people with different positions 
and interests. As already stressed in the introduction, the literature has generally 
highlighted the negative impact of vertical disintegration on labour (Doellgast and 
Greer 2007, Flecker et al.  2008). However, it  has also been highlighted that the 
effects  of  these  restructuring  processes  are  different  across  different  groups  of 
workers. Outsourcing and subcontracting have,  indeed, been associated with the 
fragmentation  of  employment  relationships  (Grimshaw  et  al.  2005),  the 
strengthening of labour market segmentation and the emergence of organisational 
insiders  and  outsiders  (Kalleberg  2003:  156)  or  of  two-tier  workforces 
(Marchington et al.  2005b: 283). But  in what sense may one argue that vertical 
disintegration produces a segmentation in working condition and the division of the 
workforce between insiders and outsiders?
Several authors have argued that the differentiation of working conditions between 
different groups of workers and across different firms is implicit in the process of 
outsourcing.  Indeed,  outsourcing and subcontracting imply a  redefinition of  the 
boundaries of an organisation and produces the transfer of jobs from the internal to 
the external labour market (MacKenzie 2000: 708, Berger and Piore 1980). If these 
two segments were relatively homogeneous in terms of wages, working conditions 
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and trade union presence, this transfer would not produce significant consequences 
in  terms  of  segmentation.  However,  organisational  boundaries  (as  well  as 
boundaries between countries or sectors) usually also define differentials in terms 
of  employment  conditions  (Flecker  2009:  254)  and  the  exploitation  of  these 
differentials “is one driving force behind restructuring” (Flecker 2009: 254, see 
also Doellgast and Greer 2007). Indeed, vertical disintegration is often “motivated 
by employers' interests of tapping into different market segments, where wages are 
at lower level”5 (Rubery 2007: 9). Indeed, jobs are usually transferred from a core 
of well organised firms to a periphery of poorly organised and poorly regulated 
firms, where wage levels and working conditions are much lower (Doellgast and 
Greer  2007) and trade  unions  weaker  or  unexistent.  Furthermore,  a  part  of  the 
industries where these jobs are transferred (such as the industrial service industry, 
the call centre industry, etc.) have been established only recently and thus, often 
lack  institutionalised  systems  of  industrial  relations,  such  as  sectoral  collective 
agreements or trade union presence (Doellgast 2009, Nicklich and Helfen 2013). In 
these cases, employment relations are governed by minimum requirements set by 
law  and  individual  bargaining,  since  collective  bargaining  is  not  established 
(Caprile 2000, Doellgast 2012). Thus, “restructuring across the value chain makes 
use  of,  and  simultaneously  creates,  segmented  labour  markets”  (Flecker  2009: 
253).  In these cases, outsourcing and subcontracting produce a differentiation of 
working conditions between those workers who remain within the contracting out 
company and those who are transferred.
Regulation at  European and national  level  partially protects  transferred workers 
from  a  deterioration  in  wages  and  working  conditions.  The  European  Union 
directive on the transfer of undertakings, indeed, guarantees transferred workers the 
maintenance of their terms and conditions of employment in the event of a transfer 
of the undertaking in which they are employed (Caprile 2000). This directive aims 
at  mitigating negative  effects  on  workers  and  at  limiting  the  possibility  for 
employers to rely on outsourcing in order to redefine conditions of employment for 
their employees. Furthermore, it “partially prevent(s) the transfer from generating 
5 Cost-cutting is the most important motivations behind outsourcing decisions (Young 2008). 
However, where other restructuring motivations prevail, such as it is often the case for IT 
services, outsourcing may not have the same negative consequences on employment as in the 
case of other business functions (Flecker 2009: 260).
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inequalities between these workers and those that stay in the transferor company” 
(Caprile 2000). Still, the directive protects solely acquired rights, not preventing a 
differentiation in working conditions to develop over time (as a consequence, for 
example,  of  subsequent  negotiations  taking  place  in  the  original  company). 
Furthermore, the protection of acquired rights may be limited in time (in several 
countries, such as Germany, for example, the guarantee is extended for solely one 
year,  see  Caprile  2000).  Moreover,  being  conceptualised  as  the  protection  of 
acquired  rights,  this  directive  does  not  cover  the  remaining  current  or  future 
workforce  of  the  company  where  workers  are  transferred.  As  a  consequence, 
employees  working  in  the  same  company  may  underlie  different  terms  and 
conditions  of  employment.  As  noted  by  Caprile,  “by  avoiding  one  form  of 
fragmentation, another has been created” (Caprile 2000).
However, outsourcing and subcontracting may not imply the transfer of employees 
from a company to another, but simply the contracting out of jobs which will be 
taken up by new workers. Thus, this process does not produce, per se, a worsening 
of working conditions for the workers involved. Still, these forms of organisational 
restructuring  may  produce  a  deterioration  in  the  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment for functions once performed in-house and produce a growing bulk of 
poorly paid jobs. The issue of working conditions in the industries where work is 
transferred  as  a  consequence  of  restructuring  processes  is  another  point  in 
identifying  the  constituencies  involved  in  vertical  disintegration.  Vertical 
disintegration  processes  such  as  outsourcing  and  subcontracting  have,  indeed, 
contributed  to  the   growth  of  new low-wage  sectors  within  advanced  political 
economies  (Gautié  and Schmidt  2010,  Wills  2009).  As we have  already noted, 
industries such as the catering, cleaning or logistics industry, which provide other 
industries  with  functions  once  performed  in-house,  show  significantly  worse 
employment  conditions  than  contracting  out  industries.  Moreover,  value  chain 
configurations  may  further  strengthen  these  negative  characteristics.  The 
introduction of market-like mechanisms in place of hierarchical relationships (as 
produced  by  the  reliance  on  contractors  rather  than  the  internal  provision  of 
functions) often increases the capacity of lead firms to extract lower prices from 
their  suppliers  (Appay  1998).  This  translates  into  lower  profit  margins  for 
contractors, often passed down on the workforce in terms of lower-wages and more 
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precarious  working  conditions.  Lastly,  these  configurations  may undermine  the 
possibility  for  workers  to  exercise  their  voice.  This  may happen  not  just  as  a 
consequence of a weaker trade union presence in these industries, but also of the 
triangular structure of the employment relationship within networks of clients and 
subcontractors, which disconnects workers from those who really determine their 
terms and conditions of employment (Marchington et al. 2005b: 239ff.).
Thus,  two lines of demarcation seem to emerge from this analysis.  A first  one, 
between  those  workers  remaining  within  the  organisation  and  those  who  are 
transferred.  And a second one, between workers coming from and/or remaining 
into the incumbent organisation and those employed by subcontractors. From the 
above reviewed literature, thus, we can derive the assumption that these groups of 
workers are likely to have different interests: Outsourced workers have the interest 
of  maintaining  their  terms  and  conditions  of  employment  and  to  be  granted 
occupational  security  after  being  transferred.  Subcontracted  workers  have  the 
interests in good working conditions and avoiding the risk of losing their jobs at 
every new round of subcontracting (Méhaut et al. 2010: 339).
More  ambiguous  are  the  interests  of  workers  remaining  in  the  incumbent 
organisation.  On  the  one  hand,  vertical  disintegration  may  question  the 
employment security of workers employed in contracting out companies and may 
weaken their  bargaining power by producing pressures for concessions (Flecker 
2009: 251). This should give rise to a negative attitude of internal workers towards 
outsourcing. On the other hand, however, outsourcing may also be used in order to 
shelter core employees and their employment conditions. This may take place in an 
indirect  or  direct  manner.  Outsourcing  has  sometimes  been  considered  as  an 
instrument  for  bypassing existing restrictions  or  rigidities  in  the internal  labour 
market. Indeed, the strength of a specific workforce and the rigidities imposed by 
its collective action (such as, for example, with regard to limitations on work in 
unsocial hours or in flexibility demands) has often had the unintended consequence 
of employers' searching for alternative routes to achieve their goals (Berger and 
Piore 1980). Thus, the use of external workers may be an instrument for bypassing 
resistance  among  the  internal  workforce  without  entering  into  an  explicit 
counterposition over specific issues. The unwillingness of the core workforce to 
accept concessions may, thus, indirectly produce negative consequences on other 
21
groups of workers, by resulting in the creation of a bulk of workers who have to 
undertake  what  the  internal  workforce  refuses  to  do (Ballarino  2005:  180). 
However,  this  clash of interests may also take place more directly,  as a way to 
protect core workers. In these cases, outsourcing may explicitly enter negotiations 
between  workers  and  managers  and  be  used  as  “bargaining  chip”.  Indeed, 
outsourcing may be conceived as an alternative to concessions that would directly 
affect the pay and working conditions of the internal workforce or as instrument to 
enhance their job security by constructing an external buffer to cope with market 
fluctuation (Doellgast and Greer 2007: 63).
Thus, the interrelationship existing between these workforce segments points not 
only  towards  the  existence  of  different  interest  constellations  among  these 
workforce  segments,  but  also  of  possible  interest  conflicts.  Do  trade  unions 
reconcile these different interests or do they give priority to one specific group?
This question is further complicated by the fact that outsourcing and subcontracting 
often crosses the boundaries of trade union representation.  As it is well  known, 
trade unions in Western Europe have historically organised around the principle of 
industrial  unionism,  according  to  which  all  workers  within  an  industry  are 
organised  by  a  trade  union,  independently  from  their  status  or  occupational 
differences (Visser 2012). Accordingly, the organising principle of industrial unions 
has  been  “one  company,  one  trade  union”.  By  moving  jobs  across  industrial 
boundaries and giving rise to multi-enterprise settings where employers belonging 
to different sectors coexist, however, outsourcing strongly questions this principle. 
Thus, the three above mentioned constituencies may fall under the representation 
domain different trade unions. As other have noted, this fact does not in principle 
imply any problem for the representation of workers' interests (Doellgast and Greer 
2007). However, as we have seen, this is often not the case, since both trade union 
presence and its effectiveness worsen moving down the value chain (Appay 1998). 
Outsourcing, thus, may translate into the fragmentation of employees' possibilities 
to exercise their voice (Marchington et al. 2005b: 239ff.). A lack of intervention on 
behalf of trade unions representing sectors where firms subcontract part of their 
activities over workers employed by subcontractors may, thus, reflect not so much 
distinct  representation  domains,  but  a  (more  or  less  explicit)  exclusive  attitude 
towards those workers.
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2.2. What do trade unions do under vertical disintegration?
From the literature we have reviewed in the previous paragraph, we can identify 
three different constituencies affected by vertical disintegration processes: workers 
remaining in the incumbent organisation, workers transferred from the incumbent 
to the subcontractor and workers employed by subcontractors. We have now to turn 
to the central question of our research: who is represented by trade unions? How 
can we categorise trade unions' strategies in terms of their inclusiveness?
In order to understand this problem, we have to clarify two issues. First, we have to 
conceptualise what does it mean for trade unions to be inclusive. Second, we have 
to  review the  possible  answers  given by trade  unions  to  vertical  disintegration 
processes and categorise them with regard to their inclusiveness.
It is important to notice, in order to assess unions'  inclusiveness, that initiatives 
aimed  at  tackling  the  effects  of  outsourcing  and  the  problems  that  new  inter-
organisational relationship produce on labour may be undertaken not just at the top 
of the value chain, but also at the bottom. Indeed, initiatives to improve working 
conditions  at  subcontractors  have  been  organised  by  trade  unions  representing 
workers in subcontracted sectors, such as cleaning or catering6 (Wills 2009). Still, 
since we are interested in the relationship between organisational restructuring and 
trade unions' inclusiveness, it is important to look at trade unions' strategies at the 
top of the value chain, i.e. where outsourcing takes place and trade unions have the 
possibility to influence its outcomes. The fact that other unions may take up the 
issue of regulation when outsourcing has already taken place and its effects have 
displaced over workers, indeed, does not change the inclusive or exclusive attitudes 
of trade unions representing core workers.
6 Some of these campaigns, such as the Justice for Janitors campaign of the American Service 
Employees International Union in the janitorial industry, have become paramount examples of 
trade union innovative initiatives in low-wage sectors (Savage 2006, Waldinger et al. 1998). 
They have acquired particular evidence because they have  targeted contractors, rather than 
direct employers, pointing out the need for labour to move collective bargaining targets in 
accordance with predominant modes of organisation of inter-firm relations and new contracting 
systems. Furthermore, they have highlighted labours' need to ally with other actors in order to 
build power in those industries where workers are less powerful on the labour market (Wills 
2009).
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2.2.1. How can we measure inclusiveness?
The issue of inclusion and exclusion in trade unions' behaviour towards specific 
groups of employees has usually been dealt with by looking at their organisation 
level. Differentials in the propensity of trade unions to include different groups of 
workers  within  their  representation  realms  are,  indeed,  usually  measured  by 
focusing  on  density  levels  of  the  respective  groups  (Ebbinghaus  et  al.  2008, 
Davidsson and Nackzyc 2009: 5). Thus, for example, Ebbinghaus et al. argue that 
“the unionisation level as the share of employees that belong to a trade union, is an 
important indicator of the inclusion and exclusion of interest groups (….) into the 
system of trade union representation” (Ebbinghaus et al. 2008: 1).
However,  this  measure  has  often  been  considered  inappropriate  (Regalia  2009: 
47ff.,  Benassi  and  Vlandas  2013).  First,  trade  union  membership  and  its 
representation  capacity  do  not  coincide  (Regalia  2009:  47ff.).  As  Regalia  has 
argued,  membership  levels  “do  not  indicate  so  much  trade  unions'  capacity  to 
represent,  but workers'  propensity or interest  in joining a trade union” (Regalia 
2009: 47). Thus, density levels may reflect different selective incentives for joining 
a trade union and not so much the fact that a trade union includes a workers' group 
into its representation domain.
Second, the extent to which unions can influence wages and working conditions of 
specific workforce groups does not only depend on union membership. The classic 
example  is  the  French  one,  where  trade  unions  organise  less  than  10% of  the 
workforce,  but  their  collective  agreements  affect  the  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment of around 90% of dependent workers through institutional extension 
mechanisms (Visser  2006:  46).  Thus,  trade  unions  might  perform functions  for 
specific groups of employees even if they are not members of the union. Vice-
versa, even within a trade union membership, there might be constituencies which 
receive a higher priority, while other might be subordinated or disregarded (Hyman 
1994). Moreover, since outsourcing often entails a crossing of the boundaries of 
trade unions'  organisational  domains,  it  might  be the case that  a  specific  union 
cannot organise a particular group of the workforce. Still,  it  might operate in a 
manner to influence its working conditions in a positive or negative way.
Therefore, rather than looking at the membership indicator, it might be more useful 
to look at other dimensions for understanding trade unions' inclusiveness towards 
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specific groups of the workforce.  A model in this  sense is  Heery's  typology of 
different  union  strategies  towards  contingent  workers.  Heery  defines  unions 
inclusiveness  as the sum of  three different  dimensions:  internal  representation, 
external representation and legitimacy of interests (Heery 2009: 431). The first one, 
internal representation, is the closest to the traditional membership dimension, but 
it analyses contingent workers' participation possibilities in a more detailed manner. 
Indeed,  internal  representation  focuses  on  membership  rules  and  organisational 
arrangements for defining contingent workers' participation in a union's governance 
and  life  (Heery 2009:  430).  External  representation,  instead,  concentrates  on  a 
union's  collective  bargaining  strategy,  its  use  of  legal  instruments  and  other 
attempts  to  regulate  the  employment  relationship  of  contingent  workers  (Heery 
2009:  430).  Lastly,  the latter  dimension focuses on trade unions'  recognition of 
contingent workers' specific interests and the legitimacy accorded to them (Heery 
2009:  430).  With  regard  to  our  specific  research  question,  it  is  the  second 
dimension, as we will see, to be of particular relevance.
2.2.2. Different responses to vertical disintegration?
It is useful, now, to review what previous studies have identified as trade unions' 
possible  responses  in  cases  of  vertical  disintegration.  I  have  grouped  possible 
answers into six broad categories: inaction or acceptance of outsourcing, ban on 
outsourcing, development of alternative measures, defence of employment levels 
and  working  conditions  in  cases  of  transfer  of  undertakings,  extension  of 
regulation, and organising. Of course, these answers are not mutually exclusive and 
more than one strategy can be deployed at the same time.
Inaction or accepting outsourcing
Employees' representatives can respond to vertical disintegration processes both in 
a  passive  and  in  an  active  manner.  A first  possible  answer  highlighted  by  the 
literature  is,  thus,  inaction.  Indeed,  a  large  bulk  literature  concerned  with 
organisational  restructuring  has  argued  that  the  influence  of  trade  unions  over 
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managerial restructuring decisions is strongly limited (Behrens and Kaedtler 2008, 
Caprile 2000, Meil et al. 2009). Indeed, employees' rights to influence managerial 
decisions with regard to vertical  disintegration processes are very narrow, since 
matters  such  as  subcontracting  and  outsourcing  often  fall  into  the  realm  of 
managerial freedom (Caprile 2000). Moreover, one can find no responses in cases 
where employees' representation is too weak or non existent (Meil et al. 2009: 68).
Inaction, can, however, also have an active dimension. In some cases, indeed, this 
attitude  may derive  not  so  much from a  lack  of  power,  but  hide  an  exclusive 
orientation of workers' representatives, one which is concentrated exclusively on 
the  defence  of  core  workers.  Indeed,  outsourcing  might  be  accepted  (and  thus 
require no intervention on behalf of workers' representatives) as an instrument for 
avoiding concessions for the core workforce. As argued by Doellgast and Greer, for 
example, works councils' response to employers pressures for cost containment at 
Vodafone  was  to  accept  the  outsourcing  of  seasonal  peaks  to  cheaper  external 
vendors (Doellgast and Greer 2007: 63). Similarly, under pressure of the economic 
crisis  that affected the industry,  the Finnish Paper  Workers'  Union accepted the 
outsourcing of cleaning activities in order to retain competitiveness of paper plants 
without  entering  into  discussions  over  the  terms  of  employment  of  production 
workers (Jonker-Hoffren 2011: 382). Often, such a strategy comes together with an 
assurance on behalf of employers on  investment or employment volumes, or job 
security for the core workforce (Palier and Thelen 2010).
At the base of active reactions to vertical disintegration is often the negotiation 
(sometimes not even connected to specific outsourcing processes) of more or less 
detailed information and consultation rights. They often constitute a prerequisite of 
employees'  representatives'  engagement  and  involvement  into  outsourcing 
decisions. Thus, several collective agreements entail provisions ensuring a timing 
information of workers' representatives in cases of outsourcing (Jalette and Warrian 
2002).
Restricting outsourcing
In  some  cases,  unions  have  tried  to  adopt  strategies  to  restrict  outsourcing. 
Sometimes  this  has  taken  place  through  mobilisation  strategies  (Pulignano  and 
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Stewart  2013),  which,  in some cases,  have involved the adoption of innovative 
forms of action. Foster and Scott, for example, account of the adoption of social 
movement style tactics to counter outsourcing in the public sector in the US and the 
construction of alliances with consumers (Foster and Scott 1998).
In  other  cases,  a  ban  on  outsourcing  has  been  introduced  into  collective 
agreements.  Rarely  however,  a  complete  outsourcing  ban  has  been  negotiated. 
More  often,  trade  unions  have  bargained  non-outsourcing  clauses  for  some 
segments  of  the  production  process,  usually  work  currently  or  historically 
performed by internal employees or which is very close to their tasks (Jalette and 
Warrian 2002: 68, Pulignano 2005: 150). For example, the collective agreement of 
the  Italian  metal  sector  impedes  employers  to  outsource  core  functions  and 
ordinary  maintenance  of  plant  facilities  (Pulignano  2005:  160,  Izzi  2010). In 
Canada, the Canadian Auto Workers developed the concept of “work ownership” 
according to which “work we had done historically belonged to us and could no 
longer  be  unilaterally outsourced by management”  (CAW 1996,  cit.  in  Holmes 
2004: 16). This idea radically changed traditional union/management relationship, 
since it  questioned management's  right to manage, one of the landmarks of the 
American Fordist compromise.
In  other  cases,  restrictions  on  outsourcing  have  been  placed  in  order  to  limit 
outsourcing to specific circumstances (such as production peaks, and personnel or 
skill deficit) or to specific procedures (with, for example, a managerial obligations 
to inform workers' representatives in due time of an outsourcing decision) (Jalette 
and Warrian 2002: 68).
Developing alternative measures
Another  option  has  been  for  workers  representatives  to  get  involved  into 
managerial  decisions  by developing alternative options  to  proposed outsourcing 
plans. This strategy entails that workers' representatives challenge management on 
its own terrain, namely that of economic efficiency. Indeed, this strategic approach 
to  outsourcing  entails  that  trade  unions  “engage  in  negotiations  on  strategic 
decisions  regarding  work  and  company  organisation,  products  and  markets” 
(Haipeter  2013:  46),  rather  than  just  dealing  with  the  social  consequences  of 
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organisational restructuring. The key backdrop of this strategy is that employers 
have multiple roads for being competitive and that not always the one proposed by 
the management is the most effective. Indeed, while outsourcing is generally based 
on a cost-cutting approach, employees' led alternatives tend to emphasise the “high 
road”  options  for  a  company's  competitiveness,  proposing  organisational 
innovations which make in-house production economically superior to outsourcing 
and offshoring.
One case in point is the IG Metall “Better not cheaper” campaign developed in 
2004  in  the  district  of  Nordrhein-Westfahlen  and  since  then  on  developed  at 
national  level.  In  this  case,  the  union  has  developed  specific  projects,  largely 
founded  by  the  regional  or  federal  government,  for  assisting  plant  level 
representatives in their activities. These initiatives aimed at developing skills and 
competence  in  economic  matters  through  workshops  and  branch  research,  the 
construction  of  networks  of  union-oriented  consultants  and  academics,  the 
identification and dissemination of best-practices (Haipeter 2013: 46). Alternative 
proposals  often  regarded  organisational  innovations,  rarely  process  or  product 
innovation.  They  ranged  from  productivity  programs,  new  wage  structures, 
decentralisation in the organisation decision making process and the introduction of 
teamwork (Haipeter 2013: 50).
In other  cases,  the development  of  alternative solutions has  gone together  with 
trade unions' and workers representatives' acceptance of concessions. In this cases, 
employees' representatives try to affect managerial sourcing decisions by accepting 
“means of change which reduce costs or improve revenues” (Helper 1990: 94) or 
by  granting concessions on  wages or other terms of employment  that reduce the 
cost  and  flexibility  differences  between  in-house  and  third-party  workers 
(Doellgast and Greer 2007: 64). These strategies are geared towards the willingness 
to avoid outsourcing or to bring work back in-house. In how far, however,  that 
these  options  constitute  alternative  solutions  or  the  simple  result  of  a  loss  of 
bargaining power is strongly questionable.
Defending employment levels and working conditions
Another strategy has been geared towards the goal of defending working conditions 
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of outsourced workers, by maintaining unchanged previous employment conditions 
(Helper 1990, Meil et al. 2009: 68). In this case, unions accept outsourcing and 
negotiate on the effects of restructuring measures on workers. This strategy is quite 
common in cases of transfer of undertakings, as an instrument to  protect former 
workers  of  the  subcontracting  company  (Caprile  2000).  As  we have  seen,  this 
strategy may produce new forms of fragmentation,  since it  concentrates  on the 
maintenance of terms and conditions for transferred workers, independently from 
the employment conditions of other workers employed in the new company (Meil 
et al. 2009: 68).
Employment  security  might  involve  the  construction  of  specific  organisational 
structures where redundant employees might be employed. These structures, like 
the Job Opportunity Bank-Security (JOBS) Program negotiated by the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) during restructuring at the so called “Big Three” (Helper 1990: 
93ff.),  aim  at  ensuring  employment  levels,  while  at  the  same  time  allowing 
employers a flexible management of the workforce. During the phase of massive 
restructuring undertaken by the biggest American automakers, the UAW negotiated 
an initial “secured employment level”, whereby all workers with more than a year 
job seniority could not be laid off. Workers which were no more directly needed in 
production were placed in the JOBS Bank at full pay and with no loss of seniority.  
Employees  in  the JOBS Bank might  receive training,  substitute  for  workers on 
leave or be assigned to other tasks (Helper 1990: 93).
Extending regulation
More difficult  is for trade unions to maintain working conditions when vertical 
disintegration  does  not  derive  from  the  transfer  of  internal  employees  to  the 
outside, but from new inter-organisational contracting agreements. In these cases, 
no  legal  provisions  are  available  for  guaranteeing  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment.
In  some  cases,  trade  unions  have  tried  to  extend  collective  agreements  and 
representation  structures  to  subcontractors  (Doellgast  and  Greer  2007:  64). 
Sometimes,  trade  unions  have  introduced provisions  in  their  sectoral  collective 
agreements, setting the obligation for the management to contract work out solely 
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to  companies  applying  a  collective  agreement  (of  the  same or  other  branches) 
(Jalette  and  Warrian  2002:  69).  This,  for  example,  is  the  case  of  the  national 
collective  agreement  of  the  metalworkers  industry  in  Italy,  which  sets  that 
subcontractors have to apply the collective agreement of the respective branch. In 
other  cases,  extension  mechanisms  have  been  bargained  at  plant  level  through 
agreements that protect working conditions for outsourced workers by enlarging 
the field of application of collective agreements. At Fiat, workers' representatives 
have extended the application of the metalworkers' collective agreement and other 
collective agreements regulating employment conditions for Fiat employees to the 
subcontractors  (Pulignano  2005:  167).  In  Canada,  the  Canadian  Auto  Workers 
developed the new collective bargaining concept of “satellite bargaining”, whereby 
the union has negotiated a clause which extends collective bargaining provisions of 
the main company to subcontractors “as if they were part of the same company” 
(Holmes  2004:  17).  The  representation  domain  of  the  union  was,  thus,  shifted 
“from the legal entity of the company, to a definition based on the structure of 
integrated production” (Holmes 2004: 17). In this sense, thus, the union's response 
to outsourcing was to redefine the scale at which collective bargaining takes place, 
following the redefinition of how production is  organised.  In other  cases,  trade 
unions  have  influenced  the  allocation  of  work  by  ensuring  that  work  was 
subcontracted  to  unionised  companies  (MacKenzie  2009:  550,  Grimshaw et  al. 
2005: 283).
Other contributions have pointed out that trade unions have struggled to “safeguard 
the  effectiveness  of  trade  union  representation”  (Pulignano  2005:  168)  by 
developing structures of representation extending over multiple employers. At Fiat, 
for example, the outsourcing of some service functions to external companies and 
the growth of  in-house outsourcing was accompanied  with  the  definition  of  an 
horizontal representation structure (a “site committe”,  comitato di sito) ensuring 
coordination among workers employed by the main company and those employed 
by suppliers (Pulignano 2005: 168). This structure identified “the production unit 
as  the  main  basis  for  collective  action”  (Pulignano  2005:  168)  and  collective 
representation. Similar is the case of Iveco (a truck manufacturer belonging to the 
Fiat group), where workers' representatives bargained the introduction of a specific 
structure for representing all  workers on the site,  irrespectively from their  legal 
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employer  (Piotto  2001).  These  examples  constitute  instances  of  trade  unions 
attempts to adapt the structures of collective bargaining and interest representation 
to companies' new inter-organisational relationships. In all these cases, employees' 
representatives exploit the bargaining strength of workers located at the top of the 
value chain in order to influence working conditions and employees' possibility to 
exercise their voice at the bottom of the value chain.
Organising
Another response undertaken by workers' representatives in core sectors has been 
to start organising drives in order to recruit workers in supplier companies and to 
regulate their working conditions (Holmes 2004: 17ff., Doellgast and Greer 2007: 
69, Rutherford and Gerteler 2002: 210). In some cases unions have exploited their 
power  position  in  core  firms  in  order  to  facilitate  these  organising  drives  by 
bargaining favourable agreements with lead firms in the form of code of conducts 
(Holmes  2004:  17).  In  several  cases  these  agreements  have  set  an  explicit 
obligation on behalf of core firms to require that their supplier have “responsible 
labour relations” and recognise trade unions (CAW 1996, cit. in Holmes 2004: 17) 
in order to enter a contracting relationship (see also Rutherford and Gertler 2002: 
201). This meant ensuring neutrality, basic workers' rights and successors rights in 
cases  of  change of  ownership.  According to  Holmes,  core  firms'  acceptance  to 
introduce  such  clauses  in  sub-contracting  agreements  has  been  facilitated  by 
employers'  willingness  to  prevent  disruptions  caused by labour  conflicts  within 
value chains organised on just-in-time principles (Holmes 2004: 17).
Sometimes, the effort to organise subcontractors has triggered cooperation between 
unions  representing  different  sectors,  but  in  other  cases  this  has  opened  up 
problems of  competition,  with  different  unions  claiming responsibility  over  the 
same company. In some cases, these problems have been overcome by horizontal 
trade unions' structures (the national or local confederations), which have acquired 
a new role in collective bargaining. This has happened not just in cases, such as the 
Italian one, where horizontal structures have historically played a crucial role in the 
definition  of  trade  unions'  bargaining  agendas,  but  also  in  those  institutional 
settings where vertical unions have traditionally played an overarching role. A case 
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in point, for example, is the German one. In order to regulate the temporary agency 
sector, which crosses sectoral and trade union representation boundaries, the unions 
belonging  to  the  German  Confederation  of  Trade  Unions  (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund,  DGB)  have  set  up  a  bargaining  commission  composed  by 
representatives of all DGB unions and led by the central confederation, which is in 
charge of negotiating a collective agreement for the sector (Vitols 2008: 197ff.). 
This is an unicum in the history of the German industrial relations, because the 
DGB has never had competences in collective bargaining, which was reserved to 
industrial unions (Dribbusch and Birke 2012). 
2.2.3. Defining inclusiveness in cases of outsourcing
It  is  useful  now  to  look  at  the  above  mentioned  strategies  in  terms  of  their 
inclusiveness  towards  different  constituencies.  As  we  have  highlighted  in  the 
previous paragraph, three are the groups usually involved in outsourcing: workers 
in  the  core  firm  which  remain  in  the  organisation,  transferred  employees  and 
employees of subcontractors/other organisations. As we have seen, what is at hand 
in  processes  of  outsourcing  (and  might  be  regulated  by  trade  unions)  is  the 
segmentation of working conditions between different groups of workers and the 
weakening of institutions for the representation of employees.
Thu, we can argue that, in this case, inclusiveness refers to two dimensions: the 
broadness of trade unions' strategies towards outsourcing and the resulting level of 
segmentation in wages and working conditions. As for the first dimension, the issue 
relates to who is included into the union constituency, i.e. whether trade unions 
strategies  direct  solely to  core  workers  remaining  in  the  firm (for  example  by 
bargaining  provisions  avoiding  negative  consequences  of  outsourcing  for  this 
group  of  workers),  whether  they  cover  transferred  workers  (for  example  by 
defending  employment  levels  and  working  conditions  during  the  transfer)  or 
whether  they  extend  to  the  outside  of  the  organisation  by  following  new 
organisational configurations (such as in the cases of unions organising suppliers or 
constructing  new  structures  of  representation).  The  second  dimension  relates, 
instead,  to  the  effects  of  this  inclusion,  i.e.  whether  trade  unions'  intervention 
32
produces  homogeneous  or  segmented  working  conditions  between  the  three 
different  workforce  groups.  Here,  the  possible  options  may  be  ranged  on  a 
continuum  from  full  parity  (or  higher  wages)  to  lower  ones.  Internal 
differentiations range from different provisions set by the same union (such as in 
the  case  of  concessions  for  avoiding  outsourcing)  to  the  adoption  of  another 
collective agreement until the lack of any collective regulation. Usually these two 
dimensions move together, with more inclusive strategies usually resulting in lower 
segmentation. 
Looking at the above mentioned responses, one can clearly see that some of them 
refer  to  the  inside of  the  firm,  while  others  to  the outside.  Indeed,  the  ban on 
outsourcing,  the defence of employment levels,  in-sourcing strategies all  aim at 
protecting internal employees from the negative consequences of outsourcing. On 
the contrary, the definition of extension mechanisms for collective agreements and 
representation structures and strategies aimed at organising subcontractors refer to 
the  outside  of  the  firm.  Indeed,  they  identify  mechanisms  to  regulate  working 
conditions  of  external  employees  and,  thereby,  to  influence  the  external 
consequences of outsourcing.
Expectations over the kind of strategies developed by trade unions have looked at 
which are the prioritised constituencies.  In the next  paragraph,  we will  analyse 
which factors have been considered important in order to explain the one or the 
other inclination.
2.3. Why are trade unions inclusive or not?
We have now to clarify the reasons why do trade unions define their constituencies 
in a broader or narrower manner. In order to disentangle how do trade unions set 
their boundaries, we have, first, to examine what are the ends and means of trade 
unions. This  means  examining  one  of  the  crucial  questions  in  the  research  on 
labour movements, namely what are trade unions for? 
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2.3.1. Defending members' interests
Being representative organisation freely constituted by workers, the first response 
to this question would be “to represent their members' interests” (Flanders 1970). 
The  focus  on  members'  interests  is  the  common  departure  of  several  current 
debates  looking  at  the  relationship  between  trade  unions'  strategies  and  their 
membership composition. According to the dualisation literature, “unions protect 
their  members  against  employer  demands  while  ignoring  the  interests  of  non-
members” (Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013: 340). Thus, trade unions' strategies 
reflect the interests of the “median union member”7 (Baccaro 2008: 4). According 
to  this  literature  stream,  trade  unions'  focus  on  the  defence  of  their  members' 
interests has progressively diminished their capacity to represent the working class 
as a whole and produced the exclusion of some workforce groups (typically young 
workers,  workers  in  non-standard  forms  of  employment,  women  and  migrant 
workers) from their representation domain (Rueda 2007). This tendency towards a 
more  exclusive  representation  is  caused  by two  parallel  developments.  First,  a 
progressive disarticulation and differentiation of interests within the working class, 
with  a  polarisation  between  the  interests  of  insiders  and  those  of  outsiders. 
Secondly,  the  concentration  of  trade  union  membership  in  specific  workforce 
segments, usually the relatively better off (see Pontusson 2013, Iversen and Soskice 
2009, Baccaro 2008). With the large bulk of trade union members progressively 
distancing from non-members in terms of economic position and, thus, material 
interests, this is the argument advanced by the dualisation literature, trade unions 
have started to represent less and less the totality of the working class and have 
become the representatives of a modern aristocracy of labour (Pontusson 2013: 23) 
made up of workers in stable employment relationships.
A milder version of this explanation introduces the issue of the external context in 
order to account for unions' exclusionary attitudes. According to several authors, 
the  latter  are  to  be  conceived  as  “second-best  solutions”  (Davidsson  and 
7 This is why this literature expects more encompassing trade unions (such as those belonging to 
the Scandinavian cluster, see Ebbinghaus 2006) to adopt more inclusive strategies. Since these 
trade unions also organise outsiders, they have to reconcile insider and outsider interests within 
their agenda and, thus, adopt more solidaristic bargaining policies (Davidsson and Emmenegger 
2013: 344). Obinger et al, for example, argue that “encompassing labour organisations transcend 
particular interests and thus have an incentive to speak on behalf of outsiders” (Obinger et al. 
2011: 177).
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Emmenegger 2012: 339) in a situation where trade unions are unable to continue 
their  function  as  representatives  of  general  workers'  interests.  Declining  union 
power and a situation of both economic and political pressure have exacerbated 
“tendencies of social closure on the part of the well-organised” (Hyman 1992: 152) 
and strengthened the appeal of particularistic solutions. Being unable to give an 
adequate  response  to  all  interests,  trade  unions  came  to  prioritise  their  core 
constituency, defending their acquired rights and letting outsiders bear the negative 
costs of adjustment (Palier and Thelen 2010, Hassel 2014). Still, the reasoning is 
quite similar and based on the same premises: interests between core and peripheral 
workers are diverging and unions prioritise the former because they constitute the 
large bulk of their members.
With regard to the specific issue at hand, namely the behaviour adopted by trade 
unions in core sectors when confronted with outsourcing, this literature predicts 
trade unions to concentrate on the interests of core workers (usually located in large 
manufacturing  firms  and  in  the  public  sector).  According  to  these  scholars, 
pressured  by  employers'  requests  for  reducing  production  costs  and  increasing 
flexibility  in  tighter  international  markets,  trade  unions  in  core  sectors  have 
accepted  managerial  strategies  for  cost-cutting  and  flexibility  enhancing  at  the 
periphery of the labour market, via outsourcing and the use of non-standard forms 
of employment. Thereby, they have allowed the growth of a bulk of peripheral (and 
poorly paid) jobs in private services, which have to bear  all the negative costs of 
employers' flexibility and cost-cutting requests8 (Palier and Thelen 2010, Hassel 
2014). Indeed, according to Hassel, firms in core sectors have “actively pursued a 
strategy of separation of the workforce,  which divided employees into core and 
fringe workers” (Hassel 2014: 3). This has taken place with the consent of workers' 
representatives  in  core  plants,  which  accepted  these  measures  in  a  scramble  to 
secure  the  competitiveness  of  their  companies  (and,  thereby,  their  members' 
8 This hypothesis has been borrowed by labour market segmentation theories first advanced in the 
1970s and 1980s (Palier and Thelen 2010: 120). According to Berger and Piore, for example, 
employers' attempts to respond to the uncertainties emanating from the market or, in some cases, 
the upsurge in labour militancy may produce the segmentation of the labour market into a 
primary and a secondary segment (Berger and Piore 1980). By moving jobs out of the highly 
regulated primary sector to the secondary one employers attempt to escape from the rigidities of 
internal labour markets and to gain more flexibility (Berger and Piore 1980). This has taken 
place through various mechanisms of organisational restructuring, such as the outsourcing of 
some segments of the production process to small, union-free enterprises, the use of self-
employed labour, etc.
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workplaces) without endangering their working conditions. This has contributed to 
widen  the  gap  between  a  core  of  manufacturing  companies  where  wages  and 
working conditions are still good and a periphery of dead-end jobs in the private 
service sector9.
This account rests on two crucial  assumptions: first,  segmentation strategies are 
sustained by a commonality of interests between core workers and their employers 
in a context of labour weakness; secondly, these strategies are supposed to benefit 
core  workers  because  the  primary and the  secondary labour  market  are  clearly 
separated  and do not compete with each other.
The  first  point  suggests  that  segmentation  is  based  on  a  cross-class  coalition 
between labour and capital in core sectors of advanced political economies (Thelen 
2012). According to this approach, these alliances benefit both parties, since core 
workers  and  their  employers  have  a  common  interest  in  their  companies' 
competitiveness. Indeed, segmentation strategies allow employers to ensure both 
cost-cutting  and  the  sustained  commitment  from a  workforce  whose  skills  are 
crucial  for  the  production  processes10.  Trade  unions,  instead,  may  look  at 
segmentation strategies as a way to ensure a company's competitiveness without 
having to enter compromises on core workers' conditions of employment and to 
buffer them from market  fluctuations.  As a consequence of changed bargaining 
power between labour and capital, thus, trade unions may be willing to abandon 
9 Indeed, as argued by Hassel, “one important component of concession bargaining was the 
increasing gap between core and peripheral workers through the outsourcing process. Collective 
agreements were adjusted accordingly, in particular by transferring service components into 
other collective agreements and lower pay. (…) Terms and conditions for workers in the service 
components of manufacturing firms drastically worsened, because their pay scales shifted from 
metal or chemical sector pay to service sector pay” (Hassel 2014: 9).
10 This idea was first advanced by Atkinson in its flexible firm model. Indeed, according to 
Atkinson, the segmentation of a company's workforce into core and peripheral segments is a 
consequence of different flexibility needs. Core workers provide companies with functional 
flexibility, since they posses those skills which are crucial to the company's competitiveness. The 
peripheral workforce, instead, provides organisations with numerical flexibility which allows 
companies to adapt their workforce to market fluctuations. Peripheral workers are employed in 
activities that do not require high skills. This secondary workforce is divided into different 
segments, internal and external to the company (Atkinson 1985: 16). Among the former are part-
timers and workers in short-term contracts, while among the latter are workers employed by 
subcontractors, self-employed workers and temporary agency workers (Atkinson 1985: 16). 
According to Atkinson, thus, the segmentation of a company's workforce into core and 
peripheral segments allows firms to fidelise human resources in a cheaper manner, by focusing 
fidelisation just on workers employed in high-skill activities, which are central to a company's 
competitiveness, and utilising the periphery to compress production costs. Moreover, peripheral 
workers also contribute to secure core workers employment, by buffering core employees from 
fluctuations in the labour market (Osterman 1994: 184; Atkinson 1985).
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solidaristic,  inclusive  strategies  for  the  defence  of  all  workers  (as  they  have 
historically done, at least in European countries, and as it would be their preferred 
option) and concentrate on core workers11.
The expression of these egoistic tendencies may be facilitated by the very same 
institutions  that  in  other  contexts  have  sustained  centralised  coordination  and 
solidaristic policies (Doellgast  2012). Indeed, the presence of institutions which 
grant workers influence at plant level, such as works councils, might facilitate the 
expression of “local egoism” (Palier and Thelen 2010: 123,  Martinez Lucio and 
Weston 1995: 237). In countries where workers' interest representation is based on 
a dual system (such as the German one, as we will see later on), this might produce 
a distancing between trade unions and works councils and the predominance of the 
latter over the former. Since works councils are closer to the immediate, material 
interests of core workers, firm-specific concerns may acquire predominance over 
more solidaristic attitudes.
The reason why these strategies may be beneficial for core workers rests on the 
second crucial assumption of this strand of literature. According to these scholars, 
indeed, there is a clear segmentation between core and peripheral segments of the 
workforce. Indeed, core and peripheral workers are not allowed to compete with 
each other, since they belong to two separated segments of the economy, which 
differ  in  terms  of  occupations  and  skills.  As  argued  by  Emmenegger  et  al. 
“outsiders are not competing directly with the insiders for jobs, income, and social 
rights: outsiders do not have the same occupations, usually do not work in the same 
economic sectors (male blue-collar workers, e.g., are not outsiders in Continental 
Europe),  they do not have the same skills, and they sometimes lack citizenship 
(…). Put differently, outsiders do not work in the same jobs for less money, they 
work in different jobs” (Emmenegger et al. 2012: 220). Thus, outsiders cannot put 
pressure  over  insiders'  terms  of  employment  and  compromise  their  wages  and 
11 The idea that, in cases of economic pressures, workers may abandon solidaristic attitudes based 
on the ideal of working class solidarity and pursue alliances with their employers was already 
advanced in the mid Eighties by authors discussing the impact of the economic crisis over neo-
corporatist institutions. According to Streeck, for example, neo-corporatist strategies, aimed at 
homogeneous regulations at national or sectoral level may be questioned by stronger members 
pushing to the abandonment of solidaristic policies in what he has defined Betriebsegoismus 
(company egoism) (Streeck 1984). Indeed, “the effect of the crisis on organised labour is 
essentially that of making it more difficult to transform particular economic interests into general 
class interests (Streeck 1984: 340)”. Accordingly, workers' interests in the survival of their 
workplace may be stronger than their commitment to ideals of solidarity (Streeck 1984: 341).
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working conditions (Palier and Thelen 2010: 122).
2.3.2. Looking at alternative explanations
The dualisation approach surely highlights a crucial point in trade unions' strategy 
formation. Indeed, as other have written,  density levels influence the process of 
selection  and  aggregation  of  demands  and,  thus,  trade  unions'  strategies  and 
bargaining  policies  (Regalia  2009:  49).  As  we  have  argued,  however,  these 
approaches  disregard  the  fact  that,  in  some  circumstances,  trade  unions 
representing insiders do indeed adopt strategies targeted to the defence of outsiders. 
As we have seen in the review of trade unions'  responses to outsourcing,  trade 
unions' strategies are not always targeted to the pure and simple defence of their 
members,  but include also external  workers even in  cases of strong managerial 
pressures for concessions. Thus, what lies at the base of these inclusive strategies?
The crucial point we want to advance is that, if one looks more closely to the issue, 
the  relationship  between  a  union's  membership  composition  and  its  strategic 
orientations  is  much  more  complicated  than  the  dualisation  literature  tends  to 
portray.  This  for  several  reasons.   First,  the  definition  of  what  are  members' 
interests and how they are best represented is not as immediate as the dualisation 
literature  portrays.  Second,  trade  unions  are  not  solely  organisations  for  the 
representation of members' interests, but, at least in several national traditions, also 
movements for the advancement of general interests. Lastly, trade unions are also 
organisations with autonomous interests which may be different than those of their 
members. Each of these points, thus, highlights pressures that trade unions have to 
balance against their members' immediate requests and grievances. In the following 
paragraphs, I will examine each of these issues separately.
2.3.3. The difficulty of defining members' interests
Even if apparently banal, the statement according to which “trade unions represent 
the interests of their members” entails several problematic points.
First,  it  is  not automatic  to define what are  workers'  interests.  Indeed, workers' 
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interests are often “scattered and particularistic” (Regalia 1988: 363) and come out 
of  “a  heterogeneity  of  immediate  and  localised  experiences  and  aspirations” 
(Hyman  1992:  159).  Spontaneously,  they  era  “as  likely  to  be  in  conflict  as  in 
congruence” (Hyman 1992: 159). As Hyman notes, indeed, looking at the history 
of  trade unions  in different  countries,  one finds  scarce instances  of a  “natural” 
homogeneity of interests among workers, which could allow to speak of “workers' 
interests” as a homogeneous entity. Still, the working class can achieve its goals 
only to the extent that it is able to set aside dividing grievances and concentrates on 
common demands which foster collective organisation (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980: 
79). Indeed, being a subordinate class, the working class can compensate its lack of 
power  solely by means of  collective  action.  Trade  unions  and their  solidaristic 
agenda are the attempt to identify and advance a commonality of interests among 
workers, making partially contradictory requests sufficiently convergent as to be 
able to sustain collective action. In order to formulate a consistent political agenda 
which enables them to effectively represent their members' interests, trade unions 
“focus  on  distinctive  aspects  of  their  constituents'  individual  and  collective 
experiences” (Hyman 1994: 120). The second problematic point is, thus, that the 
process of representation does not imply a pure and simple reflection of members' 
immediate  requests,  but  have  always  required  a  process  of  selection  and 
recomposition of the demands that are to be represented12 (Regini 1981). The last 
problematic  point  is  that,  in  order  to be able  to  select  common grievances  and 
requests, trade unions need to distance themselves from what their members might 
perceive as their immediate interests. Indeed, trade unions' autonomy from the rank 
and file has been considered of crucial importance for the effective representation 
of workers' interests (Crozier et al. 1975, Offe and Wiesenthal 1985, Hyman 1997). 
The  issue  of  “how  to  be  receptive  without  being  dependent  and  excessively 
conditioned by the specific (and often contradictory or incompatible) preferences of 
the represented” (Regalia 1988: 363) is crucial in the definition of trade unions' 
agenda. Surely,  trade unions have to be sufficiently in line with what  members 
12 Thus, even in the past, the definition of inclusive agendas which encompassed broad segments 
of the workforce, was far less the result of workers' having more homogeneous interests (as it is 
often implied in contributions on the disaggregation of the working class), than of conscious 
political efforts on part of trade unions (Hyman 1992). The construction of a working class 
solidarity, as articulated in industrial unionism, “has always required a deliberate and precarious 
effort, a mobilisation of bias by leaders and rank-and-file activists” (Hyman 1992: 159).
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perceive  as  their  immediate  interests,  in  order  to  avoid  problems  of  consent 
(Regalia  1988),  but  their  agenda  cannot  be  a  pure  and  simple  mirroring  of 
members' immediate requests.
These observations contest the idea, often implicit in the argument that trade unions 
represent insiders'  interests, that interests are something fixed and “natural”, but 
argues that they have always to be identified and defined by means of interpretation 
and selection.  Thus,  the identification  of  core workers'  interests  may not  be as 
immediate as the dualisation literature implies. Indeed, the dualisation literature has 
always portrayed the interests of insiders and outsiders as clearly separated and 
often opposing. However, several research contributions have highlighted the fact 
that,  under  certain  circumstances,  the  interests  of  these  workforce  groups  may 
indeed overlap (Benassi and Dorigatti 2013, Vlandas 2013). The presence of more 
inclusive strategies on behalf of trade unions representing insiders, thus, may be 
explained by the fact that the inclusion of outsiders is perceived as beneficial also 
for core workers. This is especially the case when labour market competition arises 
between  insiders  and  outsiders.  Indeed,  several  authors  have  highlighted  that 
unions  have adopted inclusive strategies  towards  external  groups of  workers  in 
order to protect their members from the threat posed by an unregulated supply of 
labour on the external labour market (Lee and Frenkel 2004: 520ff., MacKenzie 
2008:  543,  Benassi  and  Dorigatti  2013).  According  to  Atkinson,  trade  unions' 
inclusive strategies towards peripheral employees may “represent a safeguard for 
core  workers,  so  that  their  jobs  might  not  be  threatened  by  cheaper,  external 
labour”  (Atkinson  1985:  27).  This  echoes  Common’s  idea  that  trade  unions' 
strategies and boundaries  aim at matching the level in  which competition takes 
place, i.e. the level of the market (Common 1909).
As we have seen in  the previous paragraph,  the dualisation literature explicitly 
excludes the possibility that peripheral workers compete and pressure core ones. 
Instead, this literature stream argues that core workers are unaffected or may even 
benefit  from the  presence  of  peripheral  labour.  However,  several  authors  have 
questioned the idea according to which the presence of a secondary labour market 
is an instrument to protect core workers. Instead, they have argued that processes of 
vertical  disintegration  by  subcontracting  and  outsourcing  may  be  utilised  by 
employers as a way to change power relations inside their companies (Grimshaw 
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and Rubery 2005: 1030). Outsourcing and flexibilisation at the margins thereby do 
not constitute ways to protect core workers from market fluctuations, but rather to 
expose  also  internal  employees  to  external  competition,  undermining  labour 
bargaining power (Ackroyd and Procter 1998, Rubery 2007, Gumbrell-McCormick 
2011: 296) and the “insiders' privileged position in the long run”  (Eichhorst and 
Marx 2011: 74). Indeed, several mechanisms may contribute to pose core workers 
under pressure. First, competition between core and peripheral workers may arise 
(Holst 2014: 4, Benassi and Dorigatti 2013, Vlandas 2013). The introduction of 
market mechanisms for purchasing goods and services and the presence of similar 
or  comparable  jobs  on  the  external  labour  market  underlying  very  different 
working  conditions  may  become  a  benchmark  onto  which  internal  employees' 
performance  is  evaluated  (Grimshaw  and  Rubery  1998).  The  possibility  for 
managers to freely choose on the market the most convenient source of goods and 
services and to undertake “whipsawing” practices between internal and external 
providers  dramatically  increase  their  bargaining  power  in  negotiations  (Greer 
2008). This may lead to the intensification of work and the increase in concession 
bargaining also in core positions  (Flecker  et al. 2008, Doellgast and Greer 2007, 
Haipeter  and  Banyuls  2007).  Moreover,  this  may produce  a  disciplining  effect 
among the internal workforce (Holst et al. 2010: 128ff.). Thereby, core workers' 
propensity  to  exercise  their  collective  voice  might  be  reduced,  with  lower 
participation to strike and a more reluctant attitude. Thus, “external restructuring 
seems to retroact negatively on the (…) core workforces (Flecker 2009: 252).
According to this approach, thus, trade unions willing to protect their members' 
interests  have  not  necessarily  to  adopt  exclusive  strategies,  but  may decide  to 
include  peripheral  workers.  However,  this  observation  highlights  another 
potentially  important  point  linking  core  workers'  position  and  trade  unions 
strategies, i.e. the possible existence of a time lag between vertical disintegration 
and  trade  unions'  responses.  Indeed,  in  a  first  phase,  employers'  segmentation 
strategies may benefit core workers, avoiding them having to enter concessions, but 
pressure may become visible in a second phase, when the secondary workforce 
increases competition.
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2.3.4. Swords of justice or vested interests?
Besides the difficulty of defining workers' interests, a further element related to the 
nature  of  trade  unions  complicates  the  narration  proposed  by  the  dualisation 
literature. Indeed, even if trade unions are voluntary associations, members might 
not  be  their  only  point  of  reference.  As  Regalia  has  argued, “unions  are 
simultaneously and inextricably,  even if with changing emphases over time, both 
free organisations (with a defined base, internal leaders elected according to statute, 
an  administrative  bureaucracy,  rules  of  internal  behaviour)  and  agents  of  more 
general representation, or movements potentially addressed to all those having in 
common the condition of workers (thus with uncertain and mutable perimeters and 
borders)”  (Regalia  1988:  352).   The  idea  that  trade  unions  are  contemporary 
“swords of justice” and “vested interests” (Flanders 1970), with  both a “public” 
and a “private” orientation (Hyman 1994: 120) is well present in the literature on 
trade unionism. What is important for us is that trade unions have always had (with 
more or less intensity) ideological interests which sometimes detach them from the 
immediate  interests  of  their  members13.  This  is  particularly  true  for  industrial 
unions,  which  have  always  showed  a  strong  commitment  to  a  working  class 
orientation and developed solidaristic wage policies aimed at reducing status and 
occupational  differences  (Streeck  1993:  41).  As  argued  by  Streeck,  indeed, 
industrial  unions  developed  from  workers  self-identification  as  members  of  a 
shared community of salaried workers, i.e. to their being members of the working 
class  (Streeck  1993:  41).  Other  trade  union  models,  instead,  have  historically 
displayed far less inclusive attitudes. Craft unions, which are based on workers' 
shared  occupational  identities,  have  traditionally  aimed  at  protecting  their 
members'  market  position  and  at  increasing  the  rewards  for  the  possess  of 
particular skills. In order to achieve this goal, they have set membership rules that 
restrict access to workers belonging to a specific occupational community (Streeck 
1993:  44).  Similarly,  enterprise  unions  represent  only  workers  belonging  to  a 
13 It has to be stressed, however, that members' interests themselves might be less concentrated on 
the maximisation of their individual welfare than expected by a part of the literature. Indeed, 
several studies have highlighted how trade union members might have more egalitarian attitudes 
than average workers. This may be the effect of a self-selection process (individuals with a more 
egalitarian ideological disposition are more likely to join a union) (Checchi et al. 2010). Other 
have, instead, argued that being in a union generates or sustains egalitarian orientations 
(Pontusson 2013). In both cases, however, trade union members might be as much committed to 
defending the interests of disadvantaged groups of workers as their own.
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specific company, and usually only the core workforce (Streeck 1993: 45). Another 
typology  which  points  to  similar  analytical  alternatives  is  that  of  class  vs. 
associative unions (Regini 1981: 22). While the latter define their representation 
realm in the bulk of their members, the former aim at representing the working 
class as a whole (Regini 1981: 22).
The idea that identities and ideological orientations play a crucial role in defining 
trade unions'  constituencies  is  well  present  in  the  literature (see Hyman 1994). 
According to Herrigel, for example, different identities shape “the aims of trade 
unions” and their conception of “who should belong to them” (Herrigel 1993: 380), 
thereby defining their  underlying constituencies.  Moreover,  identities also shape 
how trade unions read workers' interests, since they define the “worldviews” and 
“cognitive maps” through which they read the external environment (Locke and 
Thelen  1995).  Thereby,  identities  represent  the  ideational  dimension  of  path 
dependency (Regini 1981: 32). Indeed, as argued by Hyman “identities might be 
viewed as inherited traditions which shape current choices” (Hyman 1994: 132). 
Thus, even under changing external conditions which would push unions to the 
adoption of path-breaking strategies for material reasons (such as the defence of 
their  members'  interests),  identities  may still  commit  unions  to  past  patterns  of 
behaviour14.
Also with regard to the representation of outsiders, ideological differentiations have 
been found to be important in order to explain varying unions' strategies. Doellgast 
has highlighted how French class-oriented unions have displayed more inclusive 
strategies than their German counterparts in cases of outsourcing, with the former 
strongly  pushing  for  the  extension  of  collective  bargaining  coverage  to  newly 
established subcontractors,  while  the latter  have been more concentrated on the 
representation of core-workers' interests in incumbent firms (Doellgst et al. 2009a: 
375). A recent analysis on trade union representation of agency workers shows the 
existence of a “Southern-European” path of inclusiveness, whereby trade unions in 
Southern Europe show comparatively higher levels of inclusiveness with respect to 
14 A case in point is the Italian debate over the so called “scala mobile” during the 1980s and 
1990s. Even if this institution was increasingly contested by an important part of their 
membership (the one constituted by skilled workers and technicians, which in some cases 
defected traditional unions and became member of new ones), it was not until 1992 that Italian 
unions agreed to abandon the system. According to Locke and Thelen, this was due to the fact 
that the “scala mobile” represented the unions' commitment to egalitarianism, a central pillar of 
their identity (Locke and Thelen 1995).
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other European trade unions. According to the authors, this is due to the fact that 
“unions  bargain  following  their  working-class  ideology,  which  is  reflected  in 
solidaristic bargaining policies” (Benassi and Vlandas 2013: 31).
Moreover,  with regard to outsourcing,  trade unions might perceive this  form of 
organisational restructuring as problematic, because it constitutes “a breach of the 
principle of industrial unionism and an attempt of the employers to enact some kind 
of inequality between different groups of workers” (Kern and Sabel 1994, cit. in 
Jonker-Hoffren  2011:  381).  Indeed,  industrial  collective  agreements  also 
constituted an instrument of wage solidarity between stronger and weaker labour 
market  segments  (Swenson  1991).  However,  outsourcing  makes  wages 
increasingly dependent on market mechanisms and the power of specific workforce 
segments on the labour market. Thus, trade unions may oppose outsourcing on base 
of their egalitarian orientation (Kern and Sabel 1994).
2.3.5. Trade unions' organisational interests
Lastly, trade unions are institutionalised organisations which may have developed 
their own organisational interests, which are separated from those of their actual or 
potential members. As Regini has argued, “the more trade union action becomes 
the monopoly of large and consolidated organisations (…), the more trade union 
choices will be informed by a “logic of action” corresponding to the interests of the 
organisation as such, rather than to the interests of its members or leaders, or to its 
ideological legacies”15 (Regini 1981: 20). The action of the organisation, thus, can 
be explained as aiming at maximising its power, by ensuring the resources needed 
for achieving its goals. 
One  of  the  most  important  frameworks  for  analysing  different  unions  choices 
within this approach is Schmitter and Streeck's “logic of membership”/”logic of 
influence” distinction16 (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). The “logic of membership” 
15 It is important to underline that trade unions' focus on their organisational interests does not 
necessarily imply a departure from their original aims or a betrayal of their members. Indeed, the 
defence of the organisation and of its capacity to survive “constitute the guaranty to be able to 
ensure benefits to its members also in the future, even in cases of the latter lower structural 
strength” (Regini 1981: 20).
16 The model was indeed developed in order to account for different logics of behaviour within 
employers associations. Still, the two authors have argued that the model is applicable to all 
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represents trade unions imperative to secure a strong membership base and reflects 
trade unions' need to offer sufficient incentives to attract and retain members. The 
“logic of influence”, instead,  represents the unions' imperative to have access to 
and to exercise influence over other actors, such as employers and the state, “and 
hence to extract from this exchange adequate resources” (Schmitter and Streeck 
1999: 19). In organisational terms, these two logics create the opposing pressures to 
be responsive to the interests of their constituency (and, thus, the tendency to focus 
on narrower groups of workers in order to be better able to reflect their short-term 
interests)  and  to  be  influential  on  their  counterparties  (and  therefore  to  be 
sufficiently encompassing as to be recognised as representatives of large interests). 
What is significant for our reasoning is that these two imperative are often opposite 
and trade unions have to balance them. Thus, responsiveness to members' short-
term  interests  is  not  the  only  guiding  imperative  of  trade  unions'  strategy 
formulation. 
This framework has been recently used in order to assess the definition of trade 
unions'  constituencies  within  the  insider/outsider  debate  (Davidsson  and 
Emmenegger  2013).  As  Davidsson and  Emmenegger  highlighted,  indeed,  trade 
unions'  behaviour  towards labour  market  reforms is  better  explained looking at 
unions'  organisational interests (and their willingness to maintain influence over 
policy-making processes), rather than at their membership composition (Davidsson 
and Emmenegger 2013). Indeed, the two authors found out that trade unions have 
allowed  for  two-tier  labour  market  reforms  (i.e.  reforms  where  job  security 
legislation  is  not  deregulated  for  all  labour  market  participants,  but  solely  for 
employees in non-standard forms of employment) also in countries where trade 
unions have a very encompassing membership, such as Sweden. According to the 
authors,  this  behaviour was due to the willingness to protect their  “institutional 
power resources”17 (Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013: 341).
Interestingly,  Clegg  identifies  an  opposite  direction  of  the  relationship  between 
forms of intermediary organisations, including trade unions (Schmitter and Streeck 1999).
17 According to the authors, two organisational interests are simultaneously at stake in case of a 
labour market reform: trade unions' participation in the administration of dismissals and their 
institutional role in the formulation of labour market policies. In difficult economic times, 
protecting the latter means that unions are likely to make concessions in order to remain part of 
the deal. However, they will accept concessions only to the extent that they do not question their 
first organisational interest. This can happen if labour market reforms have a dual-tier character 
(Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013: 341).
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trade  unions'  organisational  interests  and  their  inclusiveness,  arguing  that 
organisational interests may make trade unions supportive of pro-outsiders reforms 
(Clegg 2012). In his study on the reforms of unemployment insurance systems in 
Belgium and France, Clegg explains Belgian unions' pro-outsiders orientation as 
deriving from the governance of the unemployment insurance system. According to 
Clegg, it is its structure and mode of operation that have shaped Belgian unions' 
organisational interests and, thus, their policy preferences, pushing them to adopt 
inclusive attitudes towards outsiders (Clegg 2012: 263ff.).
Other frameworks have looked at trade unions organisational interests in order to 
explain how they set their boundaries. The revitalisation literature, for example, has 
argued that trade unions may adopt more inclusive strategies towards previously 
unrepresented groups of workers for power-related reasons (Frege and Kelly 2004). 
Indeed,  confronted  with  falling  membership  levels  within  their  traditional 
constituencies, unions might attempt to organise new groups of the workforce in 
order to strengthen their mobilisation capacities and, thus, their power resources. 
Still,  in how far unions have an incentive in organising new groups of workers 
strongly depends on the institutional context in which they operate (Baccaro et al. 
2003).  Indeed,  the  necessity to  organise new groups of  workers  is  likely to  be 
connected with trade unions' reliance on their autonomous power resources. Thus, 
in less institutionalised contexts, where trade unions rely solely on the mobilisation 
of their membership for recognition, trade unions will have stronger incentives to 
organise the unorganised and will, thereby, show more inclusive strategies. On the 
contrary, if trade unions are embedded in strong institutional configurations, which 
partially detach their influence capacity from their mobilisation and labour market 
strength (Regalia 2009), they will have less incentives to organise unrepresented 
groups of workers (Baccaro et al. 2003: 121). Several contributions have looked at 
the different propensity of trade unions in different institutional contests to include 
new groups of workers as a consequence of the different power resources they may 
rely on (Heery and Adler 2004, Marino 2012). Similarly, other authors have argued 
that  eroding institutional  resources,  might  trigger  more  inclusive  strategies  also 
within traditionally strong institutional systems, such as the German one (Greer 
2008, Turner 2009).
With  regard  to  our  specific  question,  unions  might  adopt  inclusive  strategies 
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because,  by eroding their  organisational  domain,  outsourcing  reduces  also  their 
membership  potential.  Analysing  the  responses  of  the  Irish  telecommunications 
union  (CWU)  to  outsourcing,  MacKenzie  highlights  the  role  of  organisational 
incentives  in  pushing  the  union  to  adopt  inclusive  strategies  towards  workers 
employed by subcontractors (MacKenzie 2009: 540). Indeed, he argues that “the 
possibility  of  losing  financial  viability  due  to  the  hemorraging  of  membership 
through outsourcing resonated within the CWU and informed the development of a 
multidimensional strategic response to the increase in subcontracting in the Irish 
context” (MacKenzie 2009: 548). This fear came from the union awareness of the 
effects  that  outsourcing  had  on  a  sister  trade  union  in  New-Zealand.  There, 
“downsizing  and  outsourcing  had  reduced  the  membership  base  of  the 
Communications, Electrical and Plumbers' Union (CEWU) to such an extent that 
the  union  found  it  increasingly  difficult  to  service  its  members  and  remain 
financially viable” (MacKenzie 2009: 548), up to the point that the union went into 
liquidation in 1995.
 
2.4. Research hypothesis and operationalisation
From the review of the literature, we have highlighted the fact that exclusionary 
strategies  are  just  one  possible  response  to  employers'  segmentation  strategies. 
Indeed,  segmentation strategies  pose trade unions in  front of a dilemma, where 
inclusion  and  exclusion  of  peripheral  workers  may  both  be  viable  options  for 
retaining their labour market power. From the literature, we have also derived some 
expectations related to the factors influencing this choice. First, we have reviewed 
explanations  linking  trade  unions'  strategies  to  their  membership  composition 
(Palier  and Thelen  2010,  MacKenzie  2009).  Among  them,  as  we have  seen,  a 
crucial point of difference relates to the relationship between core and peripheral 
workers,  and  in  particular  to  the  presence  or  absence  of  competition  between 
insiders and outsiders. Second, we have presented explanations looking at  trade 
unions'  ideological  orientation  in  order  to  explain  trade  unions'  inclusive  ore 
exclusive strategies (Doellgast 2009, Benassi and Vlandas 2013). Lastly, we have 
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reviewed contributions which have highlighted the role of organisational incentives 
for explaining trade unions'  behaviours when facing segmentation (Clegg 2012, 
Davidsson and Emmenegger 2012, MacKenzie 2009).
From the review of the literature we can now formulate the expectations guiding 
our research.
A first expectation comes from a combination between the dualisation literature 
and those studies pointing to the role of labour market competition in explaining 
trade unions' strategies. Indeed, both argue that trade unions' strategies reflect the 
interests  of  their  members  and  both  focus  on  core/periphery  dynamics  for 
explaining  trade  union  boundary  setting.  Thus,  the  configuration  of  the 
core/periphery  distinction  made  by  employers  when  deciding  to  subcontract  a 
specific segment of the production process is relevant in explaining trade unions' 
orientation. Indeed, a crucial point is whether the established (or to be established) 
division produces competition between core and peripheral workers and whether 
the latter are able to put pressure on the former. If this is the case, it is more likely 
that trade unions will mobilise for reducing dumping possibilities from employers 
and  to  stop  the  pressure  these  phenomena  poses  also  on  trade  unions’ core 
constituencies. Thus, we can argue that the number of outsourced workers and their 
characteristics (more or less peripheral in respect to core workers' day-to-day ope-
rations) matter for the level of inclusiveness of trade union bargaining and organi-
sing initiatives  towards  outsourced workers.  If  outsourced workers  perform the 
same tasks of the workers employed by the core firm, pressure on insiders' working 
conditions will increase through outsourcing and trade unions strategies will tend to 
become more inclusive18. On the contrary, if outsourcing takes place under a more 
classic  core/periphery  model,  it  will  be  unlikely,  under  the  interest  based 
hypothesis, that unions will strategically act in order to regulate it.
The second expectation comes from those literature strands which highlight the 
role of trade unions' identities for union boundary setting. We expect that a stronger 
working-class orientation will be associated with more inclusive strategies.
Third, we expect that also organisational incentives may matter. In particular, we 
expect  that  if  outsourcing  strongly  questions  the  foundations  of  employees 
representation (at sectoral or local level) by, for example, eroding its organisational 
18 Trade unions can aim at the “extension of those agreed rates and conditions to peripheral and 
external groups where common or comparable jobs can be defined” (Atkinson 1985: 27). 
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domain, workers' representatives are more likely to adopt inclusive strategies.
Lastly, the literature review has given us important insights in order to identify the 
inclusiveness  of  trade  unions'  strategies.  We  will analyse  trade  unions’ 
inclusiveness on the base of two elements. First, who enters the domain of trade 
union representation and, second, the content of the collective agreements applied 
to different workforce groups in a same value chain. This latter point will identify 
the segmentation of working conditions  between different  workforce groups.  In 
particular, analysing the content of the measures bargained, we will look whether 
they set equal (or better) conditions for workers at subcontractors, whether they set 
worse conditions for them (but still under the representation domain of the same 
trade union) or whether they do not exist. In the last case, this may result both in 
the regulation of workers’ pay and conditions through another union’s collective 
agreement or the lack of any collective agreement. We do not differentiate between 
these two outcomes, because they both represent an exclusion of external workers 
from  the  union’s  boundaries.  Moreover,  the  strong  differentials  in  wages  and 
working  conditions  between  collective  agreements  of  core  sectors  and  those 
applied  to  other  sectors  make  it  very  likely  that  the  absence  of  provisions 
negotiated by core sectors' trade unions will produce a significant deterioration of 
working conditions for workers employed in outsourced activities.
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Chapter three
Case selection and methodology
As I have shown in the previous chapter, this research aims at shedding some light 
on the role trade unions play in segmented labour markets. More specifically, the 
research aims at identifying the causal mechanisms driving trade unions to develop 
inclusive or exclusive strategies in cases of vertical disintegration. This chapter will 
explain the methodological choices undertaken for the research, the reasons why I 
have  chosen  the  case  study  method  as  the  most  appropriate  for  my  research 
questions and the German chemical and metal trade unions as my cases. 
3.1. The case-study method
As we have discussed in the previous chapter, the questions guiding my research 
are the following:
– Which  kind  of  strategies  do  trade  unions  adopt  in  cases  of  vertical 
disintegration?
– Which are the reasons guiding trade unions to adopt inclusive or exclusive 
strategies towards marginal workers?
As it is well known within the social science literature, different research questions 
require different methods in order to be answered. The research questions I am 
posing are mostly concerned with the exploration of the causal mechanisms linking 
different  explanatory variables  (which  we have  reviewed  in  the  literature)  to  a 
particular  trade  union  behaviour.  According  to  Elster,  causal  mechanisms  are 
defined as “frequently occurring and easily recognisable causal patterns that are 
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triggered  under  generally  unknown  conditions”  (Elster  1998:  45).  Thus,  they 
identify regularities  in  the  processes  or  pathways  through which an outcome is 
brought into being. As it has been argued by the literature, the case-study method 
has  a  comparative  advantage  in  “the  development  and  testing  of  historical 
explanations and the detailed exploration of hypothesised causal mechanisms in the 
context of particular cases” (George and Bennett 2005: 6). Thus, the case-study 
method seems to be particularly well suited for answering to questions which are 
concerned to the reconstruction of causal paths.
A case study might be defined as “the intensive study of a single case where the 
purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a 
population)” (Gerring 2007: 20). However, its theoretical leverage does not rest in 
the representativeness of the case at hand with regard to the population. Indeed, 
differently  from  cross-case,  quantitative  analysis,  where  large  samples  and 
randomisation should ensure representativeness and a minimum of selection bias, 
representativeness in statistical terms can hardly be claimed in case-study research. 
In case-study research, instead, case selection should take place on another base. 
Indeed, purposive (or theoretical)  sampling is  the most widely used method for 
selecting  cases  in  case-study  research.  Thus,  the  question  is  now  why  do  we 
consider the German metal and chemical trade unions appropriate cases for our 
research question,  namely the behaviour of trade unions confronted with labour 
market segmentation and vertical disintegration in particular. As we have seen from 
the  previous  chapter,  the  literature  leaves  us  with  different  (and  contrasting) 
hypothesis for answering this question. We have reviewed hypothesis looking at 
different core/periphery configurations which give rise to the presence or absence 
of competition between core and peripheral workers an, thus, may trigger different 
interests among members with regard to more or less inclusive strategies; others 
look  at  the  ideological  orientation  of  trade  unions  and  still  others  at  their 
organisational  interests.  Thus,  we  need  cases  which  are  able  to  discriminate 
between these different hypothesis.
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3.2. The German chemical and metal unions as crucial cases for the 
dualisation literature
A first element for justifying the choice of the German chemical and metal trade 
unions is that they constitute crucial cases for the dualisation literature. As argued 
by Eckstein, a crucial case is “a case in which a theory is most likely to be true” 
(cit. in George and Bennett 2005: 9), because the variable configuration the theory 
is based on are fully at hand. Thus, if a theory fails to predict the outcome in a 
crucial case, it is strongly impugned.
As we have seen from the literature review, the dualisation literature is expecting 
trade  unions  in  Continental  market  economies  to  be  particularly  prone  to 
segmentalist strategies (Thelen 2012: 146). This is due to three main reasons: first, 
they are inserted in a structure of opportunity that enables them to exert influence 
on  employers,  but  are  losing  power  in  terms  of  autonomous  power  resources. 
Second,  their  membership  composition  is  strongly  skewed  towards  insiders, 
understood  both  as  permanent  employees  and  employees  in  core  sectors  of  a 
country's economy. Third, employers in these sectors are interested in mechanisms 
of  coordination  with  labour  for  reasons  of  economic  efficiency linked  to  their 
competitive strategy, but contemporary press for cost reduction at the periphery. As 
we have seen in the previous chapter,  what follows from these premises is that 
trade  unions  in  core  sectors  will  try  to  exploit  their  remaining  power  and 
employers' willingness to coordinate to protect their members from the negative 
effects  of  liberalisation  (Palier  and  Thelen  2010).  As  a  consequence,  however, 
negative  externalities  will  be  confined  to  other  (and  weaker)  segments  of  the 
workforce producing dualisation (Thelen 2012). Patterns of adjustment, thus, are 
based on a cross-class coalition between labour and capital in core sectors of the 
economy and not on unilateral employers' action (Hassel 2014, Palier and Thelen 
2010, Thelen 2012).
Germany is a crucial case for this theoretical approach, since it confirms all three 
conditions.
First, German trade unions have traditionally been considered among those trade 
union  movements  which  enjoyed  a  strong  capacity  of  influence  within  their 
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country’s  economic  and  social  system (Frege  and  Kelly  2004).  The  traditional 
German model of industrial relations has, indeed, ensured trade unions a strong and 
institutionalised power position (Behrens et al. 2003). This happened via several 
channels:  a stable system of collective bargaining, institutionalised structures of 
workers’  voice  at  plant  level  with  far-reaching  rights19,  and  trade  unions' 
involvement in  policy-making and in the administration of important segments of 
the welfare state (Streeck and Hassel 2004: 102).
However  signs  of  declining  power  have  started  to  appear  after  the  country’s 
reunification, triggered both by common challenges affecting trade unions all over 
the world and country specific-factors.
Over  the  last  two decades,  German trade  unions  have  significantly declined  in 
terms of membership.  Unions belonging to the German Confederation of Trade 
Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) have lost almost 6 Million members 
in  the  21  years  between  1991  and  2012  (DGB  2013).  After  reunification, 
membership of German trade unions reached a peak of almost 12 Million members 
(11.800.412).  In  2012,  DGB  unions  counted  slightly  more  than  6  Millions 
(6.151.184)  (DGB 2013).  Density levels also declined,  with net  union density20 
moving from almost 34,9% in 1980 to 18% in 2011 (ICTWSS 2013).
This tendency was matched by a corresponding process among employers. Indeed, 
as argued by Behrens, we have assisted to a process of “external erosion”, in that 
more and more firms exited employers’ associations and several new ones never 
19 It is important to note that the works councils are juridically not a union body. Indeed, they are 
representation bodies that can be elected by all workers (being trade union members or not) 
within companies with more than 5 workers and are, thus, autonomous from trade unions. For 
this reason, their introduction was in a first  time strongly opposed by trade unions (Jackson 
2005). However, trade union have historically been able to control them in the vast majority of 
cases. This happened through a double channel. First, trade unions were able to unionise works 
councils.  Indeed,  in  the  1980s,  about  four out  of  five works councils  were  union members 
(Haipeter 2013: 119). Being union members, works councils shared trade unions’ orientations 
and goals, and performed important functions for the union such as recruiting union members 
and waking over the implementation of collective bargaining agreements in the plants (Behrens 
2009: 278). Second, works councils require a large array of competences for carrying out their  
tasks. Trade unions have developed a wide ranging system of training activities (often financed 
by employers as foreseen in the Works Constitution Act) in order to satisfy their needs. This has 
enabled  them to  exercise  their  influence  on  them (Behrens  2009:  278).  Accordingly,  works 
councils have been considered as a sort of enterprise longa manus of union organisations.
20  According to Visser, union density expresses “the rate of “actual” to “potential” membership” 
(Visser 2006: 43), i.e. corresponds to the proportion of trade union members on all “wage and 
salary earners in employment” (Visser 2006: 38). Thus, retired and unemployed members, as 
well as other groups not belonging to the dependent employees (such as students or the self-
employed) are excluded from the count.
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entered (Ellgut and Kohaut 2010), and of “internal erosion”, in that the membership 
to an employers association was separated from its collective bargaining effects 
(Behrens  2013:  476).  Indeed,  through  the  introduction  of  so  called  OT-
Mitgliedschaft21, employers associations enabled their members to keep benefiting 
from the services  connected to  membership without  being obliged to  apply the 
collective agreement bargained from the association (Behrens 2013: 476).
These tendencies produced a dramatic decline in collective bargaining coverage, 
which constitutes a second indicator of trade unions’ eroding influence capacity 
since this measure indicates the share of employees whose terms and conditions of 
employment  are  influenced  by  trade  union  negotiations.  Since  reunification, 
collective bargaining coverage has constantly shrunken. Between 1998 and 2011, 
collective bargaining coverage in Western Germany has reduced from 76% on all 
employees to 61% and in Eastern Germany from 63% to 49% (WSI-Tarifarchiv 
2013: 15). 
Moreover, increased difficulty on the unions' front was also visible with regard to 
the  content  of  collective  bargaining.  Taking into  account  the  sole  parameter  of 
wage increases, since the year 2000, trade unions have rarely been able to exploit 
the so called “cost neutral” scope of collective bargaining. This index  is composed 
by  the  sum  of  the  inflation  rate  and  of  the  annual  productivity  increase  and 
traditionally constituted the parameter trade unions relied on in order to set their 
bargaining demands, since it ensures the stability of a country's wealth distribution. 
This cost-neutral scope was fully exploited in the the chemical and metal sectors, 
but this was not the case in all other sectors (Bispinck 2011: 2). As we will see 
below,  this  is  a  signal  of  strong differences  regarding trade  unions'  strength  in 
different sectors.
Furthermore, the capacity of collective bargaining agreements to set homogeneous 
standards  in  an  industry  has  also  reduced,  because  of  the  decentralisation  of 
collective bargaining and the increased number of derogations of sectoral collective 
agreements at lower levels.
On the one hand, since the 1990s there has been a spread of derogations negotiated 
at plant level between works councils and employers through the so called pacts of 
21 OT stands for “Ohne Tarifbindung”, without bargaining coverage. 
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employment and competitiveness (Rehder 2003, Seifert and Massa-Wirth 2005). 
These pacts typically involve the exchange between job security and investment 
guarantees  on  part  of  the  employers  for  concessions  on  several  aspects  of  the 
employment relationship on behalf of workers and their representatives. Pressured 
from employers threats to offshore production, works councils have come to accept 
concessions in order to save jobs. Often, these pacts have been secreted from trade 
unions or have  took the form of open alliances between management and works 
councils  against  the  collective  bargaining  parties22 (Hassel  1999:  499).  These 
instruments, thus, open up a major problem for trade unions, since derogations are 
removed from their control.
For  stopping this  process  of  “wildcat”  decentralisation  and the  massive  exit  of 
single firms form employers  associations,  trade unions have progressively been 
persuaded  to  accept  the  introduction  of  opening  clauses  within  collective 
agreements  (Streeck  2009:  41).  This  instruments  opened  up  the  possibility  to 
deviate from sectorally set standards (usually working time and additional bonuses, 
but in some cases also wages, Bispinck 2011) under particular circumstances, such 
as a difficult economic situation of the company (Haipeter 2011). The use of these 
clauses  boomed  in  the  2000s.  Indeed,  the  percentage  of  firms  making  use  of 
opening clauses moved from 22% in 1999 to 75% in 2005 (Streeck 2009: 41).
These two processes have progressively opened up a gap between bargained wages 
and actual ones. According to estimated from the DGB research centre,  indeed, 
agreed pay rose in real terms by 6.7% over the 2000-2010 period. However, over 
the same period real actual earnings had fallen by 4% and in 2010 they set at the 
96% of their 2000 level (Bispink 2011: 1).
Furthermore,  the  decentralisation  process,  especially  in  its  unregulated  variant, 
points  to another  major  problem within the German industrial  relations system, 
namely the weakening relationship between trade unions and works councils. This 
22 This observation is mostly pertinent for small and medium enterprises, where trade unions have  
difficulties in monitoring works councils' behaviour (Hassel 2014). On the contrary, in larger 
firms trade unions are often aware of the presence of such pacts and of their content. According 
to a study of Hassel and Rehder on pacts of employment and competitiveness in the largest 120  
German companies, in only 10% of the companies were the unions not involved in some way in 
the negotiations (Hassel and Rehder 2001). However, even in cases where trade unions were 
somehow involved, derogations have arguably produced a shift in bargaining power from trade 
unions to works councils (Pulignano and Doeflinger 2013: 4151).
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trend is confirmed also by data looking at the evolution of trade union membership 
among works  councillors,  which  has  progressively reduced over  time  (Behrens 
2012).
However,  also  the  share of  employees  working in  establishments  with a  works 
council has reduced over time. Indeed, this share has moved from 51% to 44% in 
West Germany and from 43% to 36% in East Germany between 1996 and 2011 
(Behrens  2012:  16).  This  trend,  thus,  poses  a  further  problem for  trade  union, 
because they increasingly lack their traditional recruitment channel.
All  these instances  point  to  a  decline in  trade unions’ strength  and a  changing 
balance  of  power  between  labour  and  capital  (Streeck  and  Hassel  2004:  104, 
Streeck 2009).
The second point regards the membership composition of German trade unions. 
According to several authors, trade unions' membership in Germany is extremely 
skewed towards  labour  market  insiders  employed in core sectors (Hassel  2007, 
Addison et al. 2006, Schnabel and Wagner 2007). Indeed, trade union membership 
still reflects workforce composition of the 1960s, with union members concentrated 
in  manufacturing industries  and among blue-collar  workers (Hassel  2007:  178). 
Even if employment has massively shifted to the service sector (with the service 
sector employing 66.1% of the workers and manufacturing 31.0%), this was not 
reflected in the membership composition of the DGB trade unions. Indeed, in 2005 
48.1%  of  their  members  worked  in  the  service  sector,  while  46.1%  in 
manufacturing companies. What is even more interesting is that the share of service 
sectors workers among union members was 42.4% already in 1980 (Hassel 2007: 
184).  This suggests that  trade unions have not  been able to  set  a foot in those 
service sector industries which have expanded since then on. Indeed, “specialised 
professional services such as education, police, and railways primarily focused on 
public services increased their share of members” (Hassel 2007: 184). In addition, 
also the presence of works councils is much higher in manufacturing industries 
than in the service sector. In the former, around 68% of workers work in a company 
with  a  works  council,  while  in  the  latter  this  share  does  not  overcome  55%23 
23 According to the research institute of the DGB unions, this is the value for the transport and 
logistics industry. In other service industries this share is much lower with 31% of workers 
represented by a works council in retail, 12 in restaurants (Behrens 2012).
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(Behrens 2012).
Lastly,  the  dualisation  thesis  points  out  that  German  employers,  even  if 
strengthened vis-a-vis labour, have not pursued a wholesale liberalisation offensive 
against  coordinated employment relationship and are still  interested in  sectoral-
level  collective  agreements  and the  participation  of  workers  through the  works 
councils  system.  Relying  on  a  Varieties  of  Capitalism (VoC)  approach24,  those 
authors  argue  that  the  production  system diffused  in  German companies,  often 
described  as  being  based  on  Diversified  Quality  Production  (Streeck  1991), 
requires  firm-specific  skills  and  workers'  involvement.  Thus,  employers  have 
strong  incentives  to  sustain  coordination  in  order  to  ensure  their  comparative 
economic advantage. It is for these reasons that several authors have argued that 
employers in Germany will not depart from traditional models of regulation of the 
labour market and industrial relations and sustain coordination with labour even 
facing  tighter  and  more  competitive  markets  and  the  economic  pressures  of 
globalisation  (Thelen  and  Kuome  2006,  Thelen  and  van  Wijnbergen  2003). 
However,  these  pressures  have  required  restructuring  measures  for  ensuring 
competitiveness  to  take  place.  Since  the  economic  incentives  for  sustaining 
coordination  with  labour  are  still  there,  these  pressures  have  not  translated  in 
patterns of adjustment geared towards generalised liberalisation (understood as the 
“active (political) dismantling of coordinating capacities”, Thelen 2012: 147), but 
to a remodulation of the traditional model that reduces its encompassing capacity 
and gets to cover solely the core workforce (Thelen 2012, Emmenegger et al. 2012, 
Carlin  and Soskice 2009).  According to this  approach,  in  CMEs like Germany, 
employers still rely on firm-specific skills of their core workforce, but at the same 
time require to adjust their production processes to more competitive markets and 
become more cost-effective. Their preferred option is, thus, to shrink the extent to 
24 According to the VoC approach, employers in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) have 
based their competitive strategy on “high-quality, high value-added production that depends on a 
high degree of stability and cooperation with labour” (Thelen 2001: 73, see also Streeck 1991)  
and employees possessing firm-specific skills. However, labour cooperation and commitment 
are  only viable if  there are institutions which remove conflict  from the  workplace and  that  
ensure workers’ participation at plant level. Furthermore, workers’ investment on skill specificity 
is only possible if workers have incentives to remain within the company and, thus, if they enjoy 
strong job security (Hall  and Soskice 2001,  Thelen  2001).  This  is  the reason why the  VoC 
approach considers employers in CMEs to be supportive of both sectoral collective bargaining 
(which removes distributional conflict from the plant level) and works councils.
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which they still sustain coordination, encompassing solely their core workforce and 
relying more extensively on an unregulated periphery by  outsourcing low-skilled 
work and employing temporary workers (Iversen and Soskice 2009, Hassel 2014).
As  we  have  noted  above,  thus,  with  reducing  but  still  significant  power,  a 
membership  composition  strongly biased  towards  core  workers,  and bargaining 
partners strongly interested in sustained coordination, employees' representatives in 
core sectors of the German economy (such as the chemical and metal sectors) are 
strongly  suspected  to  adopt  exclusionary  practices  and  to  increasingly  “look 
inwards” (Palier and Thelen 2010: 123). Indeed, the dualisation literature expects 
them to enter cross-class coalitions with employers and, thereby, avoid negative 
consequences of restructuring for their members, by confining adjustment costs to 
the periphery of  the labour  market.  As argued by Behrens,  in  these readings  a 
crucial role is assigned to plant-level actors (and especially works councils), but 
trade unions are considered accomplice of new forms of local “egoism” at plant 
level which concentrate on core workers and excludes peripheral ones (Behrens 
2013: 474).
Evidence for these developments are the following. First, the spread of pacts for 
employment and competitiveness bargained at plant level between employers and 
works councils, which ensure job security for core workers at the expense of more 
lax regulation for peripheral ones (Palier and Thelen 2010, Hassel 2012). Second, 
the  growth  of  a  secondary  labour  market  characterised  by  non-standard  work 
contracts and lower standards (with regard to pay, working conditions and social 
protection) concentrated in the service sector25, whose development was fostered by 
25 Several studies have shown that atypical employment and low-wage work (i.e. work whose 
hourly pay sets below two-thirds of the median hourly wage) concentrate in the service sector 
and, most of all, in private services. According to Hassel, marginal employment, part-time work 
and fixed-term contracts are overwhelmingly used by service sector employers (Hassel 2014: 
66ff.). Indeed, less than 10% of marginal employment contracts are in manufacturing firms, 
while more than 80% are in the service sector (Minijobzentrale 2010). Similarly, the incidence 
of fixed term contracts strongly varies across different sectors, reaching peaks of 20% in the 
service sectors, while being at a level of around 7% in manufacturing (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2010, cit. in Hassel 2014: 67). While other forms of atypical employment, such as temporary 
agency work, are also widely diffused in manufacturing (around 20% of agency workers are in 
manufacturing, Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit 2013: 12), they are much less important in numerical 
terms (agency workers are around one Million in Germany, while minijobers are now more than 
8 Millions). Moreover, while the share of low-wage work has increased within the German 
economy (according to Kalina and Weinkopf, the incidence of low-wage moved from 19% in 
1995 to 23,8% in 2011 and corresponds today to 8.1 Million people, Kalina and Weinkopf 2013: 
1ff.), it has remained stable among full-time employees in core sectors (such as manufacturing 
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dual labour market reforms to which trade unions in core sectors did not oppose 
(Palier and Thelen 2010: 124, Hassel 2014, Eichhorst and Marx 2011).
Still,  even  if  there  are  strong  signs  of  segmentation  occurring  in  the  German 
economy, there seems to be less evidence of the political-coalitional underpinnings 
of these processes as advanced by the dualisation literature. Moreover, there are 
little  proofs  of  the  strategical  thinking  of  trade  unions  and  employees' 
representatives,  since  they are  derived from observed outcomes.  Indeed,  if  one 
looks at two core sectors of the German economy, the chemical and the metal one, 
and at how unions there have dealt with the process of outsourcing, one sees that 
the policies adopted by the two trade unions seem to show distinct features with 
regard to cooperation with employers, the acceptance of plant-level egoism and the 
adoption  of  exclusive  strategies.  The  chemical  union  has  largely  accomodated 
vertical disintegration processes within the traditional system of social partnership 
which characterise the sector, accepting employers requests for outsourcing and the 
segmentation of working conditions between core and peripheral workers. Even in 
this  case,  however,  as  we  will  see  further  on,  the  union  did  not  adopt  purely 
exclusionary practices towards transferred workers, which are still all comprised in 
the  union's  bargaining  domain.  The  metalworkers'  union,  instead,  has  shown a 
changing strategy over time. Even though in a first period it has adopted a more 
exclusive  strategy,  not  opposing  works  councils  using  outsourcing  and  agency 
work as a way to protect core workers, it is now massively addressing the issue, 
organising  campaigns both on agency work and subcontracting agreements  and 
trying to organise these workers.
3.3. Other explanatory variables 
As we have seen,  the behaviour  of the chemical  and metal  unions  constitute  a 
puzzle for the dualisation literature and strongly impinge the causal mechanism 
they indicate as driving to dualisms. Indeed, the failure of that literature strand to 
or banking and finance), but has sharply increased in other sectors (such as infrastructure and 
transport services and household and personal service) (Bosch and Kalina 2008: 37).
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predict  the  behaviour  of  the  metal  union  suggests  that  we  need  to  specify 
explanatory variables other than those specified by the dualisation literature. As we 
have  seen  in  our  review  of  the  literature,  three  other  explanations  have  been 
identified in the literature.  Two of them (different  core/periphery configurations 
and trade unions’ ideological orientation) seem to apply well to our comparison. 
Thus, trough the systematic analysis of different cases, a matched comparison “can 
contribute to adjudicating among rival explanations” (Collier 1993: 106).
As we will better clarify in the proceeding of the empirical analysis, indeed, the 
metal  and  chemical  sectors  present  different  characteristics  in  terms  of 
core/periphery  dynamics  in  restructuring  processes.  Indeed,  even  though  both 
sectors have been characterised by strong processes of re-organisation (including 
massive  outsourcing),  they  present  different  characteristics  in  terms  of  the 
relationship between core and peripheral activities. Indeed, the chemical industry is 
a process industry with a vertically integrated production process.  For technical 
reasons,  outsourcing  can  thus  take  place  just  in  auxiliary  functions,  such  as 
logistics, maintenance and cleaning. On the contrary, the production process in the 
automotive  sector  is  much  more  partitionable.  Indeed,  the  sector  has  been 
characterised  by  the  outsourcing  not  just  of  auxiliary  function,  but  also  of 
production.  Thus,  competition  between internal  and external  workers  should be 
higher in the metal, than in the chemical sector, driving to more inclusive strategies 
in the first than in the latter.
Secondly, the metal and chemical unions have historically constituted two opposite 
poles in the German trade unionism. They have been labelled by several observers 
as  representing  respectively  an  “activist”  and  an  “accomodationist”  orientation 
(Markovitz 1985). Indeed, the metalworkers union traditionally counts as the left 
within the spectrum constituted by the German Trade Union Confederation. On the 
contrary, the chemical workers' union, IG BCE, constitutes the leading example of 
the so called “accomodationist” front, i.e. of the moderates within the German trade 
union  camp.  Moreover,  since  the  Seventies,  the  industry  is  characterised  by  a 
stronger  social  partnership  orientation  (usually  referred  to  as  “chemical 
partnership”,  Chemiepartnerschaft, see Kaetler and Hertle 1997) and  much more 
collaborative relationships between the union and employers. As Claus Offe has 
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noted, this opposition “describes the opposition of a more inclusive model of class 
politics to a model of special interest group politics” (Offe, in Markovitz 1985: xi). 
Thus, the metal union should be more likely to include peripheral workers than its 
chemical counterpart.
Thus,  the  structure  of  our  comparison  is  based  on  a  “most-similar  system” 
comparative design (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 32-34). This research strategy 
requires to maximise the variance on the explanatory factor of interest and to hold 
constant all other possible causal factors (Gerring 2007: 131). However, our two 
cases  seem to  vary  in  both  the  hypothesised  explanatory  variables  and  in  the 
expected  outcome.  Still,  the  apparent  presence  of  a  strategic  turn  in  the 
metalworkers' union strategy towards the issue of vertical disintegration enables us 
to divide the metal case in two, providing a shadow case for identifying the effects 
of the hypothesised variables on trade unions' strategies. Table 1 below shows the 
comparative strategy this research is based on and the variables' configuration in 
the three cases.
Table 1. Comparative features of the independent variables
Metal (first phase) Metal (second phase) Chemical
Membership 
composition
Insider-based Insider-based Insider-based
Core/periphery 
dynamics
Competition Competition No competition
Ideology Activist Activist Accomodationist
Inclusiveness Exclusive Inclusive Exclusive
3.4. Structure of the research
Research has been undertaken at  two levels. On the one hand, I  have analysed 
outsourcing patterns, trade unions strategies and labour market segmentation at the 
sectoral level. Here, I have looked at general tendencies within the two industries. 
On the other, I have analysed five cases of plants (two for the chemical and three 
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for the automotive industry) where outsourcing has played a significant role over 
the  last  two decades.  I  have  explored  the  situation  with  regard  to  outsourcing, 
which  functions  have  been  contracted  out  and to  which  companies,  how trade 
unions and employees representatives have dealt with the issue, whether and how it 
has been regulated and what outcomes in terms of labour market segmentation have 
been reached.  Analysed sites  for the chemical  industry were the industrial  park 
Hoechst and the Chempark Krefeld-Uerdingen, while for the automotive industry I 
have  concentrated  on  the  production  site  of  Daimler  in  Stuttgart,  of  Audi  in 
Ingolstadt and of ZF in Friedrichshafen. 
This research structure enables me to overcome a possible problem in researching 
the  strategic  orientation  of  employees'  representatives  within  a  dual  system of 
interest representation such as the German one. Indeed, as we have already argued, 
in the German industrial relations system, trade unions and works councils are two 
autonomous  actors,  which  may have  different  interests  and behave in  different 
ways  (Mueller Jentsch 1995: 61ff., Jackson 2005). Thus, looking both at sectoral 
and plant level we can disentangle how the relationship between trade unions and 
works  councils  unfolded  in  the  context  of  vertical  disintegration  processes  and 
analyse eventual interest conflicts or different positions.
Within the interviews, there has been no time limitation with regard to vertical 
disintegration  processes  and  trade  union  action.  However,  since  the  major 
outsourcing wave testified by the interviewees has taken place between the end of 
the1990s and today, this is also the time frame the research mostly refers to.
3.5. Data collection
Data collection has been based on in-depth interviews with key informants. These 
are  trade  unionists,  both  at  national  and  regional  level,  works  councillor,  HR 
managers and officials of employers' associations (see table below for details on the 
distribution of interviews in the five cases)26. The interviews aimed at gaining a 
26 Unfortunately,  it  has  been  possible  to  collect  just  one  interview with representatives  of  the 
management. In some cases (such as InfraServ Logistics, Clariant, Bilfinger Maintenance Sued),  
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closer  insight  into  trade  unions'  and  works  councils  understanding  of  vertical 
disintegration processes and their effects on core and peripheral workers, as well as 
their behaviour towards these restructuring processes (whether and how they were 
regulated  and  for  which  reasons).  Interviews  were  collected  within  the  period 
September 2012 to November 2013. They ranged between 30 and 90 minutes in 
length, were recorded and fully transcribed. This information was supplemented 
through the analysis of trade union newspapers and position papers, unions’ and 
works councils’ blogs and websites, companies’ annual reports and websites, and 
other secondary material. The outcomes of trade unions' strategies and especially 
their influence over wages and working conditions across different groups of the 
workforce were reconstructed via the analysis of collective agreements bargained at 
regional and plant level.
the management refused to give an interview. In the rest of the cases, there were no reactions to  
repeated phone calls and emails. According to other informants (generally works councillors) 
this was due to the sensitivity of the topic, which is currently under high media attention in 
Germany.
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Chapter four
The chemical industry
In  2012,  the  German  chemical  industry  employed  slightly  less  than  435,000 
workers (VCI 2013a: 50). Even though in the last 20 years the industry experienced 
considerable job losses (after unification the German chemical industry employed 
around 716,000 workers, ibid.: 50), it  still  counts as the European leader in the 
chemical sector, accounting for 29 percent of the chemical production within the 
European Union.  Moreover,  with its  €156.4 billion  turnover  made in  2011,  the 
German chemical industry is the fourth biggest producer of chemical products in 
the  world  (Cefic  2012).  24  percent  of  the  industry's  turnover  was  made  by 
specialised chemistry (Spezialchemikalien), 19,5% by pharmaceutical products and 
19,5% by polymers (VCI 2013a: 12). 
The chemical industry counts as the paramount example of a high value-added, 
high-skill  and  high  capital-intensive  industry.  Control  of  production  process, 
innovation  capacities  and  technological  developments  are  key  for  firms' 
competitiveness in the sector. According to several literature streams which have 
dealt with outsourcing, these characteristics should make the industry less prone to 
outsourcing and the use of  atypical  employment,  and keener  to  retain a  highly 
skilled and well paid27 workforce in a stable employment relationship (Atkinson 
1985, Kalleberg 2003). Furthermore, the incidence of labour costs on the industry's 
cost  structure,  which  is  lower  than  in  other  industries  (in  2012,  labour  costs 
represented  12,2%  of  the  industry's  business  volume,  VCI  2013a:  66),  makes 
labour  cost  savings  through  external  employment  less  fundamental  for 
competitiveness. Indeed, the chemical industry has historically shown high levels 
of vertical integration. According to Kinkel and Lay, in 2001 the German chemical 
industry performed 81% of development activities and 85% of production activities 
in-house (Kinkel and Lay 2003: 8). This strongly contrasts with other branches, 
27 According to the VCI, in 2011 the average gross monthly wage of an employee in the chemical 
industry was 4,217 Euro, around 650 Euros more than the average in the manufacturing industry 
(3,565 Euro) (VCI 2013: 65).
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such as automotive, where levels of vertical integration are much lower (less than 
30%) (Kinkel and Lay 2003: 5).
However,  since  the  Nineties  the  industry has  undergone processes  of  profound 
reorganisation. Service activities have been expelled from chemical companies and 
concentrated in specialised service providers (Kaedtler 2006, Voss 2007). A new 
business model, that of industrial parks has emerged, where different firms share a 
common infrastructure administered by a  site  operator  which provides  them all 
services which support production (Aiche 2011). These processes have produced a 
significant pressure on wages for workers employed in less skilled functions, such 
as  logistics,  maintenance  and  catering.  This  pressure  has  translated  into  a 
significant  wage  segmentation  within  formerly  unitary  structures  and  in  the 
development  of  differentiated  employment  conditions  for  different  workforce 
groups.  This  chapter  aims  at  reconstructing  how  trade  unions  and  employees 
representatives have responded to these pressures and towards which groups of 
employees  they  have  focused  their  strategies.  For  doing  so,  we  will  present 
evidence both at sectoral and at plant level. 
The chapter unfolds as follows. First,  we will  present the characteristics of the 
vertical disintegration process at sectoral level and how did trade unions and works 
councils respond to the challenges they posed. Secondly, we will look at the cases 
of  two  chemical  sites  and  reconstruct  vertical  disintegration  patterns  and  the 
responses  of  employees'  representatives.  Lastly,  we  will  sum up  the  empirical 
finding by identifying the strategies adopted by employees' representatives.
4.1. Vertical disintegration in the chemical industry
Over  the  last  decades,  the  German  chemical  industry has  undergone  important 
processes  of  restructuring.  This  was triggered  by two key developments  taking 
place  over  the  last  40  years.  First,  the  chemical  industry has  been  exposed  to 
increasingly competitive markets. This derived most of all  from new producing 
countries  (such  as  China  and  India)  entering  the  business,  particularly  in  the 
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petrochemical and ground chemistry sector (Kamakura 2006: 15ff.). This has made 
European companies less competitive in those business segments, triggering their 
concentration on more lucrative and specialised ones. Secondly, the industry has 
increasingly oriented on business models focused on short-term goals and on the 
maximisation  of  shareholder  value  (Kaedtler  2006).  This  tendency  came  as  a 
consequence both of the increased importance of financial investors in the industry 
and  of  the  capacity  of  the  financial  market  to  orientate  managerial  norms  and 
visions of what constitute effective business strategies (Kaedtler and Sperling 2002, 
Becker et al. 1999a, Salento and Masino 2013). These imperatives translated into 
new forms of company's organisation geared towards the transformation of fixed 
into variable costs, the concentration on core competences and the contracting out 
of support functions.
Within  the  German  chemical  industry,  restructuring  took  place  in  two  major 
respects (Kaedtler 2006). First, we have assisted to the creation of chemical parks 
out  of  formerly  unitarian  production  sites.  Chemical  parks  are  multi-company 
structures where different companies operate,  using shared services and utilities 
(Aiche 2011: 44). The first examples of this business model were developed during 
the  1990s  in  Eastern  Germany,  where  formerly  state-owned  chemical 
conglomerates were organisationally split up for privatisation (Voss 2007: 4). Since 
the  end  of  the  1990s,  however,  almost  all  major  corporations  in  the  chemical 
industry  followed  on  to  this  trajectory  in  differing  degrees.  According  to  the 
business organisation of the chemical industry, VCI, 37chemical parks are present 
on  the  German  territory  (VCI  2013b).  They host  around 1,000 companies  and 
employ around 235,000 workers, roughly 60 percent of chemical occupation in the 
country (VCI 2013b).
Chemical  parks  have grown because most  chemical  companies (with the major 
exception of BASF, as we will see later on) have abandoned the traditional model 
of integrated chemical production and its emphasis on broad production portfolios. 
Instead, they have concentrated their activities on some specific business segments 
(usually  the  more  profitable  ones,  like  life  sciences,  pharmaceuticals  and 
specialised chemistry) (Becker et al. 1999b: 19ff., Voss 2007: 3). Thus, they have 
sold or closed less profitable activities, opening up their production facilities to the 
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settlement of external companies. Thereby,  traditionally self-contained production 
sites (Verbundstandorte) have been transformed into multi-company sites, where 
different companies operate using a common infrastructure,  shared services and 
utilities (Aiche 2011: 44).  The most extreme case in this respect, as we will see 
further  on,  is  the  case  of  Hoechst.  As  a  consequence  of  the  company's  new 
orientation on the life-science business, Hoechst was split up in several segments, 
which were subsequently sold or merged with other companies, producing the end 
of Hoechst as brand (Kaedtler 2006: 89ff.).   
The second area of restructuring, which is partially, but not completely overlapping 
to the creation of chemical parks, has been the reorganisation of support functions 
and service activities. Indeed, they have been contracted out to newly grounded 
specialised utilities providers (Voss 2007: 4). This took place for two main reasons. 
First, the presence of several autonomous companies in place of a unitary structure 
required that  new subjects  took charge of  the common infrastructure shared by 
chemical  companies.  Therefore,  site  operators  were  created  as  organisationally 
autonomous entities  for  the administration of  the chemical  parks.  They provide 
companies all services needed for production, from wastewater treatment to energy 
supply,  from  logistics  to  security  (Voss  2007).  These  functions  were  formerly 
provided  in-house  by respective  divisions  of  the  traditional  chemical  company. 
Usually, site operators are the product of the separation of these divisions out of the 
former owner of the production site. For example, the chemical parks originated by 
the  splitting  up  of  Bayer  production  sites  are,  as  we  will  see  further  on, 
administered by Currenta, which was built out of the externalisation of the “central 
functions” division of Bayer. A second reason, however, has been cost containment. 
Indeed,  chemical  companies  increasingly  considered  the  internal  provision  of 
service activities and support functions (such as maintenance,  logistics, catering 
and  cleaning)  as  too  expensive  in  comparison with  the  prices  available  on  the 
external  market.  As  we  will  clearly  see  in  the  plant-level  cases,  restructuring 
processes were undertaken mostly for enabling companies to  bring the costs  of 
service  provision  in  line  with  market  prices.  Thus,  chemical  companies  have 
progressively  externalised  the  provision  of  those  services  and  dismantled  their 
service  divisions.  The  latter  have  either  been  sold  to  external  companies  or 
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concentrated into autonomous subsidiaries.
Over  the  last  10  years,  pressures  for  cost  containment  have  involved  also  site 
operators  and  have  triggered  similar  adjustments  and  consolidation  processes 
focused on the concentration on core-competencies and the contracting out of non-
core activities (Festel and Wuermseher 2013: 65). This was especially the case with 
regard to services of more generic nature. Indeed, an important distinction exists 
within the service portfolio of site operators. Services can be distinguished between 
on-site and off-site services (Festel and Wuermseher 2013: 62) or monopoly and 
voluntary services (Voss 2007: 20). Among the monopoly services are wastewater 
treatment,  energy generation and distribution,  steam generation and distribution, 
fire brigades (Festel  and Wurmseher 2013: 62). They are strongly linked to the 
site's infrastructure and, typically, are services which every company in the site has 
to buy from the site operator by virtue of their settlement agreement. The latter 
comprise maintenance,  logistics, analytics, security and technical services (ibid.: 
62). They are independent of the existing infrastructure and can be purchased also 
on  the  market.  Thus,  while  monopoly  services  are  less  exposed  to  price 
competition,  since  they  are  removed  from  market  mechanisms  (chemical 
companies  are  compelled  to  rely  on  site  operators  for  their  provision  and 
competitors are relatively few), the voluntary services are directly benchmarked 
with services provided by external suppliers (IGBCE 2010: 23). Often, external 
suppliers have a competitive advantage because they do not apply the chemical 
collective agreement, but collective agreements of other branches or no collective 
agreements at all. In order to reduce service provision costs and bring them in line 
with market ones, several site operators have outsourced the supply of voluntary 
services to external companies or autonomous subsidiaries (Voss 2007).
Still,  even  if  less  pronounced,  cost-cutting  pressures  exist  also  for  monopoly 
services, since park operators compete among themselves for new investments and 
settlements,  and,  thus,  have  to  keep  operational  costs  at  a  competitive  level 
(Interview 13). Indeed, chemical companies compare different parks with regard to 
the costs of utilities, such as water, steam and electricity provision, fire brigades, 
etc.  (Festel  and Wuermseher  2013:  62ff.).  Thus,  also within monopoly services 
there have been pressures for cost containment that, as we will see further on, had 
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important consequences for workers employed in those area.
Lastly,  vertical  disintegration also took the form of an increased use of agency 
workers. Comprehensive data on agency work in the chemical industry are difficult 
to obtain and one can rely often only on survey data. Generally, it is assumed that  
agency  work  plays  a  less  relevant  role  in  the  chemical  sector  than  in  other 
manufacturing industries (such as in the automotive one). However, according to 
the data coming from the WSI Betriebsraetebefragung, in 2010 55,9 percent of the 
German  chemical  companies  employed  agency  workers.  The  level  was  61,4 
percent in 2008 but declined in 2009 to 46,9 as a consequence to the crisis. 6,9 
percent of those firms make an intensive use (more than 20%) of agency work. 
Agency workers usually remain 8,2 months in chemical companies. In those firms 
which make an intensive use of agency workers, the average deployment time rises 
to 9,8 months. A new survey among works councillors of 46 chemical companies 
shows similar  results  with  regards  to  tenure  times  (for  half  of  the  interviewed 
companies more than 36 weeks) (Jungvogel 2013). According to the survey, agency 
workers are mostly used in production and logistics activities and grouped between 
the levels E3 and E9 of the DGB collective agreement (Jungvogel 2013). Those 
levels corresponds to levels above the E4 of the chemical collective agreements, 
and are, thus, near the level of a skilled worker (Facharbeiter).
Industry informants also suggest an increased importance of agency work in the 
German  chemical  industry  (Interview  9).  Moreover,  agency  workers  are  not 
assigned  just  marginal  activities,  but  increasingly  also  highly  qualified  ones 
(Interview 9). According to a trade unionist, indeed,
Today,  we  have  the  situation  that  even  for  laboratory  personnel,  for  professional 
occupations, one can buy people from an external company. Because, I tell you again,  
agency workers which are deployed in our sectors, they have a very high qualification 
level. It is not simply, that they stand there and pack something, or transport something 
from a hall to another, and they need high qualifications (Interview 9).
All the developments described above have increased chemical companies' reliance 
on external employment. According to the VCI, today, external employees weight 
3,8% on the industry's cost structure28 (VCI 2013a: 96).
28 According to the VCI, this sum is composed by the costs for wages (Lohnarbeit) provided by 
external companies (1%), industrial and technical services (2,4%) and agency work (0,4%) (VCI 
2013a: 96).
69
4.2. Industrial relations under vertical disintegration
The processes of vertical disintegration have put the chemical union and its works 
councils in front of major challenges. First, management in newly grounded service 
companies started to pressure for wage reductions or increases in working time in 
order to line up the cost of  service provision to market levels, and, thereby, to be 
competitive  with  external  service  providers  and  with  other  site  operators. 
According to a trade unionist, 
a  crucial  element  for  us  as  trade  union  is  that  it  is  exercised  a  massive  pressure  in  
employment and working conditions, on wages, because now site operators constantly 
argue,  “we are  no  more  the  chemical  industry,  we are  service  providers.  And in the 
service sector one has to consider very different prices, one has to set very different prices 
with regard to the chemical industry (…). And this is always the problem, that they argue, 
that  certain  services  are  offered  on  the  market  at  cheaper  prices  with  regard  to  our 
collective agreement (Interview 13).
This  put  collectively bargained standards  under  strong pressures.  However,  this 
mostly  concerned  service  activities,  since  they  are  more  exposed  to  market 
competition, wage costs have a higher incidence on total production costs than in 
production companies and the competitors usually apply collective agreements of 
other industries (Interview 13). Table 2 below gives an idea of the differentials 
between diverse collective agreements signed by DGB unions. 
Table 2. Collective agreements DGB unions 
Compensation Weekly 
working 
hours
Leave 
days
Yearly 
extra 
money
Extra 
vacation 
moneyLower 
group
Mid 
group
Higher 
group
Chemical 
industry
2285 2676-
3104
5355 37,5 30 WD 95% MW 20,45€ LD
Metalworking 
industry 
2042 2413-
2808
4205-
5257
35 30 WD 25-55% 
MW
2,4% 
MW/LD
Transport 
industry
1726 1917 1984 39 27-30 WD 30-40% 
MW
14€ LD
Hotel and 
catering industry 
1414-
1535
1906 2905 39 25-30 WD 50% MW 200-240€
Cleaning 1490 2186 2518 39 28-30 WD none none
Agency sector 1242 1640 2760 35 24-30 WD 
(1)
150/200/3
00 (2)
150/200/3
00 (2)
(1) depending on the industry they are deployed
(2) after 6 months/in the 3rd 4th year/after 5 years
WD: working day; MW: monthly wage; LD: leave day
note:  if  not  otherwise  specified,  reported  date  refer  to  the  collective  agreement  of  Nordrhein-
Westfahlen.
Source WSI 2013
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As one can see, from the table, the chemical collective agreement pays significantly 
higher  wages  and  grants  more  generous  benefits  than  any  other  collective 
agreement. Looking at the middle pay grade, even the metal collective agreement 
sets  wages  at  a  level  around  10%  lower  than  the  chemical  sector,  while  the 
transport and hotel and catering industry are 30% below and the agency sector even 
40%. Also in terms of yearly bonuses, the chemical collective agreement is much 
more generous than other DGB collective agreements. Lastly, the chemical industry 
envisages  negotiated  benefits  (such  as  shift  allowances,  old-age  flexible  time) 
unknown in other industries (Interview 9).
Moreover,  multi-enterprise  sites  raised  challenges  for  works  councils 
codetermination.  Indeed,  these  new structures  have  made  it  difficult  for  works 
councils  to keep control over a wide range of issues formally falling under the 
Codetermination Act, but increasingly subject to the control of external companies 
and especially of the site operator (IG BCE 2010: 34). This concerns especially 
issues related to social facilities, health and safety provisions, work environment, 
which  are  often  regulated  into  settling  contracts  between  the  site  operator  and 
settled companies (IG BCE 2010: 34). Thereby, they are removed from the control 
of the works councils and their codetermination rights.
However, these pressures were generally managed in a consensual fashion by the 
social  partners  according  to  the  long  tradition  of  social  partnership  which  has 
marked the industry since the 1970s (Markowitz 1985, Kaedtler and Hertle 1997). 
As we will see in greater detail below, the most important goal of the union and the  
works  councils  was  to  keep all  newly established service  companies  under  the 
chemical collective agreement (IG BCE 2010).
And therefore it was also the main duty of the union to convince these companies' new 
owners to continue to apply the collective agreement,  that  was previously applied by 
Hoechst, namely the collective agreements of the chemical industry (interview 9).
This  goal  had  to  be  played  against  employers'  willingness  to  have  a  specific 
collective agreement for companies providing services to chemical companies and, 
above all, for site operators. As argued by a trade unionist, 
we are particularly satisfied with the fact that we have been able by now to hinder that 
site operating companies, that they get a specific collective agreement for site operators. 
It is a goal of several managers of site operators to have a specific collective agreement,  
but  by  now,  and  hopefully  it  will  remain  like  this,  all  employees  of  site  operating  
companies remain within the domain of the chemical union and are applied the chemical 
71
collective agreement (Interview 13).
However, the union strongly opposes this option sustaining that all activities within 
the parks have a relationship with the chemical industry and this relationship has to 
be maintained.
We belong to the chemical industry (…), we all come from the chemical industry, we are 
experienced in the chemical industry, same in which occupation we are [and] therefore 
we have to keep the relationship with the chemical industry (Interview 1).
For doing so, new instruments were bargained in order to enable service companies 
to remain within the representation domain of the chemical social partners and, at 
the  same  time,  to  adapt  their  cost  structure  to  that  of  external  competitors. 
According to a trade unionist,
sometimes, for keeping the jobs, we have made use of certain flexibilisation instruments, 
in order to ensure that the colleagues employed by these site operators remain still within 
the domain of the chemical collective agreement. But with compromises, for example 
with regard to working time or to certain pay structures (Interview 13).
First, a specific opening clause (competing collective agreements opening clause, 
Tarifkonkurrierende  Oeffnungsklausel)  was  bargained  for  those  companies  or 
company  segments  which  found  themselves  in  competition  with  companies 
applying other collective agreements. According to this opening clause, in cases of 
economic difficulty due to this reason, the social partner can negotiate a temporary 
reduction  in  collectively  agreed  standards  for  strengthening  the  company's 
competitiveness29.  Second,  the  social  partners  introduced  the  possibility  to 
negotiate  special  plant-level  collective  agreements  (so  called 
unternehmensbezogener Verbandstarifvertraege), which allow to deviate from the 
sectoral collective agreement, while remaining part of the employers' association. 
Differently  from  the  opening  clause,  which  is  a  temporary  instrument,  these 
company-specific agreements do not have time limitations and can be bargained 
permanently (Interview 9). As we will better see in the plant-level case studies, 
through these instruments the union was able to keep service companies inside the 
chemical collective agreement, even if this had the price of reducing wage levels 
for some segments of the parks' workforce (IGBCE 2010).
29 According to th eemployers' association BAVC “for the improvement of the competitive 
capacity lower compensation rates and other derogations can be bargained through works 
agreements (Betriebsvereinbarung) (with the consent of the collective bargaining partners) or 
through company agreements (firmenbezogenen Verbandstarifvertrag)“ (BAVC 2013).
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With regard to agency work, the IG BCE has bargained a collective agreement with 
the two major employers associations of the agency sector in 2012. The agreement 
sets additional wages for agency workers employed in the chemical industry that 
have to be paid by agencies on top of the sectoral wage levels. The bonuses range 
from 10 to 50% of the respective level of the agency sector's collective agreement 
and depend on the length of agency workers' assignment and their job level (for 
lower job levels,  bonuses start  from 15% after 6 weeks and reach 50% after  9 
months, for middle levels they range from 10% to 35%, no bonuses are foreseen 
for  higher  wage levels,  see  the  table  below).  Their  aim is  to  reduce  pay gaps 
between  agency  workers  and  direct  employees.  However,  these  bonuses  never 
reach a complete pay equality, because a ceiling is set at the 90% of the salary of a 
comparable  direct  employee  and  agency  workers  do  not  get  other  benefits 
negotiated at plant-level (Jungvogel 2013).
Table 3. Additional bonuses for agency workers
Job levels 
agency sector
After 6 weeks After 3 months After 5 months After 7 months After 9 months
E1 and E2 15% 20% 30% 45% 50%
E3 to E5 10% 14% 21% 31% 35%
E6 to E9 -- -- -- -- --
Source: Jungvogel 2013.
According to an informant, the logic of this agreement for the union was that the 
bonuses should contribute to avoid that chemical employers use agency workers as 
a  permanent  instrument  of  personnel  policy  by  making  agency  work  more 
expensive (Interview 9). According to a trade unionist, indeed,
we want to make it more costly, because our idea is that thereby, if it remains cheap, it 
will arise a certain pressure on stable jobs, because many agency workers, especially in 
our industry, in the chemical industry, they are not unskilled workers, that simply drive a 
fork lift.  Instead, they are hired also for high-quality production processes.  And there 
might arise a pressure, if agency workers are similarly good or exactly as good as stable 
workers.  Then,  companies  would  get  even  more  the  idea  to  increase  the  number  of 
agency workers and to reduce that of stable ones. And therefore we have said, politically,  
also as IGBCE “Yes, we are for flexible assignments, we cannot impose to a company to 
hire 500 stable workers for a six months contract, there one can employ agency workers  
or fixed-term workers, but this cannot be a permanent condition”. And in order to avoid 
it, that firms calculate right from the beginning, “we take 20% agency workers and only 
80% stable workers”, in order to avoid this we have negotiated these additional wage 
bonuses  with  the  employers'  associations  of  the  agency  sector,  [so  that]  a  chemical 
company may argue “it is almost unworthy to use agency work, than I prefer to take  
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stable  workers,  they  are  more  motivated”.  This  is  the  background.  Whether  it  will 
function,  we have to  wait  2-3 years  to understand whether  the pressure,  the material 
pressure is so big, through the increase in price of agency work via these bonuses, that we 
get again stable jobs. But we still do not know that (Interview Weber).
Here, we see one of the hypothesised logics of union inclusion at work. Indeed, the 
union has decided to act in favour of agency workers (by improving their wage 
levels)  in  order  to  protect  chemical  workers  from  possible  competition  by  an 
external (and cheaper) source of labour.
4.3. Plant-level case studies
We now turn to the single plant-level studies in order to clarify how employees 
representatives have responded to vertical disintegration processes. In each of the 
two cases, the first part of the paragraph is devoted to the reconstruction of the 
outsourcing processes which gave rise to the park and the constitution of a multi-
company setting; how employees representatives responded to these challenges; 
and how wages and working conditions  were affected  by these  processes.  The 
second part of each paragraph analyses the single companies settled in the park, 
which  role  did  vertical  disintegration  play  within  each  of  them  and  how  the 
respective employees' representatives have regulated the issue. 
4.3.1. Industrial park Hoechst
The  industrial  park  Hoechst  is  the  outcome  of  the  disintegration  of  Hoechst's 
former  main  production  site  in  the  Hoechst  district  of  the  city  of  Frankfurt 
(Kaedtler 2006: 89ff.).
Hoechst's restructuring process started in 1994, with the definition of autonomous 
profit  centres and the decentralisation of managerial  responsibility to the single 
business units (Becker et al. 1999b: 14). In 1997, the company was transformed 
into  a  management  holding.  The  management  presented  these  developments  as 
aiming to make the economic situation of each business segments more transparent 
for  being  able  to  identify  unprofitable  segments  of  activity.  Moreover,  this 
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restructuring  aimed  at  identifying  core  competences  where  investments  should 
focus on (Becker et al. 1999b: 16). In the following years, the holding increasingly 
concentrated  on  the  “life  science”  business  (pharmaceutical  products  and agro-
chemistry), recognised as more profitable than the traditional industrial chemistry 
and less vulnerable to market fluctuations (Kaedtler 2006: 98). According to the 
former head of the company, Dormann, the life science business is “virtually not 
affected  by changes  in  the  business  cycle  as  the  industrial  sector  and  delivers 
higher margins”30 (Dormann 1997, cited by Kaedtler 2006: 98). The divestment 
from industrial chemistry started in 1995, with the sell of the ground chemicals 
department to the Swiss company Clariant and continued in the following years, 
with other selling and the construction of joint-ventures (Becker et al. 1999b: 17). 
This  process  of  selling  and  divestment  also  produced  the  fragmentation  of  the 
production site into different companies and the growth of a multi-company setting. 
To manage this  new organisational structure,  a service company was created in 
1997,  where  all  support  functions  once  performed  in-house  by  Hoechst  were 
outsourced (see below for further information).
In the year 2000, the merger of the life-science business with the French company 
Rhone-Poulenc into Aventis marked the end of the Hoechst holding. 
From  the  formerly  unified  structure  which  employed  25,000  employees,  an 
industrial  park was created,  where  22,000 workers  are  employed by around 90 
companies.   As  one  can  see  from  the  table,  these  companies  have  different 
dimensions ranging from small offices of lawyers or consultants employing just a 
few people to large production companies employing several thousands of workers 
(Interview 2). Today, the major production companies settled in the park are Sanofi 
(8,000 employees), Celanese (1,670 employees), Clariant (1,500 employees) and 
Bayer  Crop  Science  (680  employees),  while  the  major  service  providers  are 
InfraServ  Hoechst  (1,900  employees),  InfraServ  Logistics  (530  employees), 
Bilfinger  Maintenance  Sued  (800  employees)  and  H&R  Industrierohrbau. 
According to a works councillor, around 40 of the companies settled in the park 
have a works council (Interview 2).
30 According to a works councillor, this was the system followed by all other companies in the park 
thereafter. Every company was willing to keep just the most profitable segments in their 
portfolio and to abandon the others (Interview 1).
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Table 4 below summarises the current situation.
Table 4. Overview industrial park Hoechst
Industrial park 
Hoechst
Company Area of activity Number of 
employees
Collective agreement
Main production 
facilities
Sanofi Aventis Pharma (Insuline) 8000 Chemical
Celanese Intermediate 
chemistry
1670 Chemical
Clariant Speciality 
chemicals
1500 Chemical
BMS Crop protection 680 Chemical
Main service 
facilities
InfraServ Hoechst Site operator 1900 Chemical
InfraServ Logistik Logistics 530 Plant level agreement 
(IGBCE)
Provadis Training 150 Chemical (with opening 
clause)
Bilfinger 
Mintenance Sued
Maintenance 800 Chemical (with opening 
clause)
HR 
Industrierohrbau
Maintenance 200 Unknown
Eurest Catering 160 Not chemical (possibly 
catering) 
Siemens IT Around 300 Metal
Reported 
companies
15930
Total companies 90 22000
An important  consequence of  this  new structure has  been the increase of cost-
cutting pressures on service providers. The restructuring process, indeed, enabled 
chemical companies to freely access the market in order to acquire the services 
they need for their production process. The presence of cheaper external service 
providers for some of these services (and especially less specialised services, such 
as security, catering, cleaning and logistics) has triggered a downward pressure on 
prices from clients to service providers. As we will see in more detail in the single 
cases,  this  pressure  has  been  often  translated  by  the  management  of  service 
companies into a pressure on personnel costs and into requests for concessions with 
regard to wage levels and working conditions (IG BCE 2010: 30). The relationship 
between the introduction of market mechanisms in place of hierarchical relations 
and the pressures on wages arisen in service providers has been well expressed by a 
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works councillor. He argued
there  [among  voluntary  services]  they  squeese  even  harder,  because  there  client 
companies have always the possibility, if the prices of the InfraServ do not suit them, to  
say “I take the services from the outside” (…). This goes to the expense of workers (...).  
Because they are always optimising processes in order to reduce their costs, but often 
they have no other solution, as to save personnel costs” (Interview 2).
Through this process, chemical companies can adjust their cost-effectiveness and 
increase their profitability. However, this happens at costs of service providers. As 
argued by the works councillor of the site operator, “this profit maximisation at our 
costs, that we feared in 1998, it has actually taken place” (Interview 1).
The role of workers representatives
According to the chair of the biggest works council in the park, both the works 
councils  and  the  IG  BCE “played  no  lucky  role”  in  the  restructuring  process 
(Interview 2). Indeed, they were not able to substantially influence the restructuring 
process and to avoid it. Reasons for this are twofold.
According  to  several  works  councillors,  there  was  no  possibility  to  avoid  this 
process (“the possibility to prevent this process was not at hand”, Interview 1), 
since works councils lack co-determination rights with respect to restructuring and 
re-organisation. Indeed, according to the German law regulating co-determination 
(the  Works  Constitution  Act),  restructuring  decisions  constitute  a  management 
prerogative, which works councils have no legal instrument to influence (Interview 
2, Interview 1).
However, works councillors also highlight another reason for this lack of influence. 
According  to  their  opinion,  there  was  a  substantial  agreement  of  some part  of 
workers' representatives (and especially those sitting in the supervisory board) with 
the managerial perspective according to which it was necessary to restructure the 
company in order to regain competitiveness (Interview 2, Interview 1). 
Similar  mechanisms were at  hand also in subsequent  outsourcing phases which 
concerned most of all the site operator (see below for further information). On the 
one hand, the works councils lack of codetermination rights impeded to exercise 
influence through an institutionalised way. However, no other instruments (such as 
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mobilisation)  were  adopted.  This  depended  to  an  acceptance  of  outsourcing  as 
beneficial for some parts of the workforce. The following quote describes the case 
of  the  outsourcing  of  InfraServ  Logistics  from  the  site  operator  InfraServ 
Hoechst31.
Interviewer:  Did  the  InfraServ  Hoechst  works  council  influence  the  [outsourcing] 
process? And if yes, how?
Respondent:  The  works  council  took  the  transition  mandate32.  Influenced  in  another 
sense, they did not do it voluntarily. They also have got pressures, they had to outsource 
the  InfraServ  Logistics,  or  they  had  to  bargain  another  collective  agreement  for  the 
InfraServ with lower standards. (…) So they have said, logistics has to go out. And they 
have in the sense,  that they have exercised a transition mandate until we built a new 
works council.
Instead of impeding restructuring to take place, employees representatives ensured 
that  all  workers  maintained their  existing  working conditions  after  the  transfer. 
According to a works councillor,
At time of the outsourcing we have relied on article 613a. Everybody gets into a new 
employment  contract  with all  he  has  at  the time.  Everybody gets  his  backpack,  gets  
individually all his sectoral and plant-level agreements, rules, and goes to the other side 
of the street. Afterwards, he has one year protection, and after one year, provided that a 
works council has been elected, one can discuss collectively all these agreements. The 
have to be re-collectivised and than I as works council have the opportunity to undertake 
changes.  All  outsourcing  processes  which  have  taken  place  here,  have  taken  place 
according to this scheme (Interview 1).
However, it was not just the protection of individual rights that concerned works 
councils and the union. A further goal was to ensure that the new companies apply 
the  chemical  collective  agreement  (Interview 2,  Interview 1;  see  also  Kaedtler 
2006: 113). 
We have always tried, as far as possible, to maintain the companies within the chemical 
collective agreement (Interview 13)
This  was  especially  problematic  for  companies  providing  industrial  services, 
which, as we have seen, have to face a fierce competition with external providers 
not applying the chemical collective agreement. In order to be able to keep these 
companies  under  the  chemical  collective  agreement,  employees'  representatives 
accepted  several  forms  of  wage  reductions,  from  the  removal  of  over-tariff 
payments to derogations of the sectoral collective agreement (Interview 1, 2, 3, 4, 
31 This is the point of view of a works councillor of InfraServ Logistics. However, as we will see 
further on, this opinion was shared also by the chair of the InfraServ Hoechst works council. 
32 According to a transition mandate (Uebergansmandat), the works council of the parent company 
represents the workforce of the new company for a specific time frame.
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9).  This  enabled  works  councils  and the  union to  keep  (almost)  all  companies 
within  the  IG  BCE  representation  domain.  Still,  as  we  will  see  below,  this 
happened at costs of a significant fragmentation of wage levels among companies 
settled in the park.
It  is  important  to  note  that,  even  though  the  ability  to  maintain  a  unitary 
representation and collective bargaining structure was primary a consequence of 
works councils' struggles, our interviewees recognise that also employers had an 
interests in this. Indeed, even though works councils highlight the efforts they made 
(“This costed some strength” (Interview 2); „It did not came from heaven, we are 
working on this  since years” (Interview 1),  they also highlight employers'  role. 
According to our interviewees, chemical employers are interested in sustaining the 
collective bargaining unity of the park and the presence of the IGBCE as the sole 
representative of the workforce because of two reasons. First, the IG BCE and its 
works councils ensure a peaceful environment and the possibility to work without 
stoppages due to strikes. Secondly, they are reliable partners, able to understand the 
economic dynamics of the industry and to act accordingly (Interview 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 
9).  Therefore,  employers  are  willing  to  pay the price  of  applying the  chemical 
collective agreement. According to a manager 
the chemical collective agreement is surely one of the highest we have in this country. 
But the IG BCE is a trade union whose leadership contributes to shape things here, within 
the chemical industry, with a lot of expertise and a sound common sense. This is for me 
strongly preferable rather than having to do with any crazy trade union, that, completely 
aside from any reasonableness,  comes with any idea and than one has to struggle for 
months. In return, I rather pay higher wages, but at least I have peace within the company 
(Interview 6).
Similarly a works councillor argued
when you have a structure such a chemical  park and you have  everything under the 
chemical  union,  but  you  have  a  central  position,  such  as  catering,  the  NGG  or 
maintenance, IG Metall, or security, ver.di, the likelihood of strikes is much higher, than  
if you have just one trade union. (…) And you know, they are much more willing to 
strike, than we as IG BCE are (Interview 2).
Still, works councillors in service companies highlight how the continuous pressure 
on wages deriving from chemical companies' pressures on service providers risks 
producing  resentment  among  workers  and  may  potentially  threaten  the 
representation monopoly of the chemical union (Interview 1, 3, 4).
If, due to optimisation programs, they start to question this system or to put it under such  
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a pressure, that at some point workers say “I don't feel represented by the IG BCE, I go 
somewhere else”. Than it gets fun (Interview 1).
Thus, production companies' purchasing strategies are potentially undermining the 
basis of peaceful industrial relations in the park.
Representation structure and site cooperation
With regard to representation structures, the decision of the works councillors at the 
Hoechst industrial park was to develop autonomous works councils in every firm. 
Again, this decision was partially due to the lack of alternatives (the possibility to 
construct  group  works  councils,  Gemeinschaftsbetriebsraete, derives  from  the 
reform of the Works Constitution Act), but also from specific choices of the works 
councillors. This  is  evident  from  the  contradictory  statements  of  two  works 
councils.
At that time, the institute of the group works council (Gemeinschaftsbetriebsrat) was not 
there. At that time, the Works Constitution Act was designed in such a manner that “one 
company,  one  works  council”.  What  we sometimes  do  today,  that  we  represent  also 
subsidiaries,  that  we  can  build  group  works  councils,  that  was  at  that  time  still  not 
foreseen by the Works Constitution Act (Interview 1).
There was never a site works council. Instead, the companies have suddenly all fallen 
apart  and  everybody  has  started  to  build  its  own  works  council  and  it  was  never  
undertaken the try, neither from the management side, nor from the works council, to 
build a site works council. One could have done that. Bayer in Leverkusen, for example, 
they have such a construction (Interview 2).
Also  the  evaluation  of this  decision  varies  according  among  the  two  works 
councillors. According to the chair of the Sanofi  works council “thereby it  was 
basically pre-programmed, that the single companies (and thereby certainly also the 
situation of the employees)  would have been dealt  with in  completely different 
ways. And this is what indeed happened” (Interview 2). 
According to another works councillor, instead, this decision
has pros and cons. The disadvantage is that the bodies get smaller and smaller, and under  
certain conditions (…) the capacity to assert oneself is somehow affected (…). However,  
it has the advantage that thereby you do not have segments of the company, such as for 
example  the  logistics,  which  drive  everything  down,  and  than  one  has  to  accept  
compromises for the whole workforce. At the end of the day, what is best, I am myself 
not sure, I still do not have a sure opinion. However, if I look to what has happened by 
Bayer in order to keep the whole structure together,  which compromises they had to 
undertake, it  gets somehow borderline. Than better one company, one works council” 
(Interview 1).
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Both  of  them link  the  absence  of  a  common works  council  to  the  subsequent 
differentiation  of  working  conditions  between  the  different  companies.  The 
evaluation  depends  on  the  willingness  to  accept  segmentation  of  working 
conditions.  It  seems by no chance that  the more critical  to this  choice was the 
works councillor in a stronger position (i.e. representing workers of a production 
company with high operational margins, where cost-cutting pressures were not at 
hand).  On the  contrary,  the works  council  of  the service provider,  immediately 
touched by cost-cutting processes, was more available to accept segmentation.
In order to coordinate their activities, the works councils in the park have built up a 
site committee composed by works councils of the different firms,  which meets 2-
3  times  a  year  in  order  to  discuss  themes  which  are  common  for  the  whole 
industrial park. However, the committee does not enter the kind of issues which 
determine competition among firms or top-down pressures on wages (Interview 1). 
According to a works councillor, it is impossible to deal with that kind of issues 
through union interventions. Indeed, it is the structure of the relationship between 
the different companies to determine pressures on service providers and no union 
intervention can possibly solve the issue.
Interviewer: I was wondering whether there are cooperation structure which could deal 
with these issues?
Respondent: You cannot deal with these issues, you cannot solve them. Because you have 
interest divergences. We are all trade union members and in principle we all agree, that 
this development is  insane. Because this development  can, at  some point,  also get  to 
others. One can ask what is chemistry? Is it solely what takes place in the reactor? (…)  
And what happens before? What happens afterwards? (…) Does marketing belong to the 
chemical  industry? Should one pay chemical rates? (…) And therefore one has to be 
careful  with  this  logics  of  the  employers,  because  employers  differentiate  between 
services and chemical industry because of this reason (…). We have to be careful also as 
organisation. But we alone do not solve this issue. Also, the colleague (name) works in a 
company which is our client. And even though the colleague (name) says “ok, the €3,50 
which we pay to you more, they will not kill us. The colleague (name), however, has a 
colleague which works in the purchasing department, that is evaluated according to the 
prices he gets from the suppliers. At the end of the year, these determine whether he is a 
good or bad purchaser. What will he do? He will crush us and give the order to someone 
else  (…).  And even  though  we  all  agree  that  this  is  bad,  in  so  far  we are  in  these 
mechanisms we cannot change anything. Because the Euro he saves from our order, goes 
directly in the profits and under some conditions corresponds to 1, 10, 50, 100 jobs for  
the works council in the company. Therefore, we can only understand each other (…). 
But we cannot do much more. I think we have to be honest. Everybody stands for himself 
and has to look how to get the best out of the conditions of his company” (Interview 1).
Summing  up,  we  can  describe  employees'  strategies  as  both  inclusive  and 
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segmentalist, because they produced a strong segmentation of working conditions 
while maintaining a formally unitary structure.  Moreover,  as we will  see in the 
single cases, the strategy of employees' representatives sometimes entailed the kind 
of trade-offs highlighted by Palier and Thelen, i.e. the willingness to protect core 
workers, by letting cost-cutting pressures apply solely to outsourced workers (see 
the case of InfraServ Hoechst).
We now turn to outsourcing processes and works councils' responses in a selection 
of firms settled within the park.
Clariant
Clariant  is  a  multinational  company  which  seats  in  Muttenz,  Switzerland  and 
employs  worldwide  more  than  21,000 employees  (Clariant  2013).  In  Germany, 
Clariant  has  15  production  sites  (interview 8).  Clariant's  production  site  in  the 
industrial  park  Hoechst  constituted  the  specialised  chemistry department  of  the 
Hoechst AG and was sold to Clariant in 1997. At that time, the company counted 
3,000 employees. In 2000, due to a phase of financial difficulties, the company sold 
some operations, which constitute now autonomous companies settled within the 
industrial park (Interview 8). Today, the production site in Hoechst employs 1,500 
workers  and  is  Clariant's  largest  production  site  in  the  world.   The  plant  is 
specialised in the production of pigments and synthetic waxes.  Since fall  2013, 
Hoechst  is  the central  Research&Development centre  of the company with 500 
workers.
Pay setting system
Clariant  is  a  member  of  the  employers'  association  and  applies  the  chemical 
collective  agreement.  Clariant  employees  have  also  right  to  additional  pay and 
benefits set by company-level agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen) negotiated by 
the works council. 
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Agency work and subcontractors
At  the  time  of  the  interview  35  agency  workers  were  employed  at  Clariant. 
According  to  the  deputy  of  the  works  council,  they  are  employed  in  easiest 
production functions (as production assistant,  Produktionshelfer) in order to cope 
with production peaks, or to substitute direct workers on holiday or maternity and 
sick leave. Those activities do not require them to possess a vocational training 
(Interview 8).
Since  2007,  the  use  of  agency  work  is  regulated  through  a  company-level 
agreement bargained by the works council. In particular, the agreement settles the 
following questions:
 Quote:  the  maximum number  of  agency workers  is  50.  This  number  is 
calculated as an average on a monthly base.
 Assignments: agency workers cannot be employed in specialised activities 
(such  as  machine  operator,  Anlagenfahrer),  but  solely  as  production 
assistant.
 Wages: agencies which provide agency workers have to apply the collective 
agreement  for  the  agency sector  bargained by the  DGB unions  and the 
collective agreement  on additional  bonuses signed by the IGBCE. Thus, 
agency workers do not receive equal pay, but the IG BCE additional wages 
(Branchenzuschlaege).
The possibility for the company to make use of agency workers was exchanged 
with the definition of a clause that obliges Clariant to employ 30% of its trainees 
(Auszubildende) for one year after successful conclusion of the vocational training. 
According to the deputy chairmen of the works council, this agreement allows 8-10 
trainees to remain in the company each year (Interview 8).
The way in which the works council has regulated agency work highlights the fact 
that the works council does not consider agency work as a problematic issue, as far 
as it does not enter crucial activities within the plant (thus, the clause that impedes 
the assignment of agency workers to specific activities). Furthermore, agency work 
is  used  as  a  “bargaining chip”  for  getting  other  allowances  which  benefit  core 
workers.
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There  are  no  subcontractors  active  in  on-site  production  activities  at  Clariant's 
Hoechst site, with the sole exception of two people employed for filling activities 
through a subcontracting agreement (Interview 8). As all other companies in the 
industrial  park,  Clariant  relies  on  InfraServ  for  a  wide  range  of  services  (both 
mandatory and voluntary, even though the interviewed works councillor could not 
tell exactly which ones). Furthermore, the company has a contract with InfraServ 
Logistic for transport. Internal logistics, instead, is still performed in house. The 
interviewed works councillor argued that a large part of maintenance services is 
also performed by Clariant employees (Interview 8). However, Clariant is also a 
client of Bilfinger Maintenance Sued (BIS 2012), and thus also outsources a part of 
the  maintenance  activities  to  the  Bilfinger  group.  Clariant  also  employs  other 
external  firms  for  exceptional  construction  activities  (such  as  pipeline 
construction). These are mostly craft firms. No plant-level collective agreements 
have been bargained on the issue of subcontracting.
Bayer Crop Science
Bayer Crop Science (BCS) is a multinational company which belongs to the Bayer 
holding. Worldwide, the company employs 18,000 workers, 3,500 in Germany. In 
2012, the company raised sales for 8.3 million Euros (BCS 2013). BCS production 
site in Hoechst constituted the crop protection department of the Hoechst AG and 
was  bought  by  the  Bayer  AG  in  2002.  Today,  the  company  is  active  in  crop 
protection (herbicides, insecticide and fungicides) for agriculture and gardening, 
and seeds production.  In the industrial park Hoechst,  BCS employs around 680 
workers.  320 workers are employed in research activities (the site is the global 
research  centre  for  the  herbicide  business),  300  in  production  and  the  rest  in 
administration. All workers at BCS have at least a vocational training in chemical 
occupation  (according  to  the  site  coordinator,  some  workers  belonging  to  the 
Hoechst  AG  still  have  a  vocational  training  in  non-chemical  occupations 
(berufsfremde  Ausbildung) but  they  are  very  few).  The  company  hosts  30-40 
trainees  per  year.  However,  they  are  not  trained  directly,  but  are  trained  by a 
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specialised vocational training company belonging to the InfraServ group, Provadis 
(see below for further details). According to the site coordinator, this enables BCS 
to reduce training costs and to avoid the presence of trainees interest representation 
in-house (Interview 6).
Pay setting system
The company is member of the employers'  association of the chemical industry 
and, thus, BCS workers are paid according to the chemical collective agreement. 
Moreover, they are allowed additional benefits bargained at company level. Among 
these benefits are a company pension scheme, a nursery, and a bonus system. This 
latter is differentiated between lower-level employees (for which it depends solely 
on company performance)  and managerial  employees  (for  which  it  depends on 
individual  and  company  performance),  and  amounts  between  one  and  three 
additional monthly wages (Interview 6). This roughly represents a positive wage 
drift of at least 8-10%.
The majority of production workers are hired between the levels E6 and E9 of the 
chemical  collective  agreement,  in  research  between  E10  and  E11  (after  the 
vocational training, employees in research activities are grouped at the E7 level).
Agency work and subcontractor
According to  the  BCS site  manager,  agency work is  mostly used  as  flexibility 
instrument in cases of production peaks. Agency workers are employed mostly in 
production, rarely in clerical tasks. They stay normally for short periods of time in 
the company, but some of them stay even for 1-2 years. Often they are permanently 
hired  by  the  company,  especially  in  recent  times,  since  BCS  is  expanding 
production and needs further employees (Interview 7). At the time of the interview, 
BCS employed 10 agency workers. According to a works councillor, they are paid 
according to the collective agreements for the agency sector bargained by DGB 
unions.  Moreover,  they  receive  the  additional  payments  (Branchenzuschlaege) 
bargained by the chemical union in 2012. Interestingly, the site coordinator argues 
instead that agency workers are paid the same wage as internal employees and that 
BCS wants “to pay the same wage for the same work” (Interview 6).
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The works council did not bargain any supplementary collective agreement on the 
issue of agency work, considering it as not being a problematic issue (Interview 7).
Interviewer: Do you have any agreement on agency work?
Respondent: No. By now it has not been necessary. We apply the collective agreement 
and we pay also, new in the chemical industry, these equalisation standards.
Interviewer: But you do not have any particular regulation at plant level?
Respondent: By now not. (…). There are negotiations currently going on at the level of 
the general works council33, but I think this is not such a big issue at our company. (…). 
Because  agency  workers  are  very  few.  The  Bayer  corporation  has  many  in  the 
pharmaceutical  sector, therefore they bargain there.  For us, for BCS, it  is less needed 
(Interview 7).
Here, again, we can see the logic triggering inclusion or exclusion decisions by the 
works council: Apparently, the works council thinks there is no need to regulate 
until it does not get a problem for core workers.
With regard to subcontracting, the issue seems to be slightly different. According to 
a manager, since the development of the industrial park, all technical activities have 
been outsourced to external companies. As a preference, outsourcing has gone to 
the site operating companies (i.e. InfraServ), but also to other companies. Today, 
maintenance activities are subcontracted to Bilfinger. Other activities (such as IT, 
payrolls, engineering) have been subcontracted to external companies belonging to 
the Bayer holding, such as Bayer Business Services and Bayer Direct Services (see 
the  Bayer  paragraph  for  further  details  on  pay  setting  systems  in  the  Bayer 
holding).  Lastly,  easiest  activities  (such  as  packaging)  have  been  outsourced 
through  subcontracting  agreements.  With  regard  to  the  number  of  employees 
working for external companies on BCS premises, the site coordinator argued that 
the legal construction through which these workers are present on BCS premises 
(namely through subcontracting  agreements)  does  not  allow him to  know their 
number34. According to a works councillor, external employees are now around 20 
and are employed in “simple activities, such as packing or preparation” (Interview 
33 Indeed, all agreements on those issues are not bargained directly on site, but for the whole group 
by the general works council (Gesamtbetriebsrat).
34 The site coordinator argued: “Juridically it is so, that we award an order to do a specific activity 
to an external company. Within this agreement, this company has the sole obligation to delivered 
the required result. How this company does that and with how many workers, thereon we have 
no influence. We cannot exercise an influence, because otherwise we get into conflict with the 
issue agency work. And therefore I have to tell you very strictly,  I  have no idea how many 
workers work for us through subcontracting agreements, because I cannot know that. And also 
because I have no influence on that. I am not even interested, I am solely interested in the fact  
that this company delivers the desired result within the desired time” (Interview 6).
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7). The company has no collective agreement on the issue, but the works council 
considers it as critical  and argued it will be the next issue on the agenda of the 
Bayer GBR (“I think the next issue will be subcontracting”, Interview 7).
InfraServ Hoechst
InfraServ Hoechst was founded in 1997 as the site operator of the Industrial Park 
Hoechst. At the time of its establishment, InfraServ contained all indirect functions 
which were considered as non-core by chemical companies. According to 1,  
due to the “core competences” philosophy of the production companies, all they did not 
need for  their business was pushed into InfraServ (…).  Thus, we comprised, I  say it  
somehow malicious, all those activities, nobody knew that existed. Because production 
companies wanted to start as lean as possible (Interview 1).
The  activities  performed  by  InfraServ  Hoechst  ranged  from  maintenance  and 
logistics,  to  postal  services,  a  scientific  library and  the  procurement.  Since  the 
beginning of its history, the company was exposed to strong price competition with 
external service providers and client firms' pressures to cost reduction. Indeed, the 
company seems to be stuck between two contrasting imperatives. According to a 
works councillor, 
On the one hand, our shareholder, our owners want to have the lowest prices. On the 
other hand, however, the company has to act in a financially efficient way and generate 
profits (Interview 1).
On the one hand, indeed,  the company had to transform once central  functions 
(which, according to the chair of the works council, were appointed according to a 
pro-rata system) into profitable services that produce revenues. On the other hand, 
InfraServ Hoechst has to guarantee low prices to its clients, which are at the same 
time also the company's owners. Indeed, InfraServ Hoechst is owned by the three 
bigger  producing  companies  in  the  park,  Sanofi,  Clariant  and  Celanese,  each 
owning  a  third  of  InfraServ's  shares.  Thereby,  producing  companies  determine 
InfraServ Hoechst's functioning. For example,  service prices are not determined 
solely by InfraServ's management, but also by the owners (Kommanditisten), which 
want to keep prices down. Because of this particular structure, thus, on the one 
hand, the company has to operate services it would not make an economic sense to 
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operate. On the other, it cannot increase the prices in the potentially more profitable 
segments,  because  of  owners'  veto  (Interview  1).  This  contrasting  pressure 
produces  a  reduction  in  operating  margins,  which  has  been  translated  by  the 
management into continuous pressures for cost-cutting in labour costs.
InfraServ  Hoechst's  management  reacted  to  these  pressures  through  further 
contracting out especially of those company segments which provided voluntary 
services. Outsourced activities have been either sold to other companies or put into 
autonomous  subsidiaries.  In  the  year  2000,  InfraServ  built  up  an  autonomous 
subsidiary for logistic services (InfraServ Logistics, see below), with around 850 
employees (Interview 3 and 4). In 2003, InfraServ Hoechst outsourced its division 
“Technical services” into the subsidiary Infraserv Höchst Technik GmbH & Co. 
KG (later bought by Bilfinger&Berger, today called Bilfinger Maintenance Sued, 
see below for details),  with 800 employees.  In the same year,  a subsidiary was 
created for training services (Provadis, with 150 employees). This subsidiary is in 
charge of the vocational training and provides trainees for more than 60 companies, 
both  inside  and  outside  the  chemical  park  (Provadis  2013).  Lastly,  in  2004 
InfraServ Hoechst  outsourced it  pilot  plants  division  (which  designs,  plans  and 
operates  pilot  plants)  into an autonomous subsidiary called Technion.  From the 
original  4,700  workers  employed  by  InfraServ  Hoechst  at  the  time  of  its 
establishment, 1,900 workers have survived those outsourcing waves (Interview 1). 
However, the whole group, which comprises also InfraServ Hoechst, Provadis, and 
Techtrion employs around 2,700 workers. The largest part of InfraServ Hoechst's 
employees are employed at the levels E8-E12, i.e above the level of the skilled 
worker  (Facharbeiter) (Interview 1).  Indeed,  almost  all  employees  of  InfraServ 
Hoechst are skilled workers trained in chemical occupations.
Today,  the  company  provides  services  in  three  areas:  site  operation  (security, 
facility  management,  etc.),  utilities  (electricity,  gas,  steam)  and  waste  disposal. 
However, the chair of the works council argued that, due to cost-cutting pressures 
from  the  clients,  security  and  facility  management  may  be  further  targets  for 
outsourcing.
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Pay setting system
On of  the  most  important  reasons  for  outsourcing  is  that  it  enabled  InfraServ 
Hoechst  to  cut  costs,  most  of  all  through  a  redefinition  of  wage  levels  for 
outsourced employees (Interview 1). The outsourcing produced a fragmentation in 
employment standards and a differentiation in the pay setting system across the 
companies belonging to the group.
InfraServ Hoechst is member of the employers' association of the chemical industry 
and its employees are paid according to the collective agreement of the chemical 
industry.  However,  since its  establishment,  over tariff  payments (uebertarifliche 
Leistungen) have been progressively reduced. According to the chair of the works 
council, 
this is a process, which has continuously occurred within the last 14 years. We have been  
in some sort of cycle: something was cashed, it was sufficient for 2-3 bargaining rounds 
and than we had to renounce to something again. And now it goes further on (Interview 
1).
At the time of the interview (23.05.2013), the only over tariff-payment still paid to 
the company's workforce was represented by an additional bonus of around half a 
monthly salary (Interview 1), which represents a positive wage drift of around 4% 
in  respect  to  the  sectoral  collective  agreement.  However,  discussions  were 
undergoing  on the  necessity  for  the  company to  enter  another  cycle  of  saving 
measures, which could have possibly meant concessions with this regard (Interview 
1). 
Different pay systems are present in the three subsidiaries. The 150 employees of 
Provadis are paid as set in the chemical collective agreement, but work according 
to  a  trust-based  flexitime (Vertrauensarbeitszeit).  Instead,  since  2002,  InfraServ 
Logistic has a specific collective agreement (see below for details).
Agency work and subcontracting
InfraServ Hoechst does not make a large use of agency workers. At the time of the 
interview  (23.05.2013),  the  company  employed  just  6  or  7  agency  workers 
(interview  1).  They  are  distributed  all  over  the  company  (not  concentrated  in 
specific functions),  and are mainly used as substitutions of workers on holiday, 
maternity or  sick leaves.  According to  the  chair  of  the  works  council,  the low 
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incidence  of  agency work in  the  company is  due  both  to  its  relatively regular 
business model (InfraServ Hoechst does not have strong fluctuations or production 
peaks) and to the opposition of the works council against this form of employment 
(Interview 1). Even though InfraServ Hoechst does not have a company agreement 
on  the  issue,  indeed,  the  works  council  argues  it  has  always  acted  in  a  very 
restrictive manner on the issue (Interview 1).
We do not want agency work. We do not have any plant-level agreement on the issue, 
but we behave there very restrictively. The management knows that and so do the 
divisions (Interview 1).
Instead, InfraServ makes large use of subcontractors and in some activity segments 
the  level  of  vertical  integration  (Fertigungstiefe) is  below  50%  (Interview  1). 
However, the works council did not tell where exactly subcontracting takes place 
and did not want to name any of the subcontracting companies. He argued that this 
subcontracting strategy is causing problems with client companies, since the latter 
are increasingly requiring InfraServ Hoechst to internally carry on at least 50% of 
the  activities  they outsource  them,  in  order  to  ensure  they have  control  of  the 
processes. However, this is seen as a problem by the works councillor, since he 
argued that  the  company's  management  has  progressively reduced occupational 
levels,  so  that  today in  some  areas  InfraServ  Hoechst  employees  perform just 
coordination activities (Interview 1). This might produce an expulsion of InfraServ 
Hoechst  from some business  segments,  since  client  companies  might  decide  to 
directly contract InfraServ Hoechst' subcontractors for carrying on the activities. 
According to the chair of the works council, this is what happened with technical 
services  in  the past35.  However,  no plant-level  agreement  was bargained on the 
issue. According to the chair of the works council, subcontracting companies do 
not apply the chemical collective agreement and often apply none.
The works council argues to have a “finger-off” approach to outsourcing (Interview 
1). This stance is somehow ambiguous. On the one hand, our interviewee admitted 
outsourcing was sometimes used as a way to avoid accepting concessions for the 
whole workforce under the pressure of managerial requests of cost-cutting. As we 
35 “The same thing happened also with the maintenance division some years ago, that at some 
point we simply coordinated external companies. And at some point the client argued: "Am I 
stupid? The external company provides the service exactly how I need it, what do you do 
[InfraServ Hoechst] in between?". And this is exactly the risk that always exists if you do not 
have the competences on your own” (Interview 1).
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will see in more detail below, this was the case of the logistics subsidiary of the 
company,  InfraServ  Logistics.  However,  this  “finger-off”  approach  and  the 
consequent  refusal  of  the  works  council  to  undertake  responsibility  for  new 
subsidiaries or subcontractors (according to the principle of joint representation) 
has  sometimes  been  used  as  a  way  to  put  pressure  over  the  management  for 
avoiding outsourcing.  Indeed,  due  to  the  fact  that  social  peace  within  the  park 
represents  a  great  value  to  chemical  employers,  the  works  council's  refusal  to 
accompany  the  process  means  the  risk  of  being  confronted  with  other,  more 
militant  representatives.  This  risk  has  been  often  taken  into  account  during 
negotiations and has been used as a bargaining instrument from the works council. 
On this issue, the works council argued
we always argue “if you think you have to outsource, than do that, it is your free decision. 
But take into account that if you do that, we will split up accordingly: we will build a 
trade union for the fire brigades, a trade union for security personnel, a trade union for 
firemen and then  we will  conduct  negotiations  for  all  of  them (…).  If  you  want  to 
outsource the security service (…), do that. Then we build a separated branch which will  
close the doors during collective bargaining round. And then nobody will be able to enter 
or exit the park. Do that!”. Something has changed also in the way in which we argument 
as works councils. They are no more able to scare us through outsourcing. I had this 
discussion some years ago with the division manager and I have told to him “do that!”.  
Because he wanted, within the current collective agreement he wanted to go down. I have 
told to him “I cannot do this, I cannot go under the level of the collective agreement”.  
Then  he  had  a  problem,  he  had  to  think  whether  outsourcing  was  a  better  solution.  
Because I told to him “Do that! But you will not get the chemical collective agreement  
anymore (Interview 1).
InfraServ Logistics
InfraServ Logistics is a fully owned subsidiary of InfraServ Hoechst. The company 
provides logistics services for the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, both on 
and off-site. At the industrial park Hoechst, the company employs 530 employees 
(Interview 3 and 4). 35% of them work in clerical occupations. As for production 
workers,  they  are  mostly  skilled  workers,  trained  in  logistics  occupations  and 
belong  to  the  CL-G  and  CL-H  groups  of  the  company  collective  agreement 
(Facharbeiter level) (Interview 3 and 4). Around 50% of the company's employees 
are member of the IG BCE (Interview 3).
The company was outsourced 1998, because of cost reasons. According to the chair 
of the mother company's works council, the company was outsourced 
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with the statement, that InfraServ needed external expertise and that logistic was not the 
company's core business and that others do that activities better. However, these were all  
pleaded (vorgeschoben) arguments. The outsourcing took place because they were trying 
to question the wage setting system in order to cut costs (Interview 1). 
This is confirmed also by the interviewed works councillors of InfraServ Logistik. 
According to him, the process started because client companies considered logistic 
services  performed by InfraServ Hoechst  as  being  too  expensive and wanted  a 
reduction in prices (Interview 3 and 4). According to him, the works council at 
InfraServ Hoechst was told that “Clariant wants a significant reduction of the prices 
for  logistic  services  (…).  Either  it  goes  at  the  expense  of  everybody  [within 
InfraServ Hoechst] or we build an autonomous logistic subsidiary” (Interview 3 
and  4).  Thus,  the  works  council  at  InfraServ  Hoechst  agreed  to  outsource  the 
logistic segment in order to avoid concessions for all the company's employees. 
According to the two InfraServ Logistic works councillors, the outsourcing was 
“the lesser evil both for the works council and for the management” (Interview 3 
and  4).  As  we  have  already  seen  at  the  beginning  of  the  paragraph,  this  is 
interestingly confirmed also by the chair of the works council at InfraServ Hoechst. 
Indeed,  he  argued that  outsourcing  has  the  advantage  that  “one  does  not  have 
segments of the company, such as for example the logistics, that drive everything 
else down and which cause one to enter compromises for the whole workforce” 
(Interview 1).
Today,  the  company  underlies  a  fierce  competition  with  external  logistics 
companies which do not apply the chemical collective agreement (but usually that 
of the logistics sector) and have, therefore, much lower personnel costs. According 
to  the  works  councillors,  those  firms  can  save  up  until  20% production  costs 
(Interview  3  and  4).  Moreover,  client  companies  use  to  define  subcontracting 
agreements requiring constant reductions in service costs. According to a works 
councillor, “Clariant has imposed us a contract which will last 5 years and requires 
us to cut the prices of our services by 5% every year” (Interview 4).
Pay setting system 
These  pressures  in  production  costs  have  translated  into  constant  requests  for 
concessions in wages and working conditions. In 2002, the company and the local 
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branch  of  IG  BCE  have  bargained  a  company-level  collective  agreement 
(unternehmensbezogener Verbandstarifvertrag) with lower pay rates and a reduced 
yearly bonus (75% of a monthly wage instead of 95%). Furthermore, in terms of 
seniority based wage increases, there has been a movement from automatic wage 
progressions to variable ones, based on an evaluation of individual performance 
(Interview 3 and 4). Lastly, the company collective agreement contains a opening 
clause which, in cases of economic difficulties, allows the management to bargain 
with the works council over derogations. In 2008, for example, the works council 
agreed to  such a  derogation,  defining a variable  regulation of the yearly bonus 
which foresaw that until 2012 the company would have paid the bonus only if the 
company realised profits.
According to a works councillor, without this agreement the management would 
have  contracted  out  the  easiest  activities  inside  the  warehouse  to  small  crafts 
(Gewerke) and to external drivers, which are paid wages of around €8 per hour 
(Interview 4). This is much lower than the lowest wage group within the company 
collective agreement, which lies at  €10 per hour (Interview 3 and 4). Thus, the 
company agreement enabled the works council to keep these activities in-house. 
In February 2013, a new company collective agreement was signed. The goal of the 
agreement is to stepwise reduce wages at InfraServ Logistics at a level 10% below 
the chemical industry (Interview 9). This will  be achieved through the fact that 
future wage increases negotiated at sectoral level will be applied to the company's 
workforce just for 50% of their level. That means that, if the wage increase in the 
chemical industry is bargained at 5%, InfraServ Logistik employees will receive 
just 2,5%. Working time is set at 39 hours per week and it has been agreed that 
future collective agreements  which do not  deal  with salary issues  (for  example 
collective  agreements  on  the  management  of  ageing  workforce,  the 
Demographietarifvertrage) will not be applied to InfraServ Logistik. According to 
a works councillor this means that the company will progressively distance itself 
from  the  bargaining  dynamics  of  the  chemical  industry.  According  to  the 
interviewed  works  councillors,  the  contract  is  worse  than  that  of  the  chemical 
sector, but it is still between 10% and 20% higher than the collective agreement of 
the logistic sector (Interview 3 and 4).
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Agency work and subcontractors
At the time of the interview, InfraServ Logistic employed 12-13 agency workers 
(Interview 3). According to the chair of the works council, agency work is used to 
cover fluctuations in clients' demands and production peaks. Agency workers have 
the same qualification level of direct employees and perform the same activities. In 
some cases, agency workers are directly hired by InfraServ Logistics after some 
time. 
According to the chair of the works council, agency workers at InfraServ Logistics 
are paid according to the equal pay principle. However he did not know whether 
agencies providing agency workers to InfraServ Logistics were part of the sector's 
employers association. Moreover, during the interview the works councillor could 
not say exactly where this equal pay principle came from. At the beginning, he 
argued that parity came from the collective agreement of the chemical industry 
(Manteltarifvertrag). I asked whether he was referring to the collective agreement 
on the additional  wage bonuses (Branchenzuschlaege)  signed by the IGBCE in 
2012 and he answered positively. This casts some doubt on the fact that agency 
workers are really paid according to the equal pay principle, since that collective 
agreement  does  not  foresee  a  wage  parity.  Moreover,  this  uncertainty  clearly 
highlights that agency work is not a crucial topic on the works council's agenda. 
This  seems  to  be  confirmed  also  by  the  fact  that  there  is  no  company-level 
agreement on agency work (Interview 3).
InfraServ  Logistic  used  to  rely  on  on-site  subcontracting  (Werkvertraege).  
However, at the time of the interview (20.10.2013) there were no subcontracting 
agreements, since the introduction of the 39 hours working week (through the new 
collective  agreement)  has  reduced  the  company's  necessity  to  rely  on  external 
employment. Subcontracting agreements were usually made with craft companies. 
The chair  of  the  works  council  did  not  know how these  companies  paid  their 
employees  (Interview  3).  Subcontracting  agreements  are  used  both  to  cover 
production peaks in the regular business and to perform easier tasks. For example, 
InfraServ  Logistics  had  for  a  long  time  a  subcontracting  agreement  for  the 
packaging of chemical products at client's premises. This subcontracting agreement 
employed 3 people coming from a craft. However, InfraServ Logistics recently lost 
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the commission and the subcontracting agreement with this company was ended. 
At plant level there are no agreements regulating the issue, thus suggesting that 
subcontracting is not a crucial topic for the works council.
In  2004,  the  company  outsourced  the  management  of  the  containers  terminal. 
Indeed,  InfraServ  Logistik  developed  a  joint-venture  with  the  transporting 
company Contargo in order to build FIT GmbH (Frankfurt Intermodal Terminal 
GmbH, today entirely controlled by Contargo and called Contargo  Industriepark 
Frankfurt-Hoechst  GmbH),  which  operates  intermodal  (sea,  train  and  truck) 
transportation  and  on-site  container  maintenance  and  repairs.  The  container 
terminal was financed by the city council as a measure to reduce unemployment 
(Interview 3 and 4). 
Again,  a main issue against further outsourcing is identified by the interviewed 
works councillors in employers' fear of conflicts. For example, InfraServ logistic is 
planning to outsource the management of the train transport service. According to a 
works councillor, a suitable train company it is currently looked for which could 
take over the business. However, since train transport is a key position (with such 
crucial positions we could shut down the whole park”, Interview 3 and 4), there is a 
problem of control. According to the two works councillors, this issue often enters 
negotiations. 
Interviewer: Does it bring advantages?
Respondent: In negotiations? I would say so. (…) Even our mother company is forced by 
the shareholders in that they say “OK, we want cheaper prices, but we also want to work 
(Interview 4).
Bilfinger Maintenance Sued
Bilfinger Maintenance Sued belongs to the business segment Industrial Services of 
the Bilfinger SE, a former construction company now increasingly active also in 
the provision of industrial services. Worldwide, the Bilfinger group employs more 
than 66,000 employees (Bilfinger 2013). The business segment industrial services 
is  represented  by  the  Bilfinger  Industrial  Services  GmbH.  In  the  year  2012, 
Bilfinger Industrial Services counted 37,000 workers, an increase of over a quarter 
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from the  2011  level  set  at  slightly  less  than  30,000  workers.  BIS'  continuous 
growth is due to subsequent mergers and acquisitions. Bilfinger Maintenance Sued 
is  one of those cases.  Indeed,  until  1997 the company constituted the technical 
division of the Hoechst AG and, after the creation of InfraServ, became its division 
“Technical  Services”.  2003,  InfraServ  Hoechst  outsourced  the  division  in  an 
autonomous  subsidiary,  Infraserv  Hoechst  Technik.  Exactly  as  in  the  case  of 
InfraServ Logistics, this decision was taken because the company was operating at 
a loss and reductions in personnel costs were deemed necessary (Interview 5). 
Interviewer: Why did InfraServ Hoechst decide to outsource this division?
Respondent: Because back then we were for a long time in the red. And then they have  
tried  to...  well,  we  were  outsourced  in  2003,  and  then  we  were  for  a  year,  was  the 
company not part of the employers' association, so we passed a wage increase [coming 
from the collective agreement]. And in 2004 we also bargained the 40 hours week without 
corresponding wage increase (…).
Interviewer: This means that the most important reason for the outsourcing decision was 
a reduction of personnel costs?
Respondent: Exactly (Interview 5).
In 2005, the company was sold to Rheinhold&Mahla, part of the Bilfinger group. 
In 2013, Bilfinger Industrieservice Mitte was renamed Bilfinger Maintenance Sued 
GmbH (BIS 2013). 
The company performs both regular maintenance and emergency stoppages and 
offers complete packages of technical intervention, which range from engineering 
know how for  the  planning of  production  facilities,  to  the  actual  technical  and 
maintenance services. For the regular operations, the company normally bargains 
long-lasting general agreements (Rahmenvereinbarungen) with client companies. 
Thereby a fixed amount of Bilfinger Maintenance Sued's employees works steadily 
directly  on  clients'  premises.  Shorter  contracts  are  instead  bargained  either  for 
standstills or for the construction of new production facilities. At the industrial park 
Hoechst  the  company  employs  around  850  workers.  Among  them,  620  are 
employed in technical services. All workers have a vocational qualification. Most 
of the workers are employed between E6 and E8 levels.  Technical  services are 
traditional trade union's strongholds. 74% of the company's employees belong to 
the IG BCE.
According to the chair of the works council, price competition with external service 
providers is quite high. The main competitors are Zoth GmbH&Co KG und H&R 
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Industrierohrbau GmbH, both settled in the park and employing respectively 500 
and 200 workers36. It is unclear whether they apply a collective agreement, but the 
works  councils  argue  that,  since  they  do  not  apply  the  chemical  collective 
agreement, they pose the company under fierce competition.
Pay setting system
The company applies the chemical collective agreement but the works council has 
negotiated an opening clause with regard to working time. Already at the time of 
the outsourcing from InfraServ Hoechst cost reduction was a significant issue. For 
one  year,  the  newly  grounded  InfraServ  Hoechst  Technik  did  not  join  the 
employers'  association  in  order  to  avoid  the  yearly wage increase  bargained at 
sectoral level. In 2004 the works council agreed to increase working time from 37,5 
hours per week to 40 hours per week without wage compensation. This represented 
a saving of around 6,3% in wage costs.
A further opening clause was bargained with regard to the yearly bonus. According 
to the chemical collective agreement, workers are entitled to a fixed yearly bonus 
corresponding to  95% of  a  monthly wage.  At  Bilfinger  Maintenance  Sued,  the 
yearly bonus has been made dependent  on the company's  performance and can 
oscillate between 80% and 120% of a monthly wage. Furthermore, several over-
tariff benefits coming from Hoechst times (such as bonuses after 25-40-50 years 
employment in the company) have been reduced to the level set in the collective 
agreement. 
Agency work and subcontracting
Agency  work  represents  an  important  element  at  Bilfinger  Maintenance  Sued. 
Indeed, the company makes large use of temporary agency workers and around 
120-130 are steadily present in the company. This represents around around 15% of 
the whole workforce. According to the chair of the works council, the company 
hires agency workers in order to manage production peaks. Indeed, the business 
model of Bilfinger Maintenance Sued is irregular and dwindling, with a structural 
36  Zoth does not work just at the industrial park Hoechst and has just a production facility in the 
park. Instead, H&R seats in the industrial park and works mostly for the chemical companies 
active in the park.
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peak after summer (due to the periodical maintenance stops chemical companies 
have to perform every year) and unforeseeable peaks when new facilities are built. 
The use of agency workers enables the company to protect the stable workforce. 
Through this instrument we manage peaks and throats. At the time in which there was 
little to do, when there was the crisis, it was 2008 I think, we had no agency workers. But  
thereby we could also keep our workforce (Interview 5).
As one can clearly see from the words of the works councillor, this buffer function 
performed  by  agency  work  is  accepted  by  employees  representatives.  Indeed, 
agency work constitutes for the works council a protection for core employees and 
a way to protect them from market fluctuations.   According to the chair  of the 
Bilfinger  Maintenance  Sued  works  council,  they  are  almost  exclusively skilled 
workers,  are  employed  in  all  activity  segments  and  perform  almost  the  same 
activities done by regular employees.
They do not perform auxiliary functions. The one or the other yes, I have to be clear. But  
the largest amount of the colleagues, they are also very good skilled workers and they 
perform exactly the same tasks of the colleagues here at Bilfinger” (Interview 5).
However, this is not perceived as a problem by the works council, but more as a 
resource in that it enables this buffering mechanism. 
Agency workers usually have long tenure (sometimes even 2-3 years) and are often 
hired permanently by the company after a period of time (Interview 5). The chair of 
the works council argued that in the last year, around 50 agency workers were hired 
permanently by Bilfinger Maintenance Sued.
There are no plant-level agreements regulating the issue of agency work, but the 
works council exercises control over several aspects of the issue, thanks to the fact 
that  the  works  council  has  to  approve  agency workers'  deployment.  The  issue 
where most of the works council's attention concentrate is that agencies providing 
agency  workers  apply  the  DGB  collective  agreements  for  the  agency  sector 
(agency workers are hired from several small agencies active in the region). Thus, 
agency workers at Bilfinger Maintenance Sued receive the additional wage bonuses 
bargained by the IG BCE at sectoral level.
According to the chair of the works council, the company has outsourced facility 
services  to  other  segments  of  the  Bilfinger  group,  but  does  not  rely  on  other 
subcontracting agreements. Thus, this is not an issue for the works council.
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Summary
Table 5 below offers a summary of working conditions, vertical disintegration and 
works councils' strategies within the industrial park Hoechst. As we can see, the 
disintegration of Hoechst has produced a fragmentation of employment conditions 
within  the  park.  Even  if  almost  all  companies  in  the  park  have  experienced  a 
reduction  in  wage  levels  with  respect  to  those  paid  by  Hoechst37,  the  largest 
differentiation occurs between service and production companies. Indeed, even if 
chemical  companies  have  also  progressively  reduced  the  level  of  over-tariff 
payments  over  the  last  20  years,  they  still  generally  pay  above  the  chemical 
collective  agreement  (Interview  8).  Service  companies,  instead,  have  adopted 
several forms of pay reduction, which have either brought them to the level of the 
collective agreement, or have even introduced derogations, such as reduced pay 
rates  or  increases  in  working  hours. Still,  according  to  the  works  councils  all 
companies  in  the  park  are  covered  by  the  chemical  collective  agreements. 
However, the responsible trade unionists highlighted that two exceptions are the 
catering company Eurest, which applies a house collective agreement negotiated 
with  the  catering  union  NGG,  and  Siemens  which  operates  the  IT-system and 
applies the metal collective agreements (Interview 9). As the chair of the local trade 
union branch has argued “with regard to the number of people, this goes for just 
500  employees.  The  rest  of  the  park  is  covered  by  the  chemical  collective 
agreement” (Interview 9).
However,  this  argument  seems  questionable.  First,  when  talking  about  the 
collective  bargaining  structure,  interview  partners  always  refer  to  those  firms 
grown out from the disintegration of the former Hoechst AG and not  to newly 
settled  ones.  On the  contrary,  when talking  about  competitive  pressures,  works 
councillors of service providers argue that some of their competitors which do not 
apply the chemical collective agreements are indeed settled in the park. Secondly, 
interview  partners  always  talk  about  firms  settled  in  the  park,  not  taking  into 
account external companies not settled in the park, but which continuously provide 
services on a contract basis. They usually fall outside the chemical representation 
37 According to a trade unionist, Hoechst had such operational margins, that it was able to pay far 
above what was set in the sectoral collective agreement. Indeed, the company presented a 
positive wage drift of around 20 percent (Interview 9, see also Kaedtler 2006). Today, probably 
only Sanofi is able to pay at a comparable level (Interview 9, Interview 2)
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domain and do apply other  collective agreements (and sometimes no collective 
agreements at all).  Lastly, there seem to be no great awareness of smaller firms 
settled in the park (those which do not have a works council). 
The  fact  that  workers'  representatives  neglect  these  units  somehow reveals  the 
implicit  idea  they  have  on  what  represents  their  constituency.  Indeed,  even  if 
employees' representatives argue they represent the chemical park as a whole, they 
in fact concentrate on workers and firms grown from the Hoechst's disintegration. 
For those companies' segments they have ensured a unitary representation domain. 
Instead, they seem not to be so worried about the presence of small firms applying 
none or other collective agreements and of agency workers. Apparently, this is due 
to  the  fact  that  these  unions  do  not  constitute  a  threat  to  the  representation 
monopoly of the chemical union within the park (Interview 1). Moreover, these 
workforce segments do not compete with the internal workforce and, thus, provide 
no incentives for inclusion. 
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Table 5. Wage segmentation and works councils' strategies at the industrial park Hoechst
BCS Clariant InfraServ InfraServ Logistics BIS
Position in the value 
chain
Final producer Final producer Site operator Service provider Service provider
Employees 680 1500 1900 580 800
Pay set-
ting
Regular 
workers
Sectoral agreement + bo-
nuses (8-10% yearly wage)
Sectoral agreement + bo-
nuses
Sectoral agreement + bo-
nus (around 4% yearly 
wage)
Company-level collective 
agreement (working time 
39h and wage 10% below 
the sectoral agreement).
Sectoral agreement with 
two opening clauses (work-
ing time 40h, flexible 
yearly bonus)
Subsidiaries BBS and BTS: same sec-
toral agreement but open-
ing clause 
Bayer Gastronomie: non 
chemical
None See InfraServ Logistics None None
Agency 
workers
DGB collective agreements 
+ IGBCE additional wages
DGB collective agreements 
+ IGBCE additional wages
DGB collective agreements 
+ IGBCE additional wages
DGB collective agreements 
+ IGBCE additional wages
DGB collective agreements 
+ IGBCE additional wages
Subcontract-
ors
Other collective agree-
ments (not specified)
Other collective agree-
ments (not specified)
Other collective agree-
ments (not specified)
Other collective agree-
ments (not specified)
None
External 
flexibility
Agency work Very limited (10) Very limited (35) Very limited (less than 10) Very limited (6-7) Intensive (15%)
Subcontract-
ors
Support services on-site 
(logistics, maintenance)
Support services on-site 
(outbound logistics, pack-
aging)
On-site, also core business, 
in the future probably also 
facility management
Support services on-site Support services on-site 
(facility management)
Works Agency work Acceptance Acceptance in exchange Restrictive Neglection Acceptance as flexibility 
councils’
position 
for the hiring of trainees. buffer
Subcontract-
ors
Acceptance Acceptance for peripheral 
services
Used to avoid concessions 
for the direct workforce
Acceptance for peripheral 
services (container termin-
al)
Regula-
tion
Agency work No company-level agree-
ment, but control by the 
works council.
Prevalence of internal em-
ployment. 
Application of the IGBCE 
additional wages
Quota (maximum 50)
Hiring just as production 
assistants
Application of the IGBCE 
additional wages
No company-level agree-
ment, but control by the 
works council
No company-level agree-
ment
No company-level agree-
ment, but control by the 
works council.
Application of the IGBCE 
additional wages
Subcontract-
ors
No extension of regulation No extension of regulation No extension of regulation No extension of regulation No extension of regulation
4.3.2. Chempark Krefeld-Uerdingen
The chemical park in Krefeld was the second-largest production site of Bayer and 
up  until  1998  a  unitary  production  site.  The  current  multi-employer  structure 
originates from the reorganisation of the Bayer company. The first outsourcing of a 
big segment of the company took place in 1998, when Bayer AG outsourced its 
dioxide division with 600 employees to an American company (Interview 12). That 
was the business segment that today constitutes Sachtleben. In the year 2000, Bayer 
outsourced the catering and logistic services in two autonomous subsidiaries (Bayer 
Gastronomie  and Chemion respectively).  In  2002,  Bayer  undertook a  complete 
restructuring  of  its  internal  structure.  The  company  was  reconfigured  as  a 
“Strategic  Management  Holding”,  and  was  divided  in  four  production  (Bayer 
Healthcare,  Bayer  Material  Science,  Bayer  Crop  Science,  Bayer  Ground 
Chemicals)  and  three  service  (Bayer  Business  Services,  Bayer  Technology 
Services, and Bayer Industrial Services) companies. Bayer Industrial Services took 
up  the  role  of  site  operator,  managing  the  common  infrastructural  space  and 
providing other companies with auxiliary services. In 2005, Bayer sold its Ground 
Chemicals  unit  and  40%  of  the  shares  of  the  site  operating  company,  Bayer 
Industrial  Services,  to  Lanxess.  Hence,  as  we  will  better  see  in  subsequent 
paragraphs,  today  the  site  operator  is  owned  by  the  two  biggest  production 
companies  settled  in  the  park.  Due  to  further  processes  of  acquisitions  and 
subcontracting, the site counts today 22 different companies which employ around 
7,500 workers (Chempark 2013). The most important production companies are 
Lanxess  (1,500  employees),  Bayer  Material  Science  (1,000  employees)  and 
Sachtleben  (500  employees).  Service  providers  are  Currenta,  Chemion,  Aliseca 
(240 employees), Bayer Business Services (10 employees) and Bayer Technology 
Services.
Among  these  companies,  external  service  providers  entering  the  park  though 
subcontracted  agreements  with  settled  companies  are  not  considered.  On  these 
service providers, the number of employees they employ for providing required 
services and how they pay their employees, works councils have no information 
(Interview 10, Interview 12). 
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Table 6. Overview Chempark Krefeld-Uerdingen
Chempark 
Krefeld-
Uerdingen
Company Area of activity Number of 
employees
Collective agreement
Main production 
facilities
BMS Materials 1000 Chemical
Lanxess Pigments 1500 Chemical
Sachtleben Ground chemicals 500 Chemical (with 
opening clause)
Main service 
facilities
Currenta Site operator 610 Plant-level collective 
agreement (IGBCE)
Tectrion Maintenance 220 Plant-level collective 
agreement (IGBCE)
Chemion Logistics 1000 Plant-level collective 
agreement (IGBCE)
Aliseca Maintenance 240 Chemical
Bayer 
Gastronomie 
Catering N/A Not chemical (possibly 
catering)
BBS IT 10 Chemical (with 
opening clause)
BTS Engineering N/A Chemical (with 
opening clause)
Weber 
Rohrleitungsbau
Maintenance N/A Metal 
Horst Goetz 
Industriereinigung 
Industrial cleaning N/A Not chemical 
Lehnkering Logistics N/A Not chemical
Total 22 7500
The role of workers representatives
Similarly  to  what  happened  at  Hoechst,  workers'  representatives  did  not  enter 
restructuring decisions (Interview 10, 12). The sole exception to this rule was the 
case  of  Bayer  Industrial  Services  (BIS,  today  Currenta),  where  a  fierce 
counterposition  took  place  over  the  subcontracting  of  some  segments  of  the 
company after  it  was  already outsourced  by Bayer.  At  BIS,  the  works  council 
aimed at blocking outsourcing and to find a “solution under the same root” (see the 
paragraph on Currenta for further details). According to an interviewee, this was 
due to the perceived commitment of the works council towards workers who were 
employed since a long time by Bayer.
So,  this  was the  biggest  problem: through the  transfer  you  would have  moved those 
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people into other collective bargaining realms. Some would have become ver.di, some 
other  IG  Metall,  still  other  would  have  had  no  collective  bargaining  coverage.  In 
principle,  you  would  have  left  those  people  to  their  own  destiny  (…).  And  this  is 
simply...we did not want that, because they have been part of this company for a long 
time (Interview 10).
In  general,  instead,  works  councils  have  dealt  with  the  social  consequences  of 
restructuring,  leaving  restructuring  decisions  to  the  management.  They  have 
operated  through  the  definition  of  transition  agreements 
(Ueberleitungsvereinbarungen),  which  aimed  at  ensuring  existing  individual 
working conditions for transferred employees.
The second major goal of employees' representatives was to keep all companies 
settled in the park under the representation realm of the chemical union. Again, the 
most problematic aspect was represented by those company or company segments 
carrying out service activities. As at Hoechst, indeed, the presence of new market 
relationship  between  chemical  companies  and  service  providers  produced  a 
pressure on prices for the new service companies. Due to the high incidence of 
personnel costs within service companies, this pressure translated into cost-cutting 
pressures on wages. Actually, as we will see below, this was exactly the aim of the 
management in defining outsourcing processes (Interview 11). Again as in Hoechst, 
cost-cutting  pressures  were  dealt  with  through  the  reliance  on  flexibilisation 
measures present in the chemical collective agreement (i.e.  opening clauses and 
company-level collective agreements). This kind of concessions have been used 
both in the first restructuring phase (i.e. during the reorganisation of Bayer) and in 
subsequent outsourcing waves concerning the single companies and most  of all 
service providers. They have enabled the works councils  and the union to keep 
almost all companies within the chemical bargaining realm even if, as we will see 
further  on,  at  the  expense  of  wage segmentation  across  different  companies  or 
company segments.
Still, in some cases these flexibilisation instruments were not sufficient, since wage 
differentials between the chemical collective agreements and those applied in other 
branches were too big. This was, for example, the case of Bayer Gastronomie (a 
subsidiary  of  Bayer  providing  catering  services  and  growth  out  of  the 
externalisation of Bayer's catering division), where, according to the chair of the 
works council, 
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we have tried to negotiate a plant-level agreement for Bayer Gastronomie, because due to 
the kind of activities the responsible trade union would be the catering union NGG and 
they have for these activities significantly lower rates than we as IG BCE have. And there 
the deviations were very very big, they were even 40-50% under the collective agreement 
of the chemical industry. And therefore an opening clause would have not been sufficient. 
So  the  IG  BCE  tried  to  bargain  a  plant-level  collective  agreement  with  Bayer  
Gastronomie,  with  distinct  pay  rates,  below  those  of  the  chemical  industry,  but 
significantly above those  of  the  NGG:  But  we did  not  manage  to  do that.  We have 
bargained  the  transition,  according  to  which  transferred  workers  maintained  a  wage 
security for seven years, but a new collective agreement came about (Interview 12).
According to the interviewed works councillors, retaining the collective bargaining 
unity  inside  the  park  was  possible  because  of  the  presence  of  flexibilisation 
instruments in the chemical collective agreement.
Interviewer: I would like to know which is your opinion with regard to the factors that 
have enabled you to maintain a relatively homogeneous situation within the park, with 
almost all the companies applying collective agreements of the chemical union.
Respondent: This has been possible thanks to intensive contacts with the IG BCE and to  
the reliance on opening clauses. Had we not had these instruments within our collective  
agreement, this would have not been possible (Interview 12).
Also for the management, the union's willingness to compromise and to accept to 
derogate the sectoral collective agreement was an important point for accepting not 
to pursue more extreme vertical disintegration agenda.
Interviewer: I was wondering why the management accepted this solution and did not 
pursue higher cost-advantages through further outsourcing. 
Respondent. They have understood, that we works councils and also the IG BCE are 
ready to  find  creative  solutions  for  the  companies  under  the  heading  of  opening 
clauses. So that at the end we could say “with this solution we have been able to 
reach prices that  are  similar to those that  exist at competitors”.  And through this 
argument we have been able to persuade also the management (Interview 10).
The IG BCE is a partner for good solutions, because they have been willing to accept  
suitable  corrections  in  their  collective  bargaining  politics,  which  also  employees 
benefit from, since through these instruments they could secure their jobs (Interview 
Waldi).
Beside  the  union's  willingness  to  accommodate  employers  requests  through 
flexibilisation  instruments,  however,  also  employers'  fear  of  conflicts  possibly 
originating from the entrance of other unions in the chemical park was deemed 
important in order to explain why the union maintains a monopoly representation 
within the park.
I  think  that  employers  also  have  worries  that,  if  they  outsource  or  sell  certain 
activities which are, let's say, important for a chemical park, there could other unions 
suddenly  play  a  role.  So  everything  has  remained  under  the  chemical  collective 
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agreement  and  the  IG  BCE.  Try  to  imagine,  they  now  sell  the  maintenance 
department and it goes to another company, which falls under the responsibility of 
the IG Metall, and they have the collective bargaining round. They might strike and 
during the strike they stop doing maintenance for the machinery in the park. I think 
the risk is too big (Interview 10).
Representation structures and site cooperation
Representation structures in Krefeld-Uerdingen are slightly less dispersed than in 
the industrial park Hoechst. Indeed, differently than what happened in Hoechst, the 
Bayer works council bargained a collective agreement according to paragraph 3 of 
the Works Constitution Act for the construction of a unitary representation structure 
for the companies grown out of the reorganisation of Bayer and belonging to the 
Bayer Holding. 
We have bargained a collective agreement with the IG BCE and Bayer for constructing a 
personnel  group (Personalbund). Juridically, these were four autonomous companies, but 
we have acted as if they were still one company (Interview 12).
Still today, the companies belonging to the Bayer Holding (with the exception of 
Bayer Gastronomie and of the Currenta group, which is owned by Bayer solely for 
60%) are represented by the same works council.  Similarly,  the Lanxess works 
council  bargained the  extension  of  its  representation  mandate  to  the  subsidiary 
Aliseca. However, the less fragmented nature of representation structures did not 
prevent  the  development  of  differentiated  working  conditions  also  within  the 
representation realm of a single works council. Indeed, works councils negotiated 
derogations  and  different  employment  conditions  for  specific  segments  of  the 
workforce or for different subsidiaries in the group (see below for examples).
In terms of intra-firm cooperation,  the works councils  of the park have built  a 
works councils forum which has the duty to coordinate works councils' activities 
and discuss common issues (Interview 12, Interview 10).
Through the IG BCE, we have established a “chemical park works councils' conference”,  
where we all convene, all works councils of the chemical park. Because we use the same 
infrastructure, the same building for social activities,  the same canteens. i.e. there are 
several area of codetermination or several areas of haelth and safety at work that because 
of codetermination concern us all. And therefore we have to coordinate, even though we 
are all autonomous bodies, we have to coordinate with regard to how we deal with certain 
issues and ensure that we get the same information on certain issues (Interview 12).
According  to  the  interviewed  works  councils,  this  coordination  structure  meets 
every three months and works quite well,  ensuring the exchange of information 
107
among the works councillors. Still, it does not constitute an instrument to deal with 
the effects of marketisation processes over working conditions.
In the next paragraphs, I will present the extent of vertical disintegration within the 
single firms and how employees' representatives have dealt with the issue.
Bayer Material Science
Bayer  Material  Science  (BMS) is  a  company belonging  to  the  Bayer  Holding. 
Worldwide, the company employs 14,500 employees and in 2012 its total revenues 
amounted  to  11,6 billion  Euros.  BMS is  a  global  corporation  with  around 300 
production sites. As we have seen, BMS is the incumbent of Krefeld Chempark and 
employs  today  1,000  workers.  The  focus  of  the  Krefeld-Uerdingen  site 
concentrates mostly on production. A research centre used to be active in the site, 
but it was closed in 2009, and the employees were transferred to Leverkusen (after 
a 30% reduction in occupational levels).
Over time, the Bayer group has established several subsidiaries. As we have seen, 
Bayer Gastronomie is specialised in catering activities and employs 700 workers. 
The company runs canteens and internal restaurants in the three production sites 
and in Leverkusen also a hotel. Moreover, the company has enlarged the business 
towards the outside and provides  catering for private  events  in  the Rhine area. 
Bayer  Technology  Services  is  the  subsidiary  for  engineering  services  and 
technological solutions and employs 2,300 workers worldwide and had sales of 
approximately EUR 450 million  in  2012 (BTS 2013).  Bayer  Business  Services 
manages the IT and HR services (this latter through a further subsidiary) for the 
whole group. It has 4,300 employees worldwide and had sales of around €1,093 
million in 2012 (BBS 2013). 
Pay setting system
BMS  is  member  of  the  employer  association  of  the  chemical  sector  and  its 
employees are paid according to the sector's collective agreement. The largest part 
of  BMS  employees  are  employed  between  the  levels  E6  (skilled  workers, 
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Facharbeiter)  and E8 and have a vocational training in the relevant occupation 
(chemical or mechanical occupations). There are some older employees which are 
employed at the E5 level, since they were trained in non-chemical occupations and 
were trained on the job when they were hired by Bayer (Interview 12).
As for Bayer Crop Science, BMS has several over tariff payments, which range 
from an additional pension scheme to a nursery. BMS' employees are also entitled 
to a bonus system which amounts between one and three additional monthly wages 
(Interview 12). This roughly represents a positive wage drift of at least 8-10%.
Different  working  conditions  have  been  bargained  for  the  subsidiaries,  mostly 
through  the  use  of  opening  clauses.  An  increase  in  working  time  has  been 
bargained for employees at  Bayer Technology Services, which work 40 hours a 
week (instead of the 37,5 fixed at sectoral level) without a corresponding increase 
of  the  compensation.  Bayer  Business  Services  does  not  have  the  same  wage 
structure as in the chemical collective agreement. Indeed, instead of 13 pay groups 
(Entgeltgruppen), workers are grouped in 5 X-levels (Baender). According to the 
chair of the works council, this allows the company “a larger flexibility to group 
new employees” (Interview 12). Moreover, due to lower wages among competitors 
(according to an interviewee, competitors pay even 20-30% less) the works council 
agreed for a cut in wages of 10%. 
Due to the competitive situation, we have bargained...we have looked at it very closely at 
that time, how was the situation at the other big players in the sector, and they paid even 
20-30% below our collective agreement. And so we have bargained, in order to keep our 
collective agreement, a 10% reduction in pay levels (Interview 12).
This was not achieved directly, but through an increase in working hours (from the 
37,5 hours per week settled in the sectoral agreement to 40 hours per week) and the 
absorption of  3,3% of  the wage increase in  the following collective bargaining 
round  (Verrechnung).  This  opening  clause  was  bargained  because  the  works 
council wanted to ensure that the company segment remained under the chemical 
collective  agreement  and  that  the  company  restrained  to  carry  out  other 
outsourcing. However, after some time Bayer management violated the prerequisite 
for the bargaining of the opening clause, outsourcing a part of the tasks covered by 
the opening clause. Thus, the works council did not renew the opening clause on 
working time and BBS employees went back to 37,5 hours per week (Interview 
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12).
The company did not respect what we wanted to gain with the opening clause, namely to 
avoid further outsourcing (…) – the company wanted to outsource other segments, in 
some cases to India (…) and sell them to other companies – and they did it last year to 
the company Atos. And in the negotiations we argued that, through the alignment with the 
conditions of the competitors, our goal  was to avoid offshoring and outsourcing and the 
reduction of jobs. And now you do it anyhow. So our preconditions are no longer met. 
Therefore, we have denied that part of the contract and our colleagues work now 37,5 
hours a week (Interview 12).
Bayer Gastronomie has no collective agreements with the chemical union, but it is 
not clear whether it applies an NGG collective agreement or none at all. According 
to the works council  of the Bayer AG, when the company was outsourced, the 
former works council tried to bargain a specific collective agreement for the Bayer 
Gastronomie.  However,  the  wage  differentials  between  what  foreseen  in  the 
chemical collective agreement and the collective agreement applied in the catering 
industry (NGG) are around 40-50%. Thus, the works council was not able to keep 
it under the chemical representation domain, neither trough an opening clause, nor 
through  a  specific  plant-level  collective  agreement  (unternehmensbezogener 
Verbandstarifvertrag). Instead, the works council was able to negotiate a transfer 
agreement, according to which transferred employees kept their working conditions 
for  seven  years  (longer  than  what  foreseen  under  the  law  for  the  transfer  of 
undertakings, which protects working conditions just for one year) (Interview 12).
Agency work and subcontractors
Agency work is very limited at Bayer Material Science (BMS). At the time of the 
interview (27.10.2013), the company was employing around 20 agency workers. 
According to the chair of the works council, this is already a significant number in 
respect to the average utilisation of agency work at BMS (in past years they had an 
average  of  5-10  agency  workers)  (Interview  12).  They  are  mostly  utilised  as 
substitutes in cases of illness or vacation of permanent workers. According to the 
chair of the works council, the main explanation for this low level of agency work 
is  the  presence  of  a  company-level  agreement  where  the  social  partners  have 
excluded economic redundancies (betriebsbedingte Kuendigungen) and stated the 
prevalence  of  internal  over  external  employment.  With  regard  to  the  issue  of 
agency  work,  this  agreement  sets  that  in  order  to  deploy  agency  workers  the 
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company has to prove that nobody else among the company's employees can cover 
that job (Interview 12). Even if external personnel is needed, moreover, the works 
council tends to prefer (and thus asks the management) the hiring of workers with 
fixed-term contracts (befristete Beschaeftigte) to agency workers (Interview 12). 
Lastly, Bayer has a special employee platform, so called Bayjobs, where employees 
which have finished their vocational training and still do not have a position within 
the  company  or  employees  whose  jobs  have  become  redundant  are  temporary 
placed  and  can  be  assigned  to  different  activities.  Through  this  system,  the 
company  also  covers  those  temporary  vacancies  (like  illness  or  vacation  of 
permanent employees) which would otherwise be covered through agency work. 
In case the company hires agency workers, the works council controls that agencies 
belong to the employers association of the agency sector, so that agency workers 
get the additional wages bargained by IG BCE at sectoral level. However, no equal 
pay provisions have been bargained for these workers. The permanent hiring of 
agency workers by BMS is considered as an absolute exception, since the company 
privileges the creation of an internal labour market and the hiring of young workers 
which  have  finished a  vocational  training within  the  company (Auszubildende). 
According to our interviewee, agency work is not a crucial  issue for the works 
council (“the issue agency work is not a key one”, Interview 12) and it is handled 
as if it was a completely marginal phenomenon.
Much more critical is the issue of outsourcing and subcontracting, “where people 
working on our  premises  are  removed from the chemical  collective agreement, 
because  they work  for  other  companies,  which  sometimes  do  not  even have  a 
collective agreement” (Interview 12).
According to the chair of the works council, it is difficult to understand how many 
workers are employed at the site through subcontracting agreements. “We always 
ask it, but we get no satisfactory answer”. According to her, sometimes even BMS's 
management  does  not  know  how  many  workers  are  employed  by  the 
subcontractors, because they sometimes contract out work themselves. Some years 
ago, an estimate was attempted relying on an instrument used to assess personnel 
efficiency (the Shell Personnel Index), which maps the use of external personnel in 
every function. According to the analysis, the number of external personnel has 
111
grown significantly over  the  years,  in  some maintenance  segments  even by 50 
percent.  However,  the chair of the works council was not able to give concrete 
numbers on this issue.
As we have seen,  some service segments have been outsourced to subsidiaries. 
Bayer Technology services provides engineering and other technical services. IT-
services are provided by Bayer Business Services. Some of these services are not 
provided in Germany, but have been offshored. For example, the Head Desk for IT 
services is based in India and the accounting department in Manila (Interview 6). 
Services related to the common infrastructure of the park are provided by Currenta 
(see  further  on  for  details).  Catering  services  have  been  transferred  into  an 
autonomous subsidiary in 2000 and today they are provided by Bayer Gastronomie.
A reorganisation  of  the  logistics  process  is  currently  taking  place  at  the  BMS 
production site in Dormagen, with the goal to subcontract further segments of the 
logistics  services.  starting  from  2016-2017,  this  will  take  place  in  Krefeld-
Uerdingen as well according to the program “Site logistics NRW”.
In the past, the issue of outsourcing had been regulated by a plant-level agreement 
bargained by the works council (Betriebsvereinbarung), but according to the chair 
of the works council this agreement is no longer applied in the praxis (Interview 
12).  The  works  council  would  like  to  bargain  another  agreement  on  external 
employment  (Fremdbeschaeftigung),  covering  both  agency  work  and 
subcontracting. However, even if the management is willing to discuss the issue of 
agency work, it is not available to jointly regulate subcontracting, arguing it is a 
free company decision. An agreement has been bargained in 2013 for dealing with 
the restructuring process and outsourcing of the logistics services (Interview 12). 
The agreement obliges the company not to subcontract work to firms which do not 
apply a collective agreement. Thus, we can see a concern from the works council 
on the issue.
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Lanxess38
Lanxess  is  a  company  specialised  in  the  development,  manufacturing  and 
marketing of plastics, rubber, intermediates and speciality chemicals. The company 
grew out of the outsourcing of the Bayer Group’s chemical and plastics businesses 
at  the  beginning  of  2005.  In  2012,  the  company  generated  9.1  billion  Euros 
revenues and employed roughly 17,500 employees  worldwide (Lanxess 2013a). 
The company is currently represented at 52 production sites worldwide. Krefeld is 
the  second  largest  production  facility  operated  by  the  company  and  is  the 
headquarter of the Inorganic Pigments Business Unit (Lanxess 2013b). In Krefeld, 
the company employs 1,500 workers (Der Betriebsrat 2013: 10). Since the time of 
its  establishment,  Lanxess  has  built  a  subsidiary for  technical  and maintenance 
services, Aliseca. In Krefeld, Aliseca employs 240 workers. 
Pay setting system
Lanxess is member of the employers' association of the chemical industry and its 
employees are paid according to the chemical sectoral agreement. Employees at 
Aliseca  are  paid  according  to  the  chemical  collective  agreement  and  to  the 
company  agreement  of  the  mother  company.  Furthermore,  Lanxess  employees 
receive a yearly bonus which is dependent both on the company and the individual 
performance. The first element ranges between 2,5% and 7,5% of a yearly wage, 
the latter between 250€ and 1,5 monthly wage (Lanxess 2013b). This additional 
yearly bonus does  not  apply to  Aliseca.  Lanxess  works  council  also represents 
Aliseca's employees.
Agency work and subcontractors 
Agency work is  quite  widespread at  Lanxess.  At the end of 2012, the Lanxess 
group employed 673 agency workers (slightly less than 10% of the total workforce, 
see  Der Betriebsrat 2013: 10). In 2012, Lanxess in Krefeld employed 66 agency 
workers and Aliseca 4. According to the works council of the Leverkusen site, two 
38 The paragraph on Lanxess is not based on interviews with plant level informants, but with 
interviews of other works councillors and information retrieved on the internet.
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different  deployment  modes  can  be  highlighted  at  Lanxess  and  its  subsidiary 
Aliseca. While at Lanxess agency work is mainly used as a coverage for production 
peaks,  at  Aliseca  is  a  structural  component  of  the  daily  operations,  used  to 
substitute core workplaces and as an instrument for the reduction of wage costs 
(Der Betriebsrat 2013: 11). According to what reported in a newspaper published 
by the company's works council in Leverkusen,
While  Lanxess  and  Saltigo  [another  company  belonging  to  the  group]  make  use  of 
agency work mostly in order to cover production peaks and temporary vacancies, Aliseca 
follows another reasoning. In this case, agency work is used for the handling of daily 
activities or for standstills. In this case, agency work substitutes stable job positions and 
is used as an instrument for reducing personnel costs (Der Betriebsrat 2013: 11).
The fact that agency work is potentially substituting stable job positions had the 
consequence that the issue is acquiring importance for the works council. Indeed, 
the general works council is trying to bargain a new plant-level agreement on the 
issue. The platform entails the use of agency workers just for production peaks, the 
oblige  to  hire  agency workers  just  from agencies  applying the  DGB collective 
agreement,  and  the  inclusion  of  agency  workers  in  training  measures  (Der 
Betriebsrat 2013: 11). The logics of the agreement is, thus, to restrict the use of 
agency work and to ensure minimum standards for those employed.
With regard to outsourcing and subcontracting, technical services are outsourced to 
Aliseca.  Logistics  services  are  outsourced  as  well.  Since  2009,  a  part  of  these 
services have been outsourced to Lehnkering. No plant-level agreements, however, 
are in place with regard to the issue. 
Currenta
Currenta  is  the  site  operator  of  the  former  Bayer's  production  site  in  Krefeld-
Uerdingen.  It  was  externalised  as  Bayer  Industrial  Services  in  2002,  when the 
Bayer AG was restructured as a strategic holding (see above). 2005, it was renamed 
as  Currenta.  In  the  same  year  40%  of  the  company  was  sold  to  the  by  then 
autonomous Lanxess, so that today the company is owned 60% by Bayer and 40% 
by Lanxess.
Currenta  employs  3,300  workers  in  the  three  production  sites  of  Leverkusen, 
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Dormagen  and Krefeld-Uerdingen.  Currenta  has  six  business  segments:  energy, 
environment,  security,  CHEMPARK,  analytic  and  education.  As  for  InfraServ 
Hoechst, the services provided by Currenta can be divided between voluntary and 
monopoly services. According to a manager, monopoly services represent less than 
10% of  the  overall  sales  volume  (Interview Waldi).  Competition  with  external 
providers  represents  for  Currenta  a  major  challenge,  especially  in  voluntary 
services. This triggered several reorganisation measures aiming at increasing the 
company's competitiveness and adapting service prices to the market.
We are exposed to a very normal competition for getting contracts. This means that if 
we want to sell our services, also to our shareholders, we have to offer these services  
in competition with other providers.  We do not have particular rights,  so that for  
example our shareholders prefer our services. They get the offers also from other  
providers and our prices have to conform with them. Otherwise we will not get the 
contracts (Interview 10).
Indeed,  Currenta has two subsidiaries,  Chemion (logistic  services)  and Tectrion 
(maintenance)  which  employ  respectively  800  and  1100  employees  and  were 
founded  in  order  to  reduce  the  costs  of  service  provision  (Interview  Waldi). 
Chemion was founded in the year 2000 (not by Currenta, but by Bayer itself) as the 
second autonomous company at  the Krefeld-Uerdingen site together with Bayer 
Gastronomie.  The  company  is  active  in  Leverkusen,  Dormagen,  Krefeld  and 
Duisburg and employs around 1,000 workers in the four sites. Chemion provides 
transport  solutions,  on-site  and  distribution  logistics,  storage  and  batching  of 
chemical products, operates a container terminal and the Krefeld-Uerdingen port 
(Chemion 2013).
Tectrion was born in 2008 from the outsourcing of the Technical Services Business 
Unit from the former Bayer Industry Services. Today, the company employs 1,200 
workers in the three sites (Tectrion 2013). The works council was strongly against 
the outsourcing of Tectrion, but had to accept it to avoide it was sold. However, in 
exchange to its consent to the outsourcing, the works council required that Tectrion 
remained under the representation domain of the Currenta works council. 
In 2006, a fierce dispute arose between the works council and the management, 
because the management started plans to outsource the business segments security, 
analytics, facility management and maintenance (Interview 10).
The service department was operating at a massive deficit, i.e. we were making massive 
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losses. And therefore in 2006, after we elected a new works council, so we were more or 
less out of the Bayer system (Personalverbund), the have developed a so called “strategic 
project”.  And in this strategic project  the management tested which areas (…) of the 
company should belong to the service portfolio, to the core competences of a service  
provider within a chemical park. And the deliberation of the management was that around 
a third of all BIS employees – at stake were the areas plant security, chemical analysis,  
facility management and maintenance – they should have been sold to competitors, to  
other external providers specialised on these issues (Interview 10).
A manager very clearly explains that these measures were undertaken in order to 
gain competitiveness by redefining pay levels. 
Respondent: Thereby the goal was to strengthen the competitiveness of these areas, 
because no job can be kept, which is not competitive”.
Interviewer: And how was this to be achieved?
Respondent: Though a more adequate and more competitive pay structure (Interview 
Waldi).
However,  as  we  have  argued  above,  the  works  council  did  not  accept  the 
outsourcing decision because this would have implied worse working conditions 
for transferred employees.
We had long discussions with the employer, but could find no solution, because they 
always told us that, in comparison to external providers...I go on with the example 
maintenance. There are pure maintenance companies in Germany and they can offer 
their services at much lower prices than ours. Therefore, they would have liked to 
sell our maintenance. A consequence of this would have been that our people, if they 
were sold, would have got much lower wages and another working time. So worse 
employment conditions (interview 10).
The dispute was resolved through the definition of a specific plant-level collective 
agreement  which  derogates  the  sectoral  collective  agreement  with  respect  to 
working time and wages. This agreement also entailed a solidaristic contribution of 
all workers in the company in order to keep less competitive segments in-house. 
Indeed, workers employed in relatively competitive activity segments accepted a 
lengthening of their working time (see below for details) in order to allow weaker 
segments to  remain within the company and ensure that employer accepted the 
presence of some segments that were operating at a loss (Interview 10). Still, other 
derogations  have  been  required  for  the  latter  segments,  thus  producing  a 
segmentation in working conditions within the company. However, even though 
this instrument has enabled workers to remain within the representation realm of 
the chemical union, it is still questionable whether it offers a stable solution to the 
outsourcing problem, because the management continuously comes with requests 
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for new concessions. According to the chair of the works council,
This plant-level collective agreement was necessary in order to stabilise the situation of 
the company and to save jobs. But at the end we have a continuous pressure on the prices 
of our services, because also our shareholders, Bayer and Lanxess, compare our services 
with those of external competitors. And if at a competitor an hour of work costs €30 and 
we cost €40, then it is clear how big is the pressure. We know this since the very first day 
until today (Interview 10).
In order to partially compensate the pressure, the works council and the union have 
steadily argued on the difference between service personnel within a chemical park 
and  other  security.  Below  is  a  typical  argument  taken  from  the  information 
newspaper published by Currenta's works council:
the fact that the security industry can enter the market with very low personnel cost is a  
reality. However, equally clear is for the IG BCE that the plant security in a high-risk 
industry with high safety standards cannot be compared with the guards of a supermarket 
(Betriebsrat Leverkusen 2013).
However, in how far this argument is going to be effective is an open question. 
Pay setting system
Currenta is part of the chemical employers' association, but, as I have stressed, it 
does  not  apply  the  sectoral  collective  agreement,  but  a  specific  plant-level 
agreement  negotiated  between  the  company  and  the  local  IG  BCE  branch. 
However,  pay  levels  for  the  majority  of  Currenta's  employees   are  defined 
according to the sectoral collective agreement. Some workforce segments, instead, 
such  as  security  and  facility-management  are  paid  according  to  lower  rates 
(Interview  10).  Indeed,  the  plant-level  agreement  introduced  a  market-factor 
(Marktfaktor) aiming at adjusting wage levels to external competitors. Accordingly 
“the market-factor is tied to competitiveness, which is proved by the employer in 
comparison  with  competing  collective  agreements  of  other  DGB trade  unions” 
(Betriebsrat Leverkusen 2013: 28). Wage differentials for those groups of workers 
lie between 10 and 20% below the chemical collective agreement (BIS 2007). Still 
the level of their salaries lie quite above the levels set in the collective agreement of 
the security sector.
As in other cases, these reductions in wage levels were not reached through direct 
pay cuts, but through the absorption of subsequent wage increases coming from 
yearly collective bargaining rounds in the chemical industry (Interview 10).
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In 2007, the management and the local branch of the union have negotiated an 
opening  clause  on  working  time.  Accordingly,  working  time  for  employees  at 
Currenta was increased to 40 hours per week instead of 37,5 as set in the chemical 
collective agreement. This was meant to reduce wage levels by 10% in respect to 
the sectoral agreement. However, in the 2013 bargaining round the union was able 
to  set  a  way  for  progressively  reducing  working  time  to  37,5  hours  by  2015 
(Betriebsrat Leverkusen 2013: 13). However, this working time reduction applies 
solely to half of the company's workforce and excludes those workforce segments 
whose  pay  levels  are  below  the  one  set  in  the  chemical  collective  agreement 
(namely  maintenance,  security,  analytics).  For  some  of  those  groups  (such  as 
employees at Tectrion), the bargaining round achieved a working time reduction to 
39 hours per week, while for others (such as ISS and security) it will remain at 40 
hours per week (Betriebsrat Leverkusen 2013: 13). This raised some dissatisfaction 
among several groups of employees (Betriebsrat Leverkusen 2013: 27ff.).
A different  pay  setting  system  is  applied  to  Currenta  subsidiaries.  Chemion's 
employees  are  paid  according  to  a  plant-level  collective  agreement 
(unternehmensbezogener Verbandstarifvertrag).  The company is  still  part  of the 
employers' association and is represented by an autonomous works council.
Agency work and subcontracting
Currenta has a very low amount of agency workers (4-5 in the medical services). 
Tectrion, instead, has around 100 agency workers (Interview 11). Agency workers 
enable the company to overcome oscillations in the business model and production 
peaks (especially during production stoppages, which usually take place from April 
to  October)  (Interview  11).  Agency  worker  are  highly  qualified  and  strongly 
integrated into the standard workforce. At time of the interview,   no collective 
agreement on the issue has been stipulated, even though a works councillor argued 
that the increased numerical significance of agency work within Tectrion has made 
the issue more relevant. Indeed, the works council would like to negotiate on the 
issue (Interview 10). 
Currenta  has  subcontracting  agreements  with  external  companies  in  the  area 
industrial gases and security. With regard to the latter, all the security business will 
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be  progressively  subcontracted  in  that  retired  personnel  will  not  be  substituted 
(Interview 11). Even though outsourcing has always played a significant role at 
Currenta (also as an instrument to force concessions over the workforce), the chair 
of the works council considers the current situation as being relatively stable and 
no further outsourcing waves seem likely. On the one hand, this depends from the 
high qualification levels and thus quality of services given by Currenta. As we have 
already  seen,  on  the  other  hand,  the  chair  of  the  works  council  highlights 
employers' fear of conflicts as a reason for no further outsourcing. However, he 
also argued that
the issue of process optimisation, cost-cutting, etc. is always there, it is always an 
issue on part of the employers. So that I would not be sure that at some point they get 
the idea of outsourcing something else (Interview 10).
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Table 7. Wage segmentation and works councils' strategies at Chempark Krefeld-Uerdingen
BMS Lanxess Currenta
Position in the value chain Final producer Final producer Site operator
Employees 1000 1500 Around 1000
Pay set-
ting 
Regular work-
ers
Sectoral agreement + bonuses (8-10% yearly 
wage)
Sectoral agreement + bonuses (2,5%-7,5%) Plant-level collective agreement.
Security, facility management and analytic: 
opening clause on working time (40h) and 
wage corridors (15-25% below) 
Subsidiaries BBS and BTS: same sectoral agreement but 
opening clause 
Bayer Gastronomie: not chemical
Aliseca: same sectoral agreements (no bo-
nuses)
Chemion and Tectrion: Plant-level collective 
agreement with opening clause on working 
time (40h) and wage corridor (10% below)
Agency work-
ers
DGB collective agreements + IGBCE addi-
tional wages
DGB collective agreements + IGBCE addi-
tional wages
DGB collective agreements + IGBCE addi-
tional wages
Subcontractors Other collective agreements (not specified) Other collective agreements (not specified) Other collective agreements (not specified)
External 
flexibility
Agency work Very limited (20) Moderate (66, 4,5% of the workforce). Very limited at Currenta, intensive at Tectrion
Subcontractors Support services on-site (outbound logistics, 
maintenance, IT, payroll).
In the future probably also on-site logistics
Support services on-site (logistics, mainten-
ance)
Support services on-site (security)
WCs’
position 
Agency work Restrictive –fixed-term contracts instead Acceptance for production peaks but not as a 
stable element (trying to bargain an agree-
ment)
Acceptance
Subcontractors Restrictive (needs to be regulated, currently 
trying to bargain a plant-level agreement)
N/A Opposition in 2006 and 2008, now acceptance 
for security
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Regulation Agency work No company-level agreement, but control by 
the works council.
Prevalence of internal employment.
Application of the IGBCE additional bonuses
No company-level agreement, but interest in 
negotiations from the works council as a re-
sponse to substitution (at Aliseca).
No company-level agreement, but interest in 
negotiations from the works council.
Subcontractors Regulation in logistics (for internal and ex-
ternal employees).
No extension of regulation No extension of regulation
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Summary
Table 7 above summarises working conditions and works councils strategies within 
the  single  companies.  As  we  can  see,  as  happened  also  at  Hoechst,  the 
fragmentation of the formerly organisationally integrated production into a multi-
employer  site  has  produced a  segmentation of working conditions between and 
within  the  companies.  This  has  most  of  all  gone  to  last  of  service  companies' 
employees. Thus, even if almost all companies fall under the representation domain 
of the chemical union, significant wage differences are visible between production 
and service companies. Indeed, production companies still pay above the chemical 
collective agreement, while service providers fall below this level. Still, according 
to  the  interviewed  works  councillors,  almost  all  companies  apply  a  collective 
agreement signed by the chemical union IGBCE (Interview 12, Interview 10). The 
sole  exception  is  Bayer  Gastronomie,  which  applies  a  collective  agreement 
negotiated with the catering union NGG. However, several companies (Currenta, 
Tectrion and Chemion) have stepped out from the sectoral collective agreement and 
apply a  specific  plant-level  one.  As in  Hoechst,  external  subcontractors  are  not 
counted by the works councillors and usually do apply collective agreements of 
other branches or no collective agreements at all. 
In  term  of  works  councils  strategies,  the  main  goal  had  been  to  keep  the 
representation domain of the union and the application of the chemical collective 
agreement. With regard to agency work and subcontracting, it  generally gets an 
issue  when  their  number  increase  and  they  become  a  problem  for  internal 
employees.
4.4. Conclusions
As  we  have  seen  from  the  analysed  case  studies,  vertical  disintegration  has 
produced major challenges for employees' representatives during the restructuring 
process  of  big  chemical  companies  which  brought  to  the  creation  of  chemical 
parks.  More limited has  been,  instead,  the incidence of  agency work and other 
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forms of subcontracting since then on.
In  terms  of  the  responses  developed  by  workers'  representatives  to  these 
developments we have identified relatively similar orientations in the two cases. 
Trade union's and works councils' strategies have been characterised by the absence 
of opposition to restructuring, the (generally successful) attempt to keep all new 
companies (service providers and producing companies alike) under the chemical 
collective  agreement,  and  scarce  attention  for  newly  settled  service  providers, 
agency workers and subcontractors not emerging from the dissolution of the two 
incumbents, Bayer and Hoechst.
In  both  our  case  studies,  employees  representatives  have  not  questioned 
outsourcing and the reorganisation of the two companies. This was explained with 
reference to the lack of codetermination rights on such issues, which, according to 
the Works Constitution Act, constitute economic decisions of the firm (Interview 1 
and 2). Still, these reorganisation processes were associated with remarkably low 
levels of conflict (Kaedtler 2006: 112ff.). Thus, the lack of legal rights is probably 
not the only explanation for the behaviour of workers' representatives, but this may 
also be referred to the fact that they partially accepted the managerial perspective 
on restructuring and shared the idea that this was necessary for the competitiveness 
of chemical firms. In one case, during the creation of InfraServ Hoechst's logistics 
subsidiary, the works council's acceptance of outsourcing aimed at protecting the 
core  workforce  and  confining  restructuring  costs  on  logistics  employees.  This 
episode  very  closely  resembles  the  hypothesis  formulated  by  the  dualisation 
literature with regard to the behaviour of trade unions and works councils when 
faced with employers' segmentalist strategies. However, two elements suggests we 
can  hardly  subsume  all  other  cases  under  this  logic,  confirming  the  idea  that 
employees' representatives in core sectors have sustained managerial restructuring 
for protecting their members' interests. First, examples in which the trade off was 
so visible are rather limited. The cited case is the only one in which the avoidance 
of  negative  costs  for  the  core  workforce  was  explicitly  traded  off  against  a 
worsening of working conditions  for a part  of the workforce (i.e.  in which the 
choice would have been between a general reduction in employment conditions or 
their  reduction  solely  for  a  single  part).  In  all  other  cases,  employees 
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representatives underwent these processes in a rather  passive way.  In one case, 
instead, a works council fought against the contracting out of non-core activities for 
ensuring that all workers remained within the company, even requiring a “solidarity 
contribution” on part of the rest of the workforce. 
Secondly, transferred workers never exited the bargaining domain of the chemical 
union. Indeed, the major goal of employees' representative during this phase was to 
maintain a unitary representation structure within the parks and to ensure that all 
new companies fell within the realm of the chemical collective agreement. This, 
even by accepting the segmentation of working conditions between production and 
service companies.  For transferred employees this choice meant avoiding a much 
stronger deterioration of their employment conditions, which would have happened 
if they were moved from the chemical collective agreement (which, as we have 
seen, envisage very high standards) to collective agreements of other branches.
Thus, it seems to me that, more than reflecting a subordinated position of these 
workforce segments within the union's  constituency or an attempt on behalf  of 
works  councils  in  chemical  companies  to  discharge  the  negative  effects  of 
restructuring onto peripheral employees39, this strategy reflects the accomodationist 
tradition of the chemical unions. Indeed, the acceptance of segmentation was the 
result of a compromise aiming at avoiding that peripheral workers had to undergo 
worse working conditions on the external labour market.  This seems confirmed 
also by the fact that,  even in the sole case in which employees'  representatives 
fought against outsourcing, mobilising conflict against the employer's decision, the 
solution  of  the  dispute  entailed  the  construction  of  differentiated  terms  of 
employment for different segments within the company's workforce. This seems to 
reflect the traditional “economism” of the IG BCE culture, which, in this case, has 
assumed a part of the managerial point of view (the presence of work of different 
value  within  chemical  companies,  which  has  to  be  remunerated  according  to 
different principles), but is still committed to protecting the whole workforce. 
As  we  have  seen,  this  strategy  was  possible  because  of  the  presence  of  a 
corresponding point of view on part of the employers. Indeed, managers within the 
chemical  industry  support  the  presence  of  the  chemical  union  as  the  sole 
39 I use peripheral for indicating workers employed for non-core, non-production activities, i.e. 
those employed for services.
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representative of workers in the park and are willing to pay a price (i.e. avoiding 
the most extreme outsourcing measures) in order to safeguard it. Thus, employees 
representatives  faced  a  counterpart  which  was  disposed  to  find  a  compromise 
without having to exercise stronger conflict.
However, the commitment of the IG BCE and of the works councils of chemical 
companies towards those peripheral workforce segments also makes more evident a 
specular  exclusive  attitude  towards  other  groups  of  peripheral  employees,  thus 
revealing  an  exclusive  understanding  of  their  imagined  constituency.  Indeed, 
employees' representative do not display the same attitude towards other “external” 
workers, such as agency workers and those subcontractors that did not grow out of 
the  restructuring  process  of  chemical  companies  (such  as  new  logistics  or 
maintenance  subcontractors).  The  latter  have  remained  outside  the  focus  of 
employees'  representatives  and  are  not  regulated  at  plant  level.  Thus,  this 
differentiated strategies suggest another element important for understanding the 
inclusive (even if segmentalist) strategy of the employees' representatives, i.e. the 
fact  that  these  restructuring  processes  entailed  the  transfer  of  workers  form 
chemical  to  service  companies.  Thus,  workers  in  the  newly  grounded  service 
companies were not “outsiders” but shared a chemical identity and were recognised 
as chemical workers. Furthermore, they constituted the traditional backbone of the 
IG BCE membership (Kaedtler 2006: 90). As a trade unionist argued, these areas 
constitute “the classical activities, where we have a high unionisation rate, classical 
technical  and  craft  occupations”40 (Interview  13).  The  presence  of  a  common 
sectoral identity and of organisational incentives are, thus, key in understanding the 
behaviour of employees' representatives.
On the contrary, other forms of vertical disintegration receive attention only when 
they  become  a  problem  for  the  union's  core  constituency  and  especially  for 
chemical  workers.  In  this  light  we  can  explain  both  the  sectoral  regulation  of 
agency work, the lack of a comprehensive strategy of regulation of this issue at 
plant level regulation, and the scattered cases in which this is acquiring relevance. 
40 According to  the interviewee,  the high organisation rate  of  these workers  was an important 
element  for  understanding  the  success  of  the  union  in  maintaining  a  unitary representation 
structure. Indeed, according to a national trade unionist, “this [a high organisation rate within  
technical areas] has given us a certain power in shaping the outcomes and therefore we have 
been able to influence the process”.
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Indeed, at sectoral level, agency work has been regulated because it was perceived 
as constituting a threat for core workers due to its increased numerical relevance. 
On the  contrary,  in  our  cases,  agency work constitutes  a  marginal  phenomena, 
which requires no regulation or is admitted in exchange for other concessions (such 
as in the case of Clariant). Only in those cases (such as Bayer's pharmaceutical 
divisions)  where  agency work is  getting more  significant,  the  works  council  is 
raising the issue of regulation. In all these cases, the central concern of employees' 
representatives is not primarily on the well-being of agency workers, but on the 
potential threat they pose to core workers. Similar is the case of subcontracting. 
Just in one of the researched companies (namely Bayer Material Science) the works 
council  pressed for  a  regulation  of  the issue and solely for  a  peculiar  segment 
(logistics). In all other cases, no regulation had been bargained. However, in some 
cases, the issue is getting more relevant, because it is entering more crucial areas of 
the companies.
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Chapter five
The automotive industry
The  automotive  industry  constitutes  one  of  the  driving  sectors  of  the  German 
economy. In 2012, the industry employed almost 750,000 workers directly (VDA 
2013a) and estimates set at around 1.7 -1.8 million the number of jobs related to 
that industry (Legler et al. 2009: 65). In the same year, almost 5,400,000 cars were 
produced in Germany and the industry accounted for a business turnover of €357 
billions (VDA 2013b: 14). In Germany, the automotive industry plays a much more 
crucial role than in other countries (Legler et al. 2009: 10ff.). Indeed, in 2006 it 
made up more than 4% of all German value added and around 14% of the value 
added of the manufacturing industry41 (Legler et al. 2009: 10ff.).
The German car industry is dominated by seven main final producers (so called 
Original  Equipment  Manufacturers,  OEMs):  Audi,  BMW, Daimler,  Ford,  Opel, 
Porsche, and Volkswagen. In 2002 there were 40 first-tier suppliers, 250 second-
tier and 1,400 third-tier suppliers (Barthel et al. 2010: 18).
Historically,  the  German  automotive  industry  has  been  described  as  the 
prototypical  example  of  the  German  model  of  Diversified  Quality  Production 
(DQP)  (Streeck 1991). This  model,  which  afterwords  became the  basis  for  the 
categorisation  of  Coordinated  Market  Economies  according  to  the  Varieties  of 
Capitalism approach, envisages a production strategy based on diversification and 
non-price competition which rests on the use of sofisticated technologies operated 
by highly skilled workers. This strategy rests on a thick set of institutions which, on 
the one hand, ensures workers' commitment and investment in specific skills and, 
on the other,  produces high wages,  low wage spread and workers'  participation 
41 The mean of the OECD countries is respectively 2% and 8% (Legler et al. 2009: 12).
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(Streeck 1991: 35). However, according to several observers, this model has started 
to change since the 1990s. One of the most significant drivers of this change has 
been  vertical  disintegration  (Juergens  2004,  Doellgast  and  Greer  2007,  Greer 
2008). Thus, it is of particular importance to look at how the union dealt with these 
processes.
Furthermore, the automotive industry constitutes a stronghold of the metalworkers' 
union, IG Metall.  The unionisation rate of the industry lies at around 70% with 
peaks of over 90% in almost all OEMs (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011: 18). All 
automotive OEMs and most of the biggest suppliers have powerful works councils, 
which are usually hegemonised by IG Metall candidates42 (Dribbusch 2012: 125). 
Also for this reason, the automotive industry has often been a pace-setter in terms 
of collective bargaining and in the definition of the union's agenda. Thus, exploring 
what happens within this  branch is  of crucial  importance for understanding the 
general orientation of the union.
5.1. Vertical disintegration in the automotive industry
Vertical disintegration has not been a new phenomenon in the automotive industry. 
Already in the 1970s, the industry outsourced several segments of its production 
process to external companies. However, a major push in this process took place 
during the 1990s, when all Western OEMs, largely inspired by the Japanese model 
and the debate on lean production (Womack et  al.  1990),  started to  push for a 
concentration on core competences and the externalisation of non-core activities.
The  reorganisation  of  the  value  chain  had  two,  strongly  connected,  main 
characteristics:  a  reduction  in  vertical  integration  levels  and  a  changing 
relationships  between  OEMs  and  suppliers.  This  process  was  enabled  by  the 
development of a new car architecture based on the principles of modularisation 
and  the  introduction  of  the  so  called  platform strategy.  This  strategy aimed  at 
42 The situation with regard to industrial relations institutions, however, is much different in the 
supplier industry. Here, bigger suppliers have unionisation rates and working conditions similar 
to those at OEMs, while smaller suppliers have a much weaker union presence (Bispinck and 
Dribbusch 2011: 13).
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“combining economies of scale and scope” (Haipeter and Banyuls 2007) and to 
reconcile  the  advantages  of  mass  production  and  the  need  to  offer  diversified 
products  as  required  by  consumer  demands.  Indeed,  it  defines  a  new  car 
architecture based on the division of the car into different standardised modules, 
common to several car models, which can be differently assembled and combined 
in  order  to  produce  different  final  results  (Juergens  2011).  This  new  structure 
allows “production of large sections of the car, such as the cockpit or the front-end, 
to  be  assembled  by selected  suppliers  and  delivered  as  an  integral  part  to  the 
assembly plants of the car-makers” (Juergens 2004: 419). Thus, it contemporary 
facilitated the outsourcing process and the flexibility of production among different 
locations.  Furthermore,  it  requires  that  suppliers  undertake  new  roles  and 
responsibilities, getting involved in the planning and development of car modules. 
Thereby,  this  strategy also enables  OEMs to shift  a  part  of  the investment  and 
development  risks  to  suppliers.  However,  it  has  also  triggered  a  process  of 
concentration  and  consolidation  among  first-tier  suppliers,  which  have  become 
multinational giants often called mega-suppliers. Indeed, only few companies have 
the  competences  and  the  financial  resources  necessary  for  becoming  module 
suppliers  (Juergens  2011:  20).  According  to  the  consulting  company  Roland 
Berger,  especially  in  production-oriented  segments  (such  as  brakes,  cocks  or 
injection systems) there is generally a very concentrated market structure, whereby 
“the market leader owns a market share of 30-35%, the top-two companies account 
for  50%  and  the  top-five  for  75%  of  the  market”  (Roland  Berger  2010:  3). 
Interestingly,  five  of  the  twenty  biggest  automotive  suppliers  in  the  world  are 
German companies43 (Barthel et al. 2010: 17).
This  consolidation  process  was,  however,  also  consequence  of  an  explicit 
strategical re-orientation by OEMs, which pursued a radical simplification of their 
supplier's chain in order to reduce transaction costs. For example, the number of 
Fiat's  suppliers reduced from 1,200 in 1983 to 330 in 2000 (Follis and Enrietti 
2002: 5). Similarly, the suppliers of the Volkswagen plant in Sachsen was cut in 
half during the 1990s. 
Due to  these processes,  the structure of  the automotive value chain profoundly 
43 They are Bosch, Continental, ThyssenKrupp, ZF and BASF (Barthel et al. 2010: 17).
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changed,  acquiring  a  more  hierarchical  character,  often  described  through  the 
pyramid metaphor. At top of the value chain, immediately below the OEMs, are 
first-tier suppliers, which, as we have seen, have the task of delivering complete 
modules and, consequently, to organise lower tiers of the value chain. Second and 
third-tier  suppliers,  instead,  deliver  single  parts  and  components  to  first-tier 
suppliers. Distinguishing of the pyramid structure is, according to Juergens, the fact 
that “the tiers clearly differ with regard to firms' size, technological competences, 
as well as working conditions and pay levels” (Juergens 2011: 21).
Another important development has been a consequence of the introduction of just-
in-time and just-in-sequence production systems. Indeed, these production methods 
require suppliers to adapt production rhythms to the fluctuating demands of the 
OEMs and to respond within short time frames to their requests. This has triggered 
the  construction  of  module  assembly  plants  in  the  close  nearness  to  OEMs' 
premises. In some cases, this process has taken the shape of industrial or suppliers 
park44 (Pfohl and Garais 2005).
Within  these  reorganisation  processes,  a  crucial  element  regards  the  new  role 
assumed by logistics companies. Indeed, increased vertical disintegration levels on 
the  one  hand,  and  just-in-time  imperatives,  on  the  other,  have  contemporary 
triggered  an  increase  in  the  incidence  of  logistics  activities  in  the  overall 
automotive  production  costs.  Moreover,  several  logistics  providers  have 
progressively  moved  from  providing  pure  transport  services  (i.e.  moving 
components or modules from the supplier to the OEM), to organising the suppliers 
chain (the so-called supply-chain management). Thus, in order to be able to provide 
their  clients  with  full-packages,  logistics  providers  have  progressively  moved 
towards  the  incorporation  broader  activities,  which  range  from  packaging  and 
storage,  to  pre-assembly45.  Indeed,  logistics  suppliers  increasingly  undertake 
activities  (and  acquire  competences)  which  were  typical  to  manufacturing 
companies. Similarly to what happened among first-tier  suppliers, this  tendency 
44 According to the Fraunhofer Institute, “today there is barely a new or restructuring plan of plants 
in the automotive industry that does not contemplate also a specific supply structure such as a 
supplier park” (Fraunhofer Institut 2006: 2).
45 For example, the website of a leading logistics supplier, Schnellecke, reports module and 
welding assembly as a crucial competence of the company (Schnellecke 2013). Indeed, logistics 
providers more and more also function as system integrators, assembling individual parts into 
complete modules.
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has  triggered  a  process  of  specialisation  and  of  concentration.  According  to  a 
purchaser of logistics services within a German OEM interviewed by Meissner, 
indeed, worldwide there are around 15 companies able to provide these so called 
value-added activities (Meissner 2013: 13).
Outsourcing, however, has not involved solely production, but also a broad range 
of services. Besides logistics, which we already analysed, other services, more or 
less  close  to  OEMs'  core  competences  were  progressively  outsourced.  These 
services range from auxiliary activities,  such as cleaning or  catering,  to  crucial 
components of the production process, such as research and development (R&D) 
activities. As we have seen, growing portions of a car's development process have 
been passed down to module suppliers. However, both the OEMs and the suppliers 
have  increasingly  commissioned  development  activities  to  external  engineering 
service  companies  (Rentmeister  2002).  Thus,  vertical  disintegration  has  not 
concerned solely the manufacturing process, but also R&D.
The German car industry followed much of the patterns typical of the automotive 
industry all  over Western countries.  The contingent trigger of restructuring was, 
however, the severe crisis experienced by the industry in the first half of the 1990s. 
As a consequence, outsourcing and subcontracting have acquired a new relevance 
and the German OEMs started to undertake major outsourcing waves. According to 
the German Association of Car Industry (VDA), between 1980 and 2007, the level 
of vertical integration of the industry has reduced from 35% to slightly above 20% 
(VDA 2008: 78). This is reflected also by the shift in employment from OEMs to 
suppliers.  According  to  Meisser,  indeed,  in  1980 OEMs employed  63% of  the 
industry's workforce, while this share reduced to 51% in 2008 (Meissner 2009: 7). 
In 2010, German auto-suppliers accounted for 70% of the national value added 
production in car manufacturing (VDA 2010: 53).
Vertical  disintegration  took  place  in  several  ways:  the  externalisation  of 
components  and  parts  production  to  external  companies,  the  creation  of 
autonomous subsidiaries, the use of in-house service providers and the reliance on 
agency work. Cross-boarder outsourcing has also acquired new importance, with 
several automotive groups externalising production facilities to other countries and 
especially to Eastern Europe. The fall of the Iron curtain, indeed, opened up the 
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possibility for manufacturing companies to locate production facilities in countries 
with  much lower labour  costs,  but  a  strong tradition  in  manufacturing  and car 
production in particular (Meardi 2012).
Moreover,  OEMs  in  Germany  have  established  separate  subsidiaries  for  parts 
production, design and services (Doellgast and Greer 2007: 66). For example, Ford 
has  converted  three  parts  plants  into  a  new  company,  Visteon,  and  three 
transmission plants into a joint venture,  Getrag Ford Transmissions (GFT) (Greer 
2008: 189).  Volkswagen has created a subsidiary,  Autovision,  providing support 
services  and  agency  workers  both  to  other  Volkswagen  plants  and  to  external 
clients. In some cases, OEMs have settled operations in Eastern Germany in order 
to  exploit  lower  production  costs  (most  of  all  determined  by  low  wages  and 
incentives given by public authorities) (Scheuplein et al. 2007). These operations 
usually have much lower levels of vertical integration with respect to older plants 
(Greer 2008).
Another  important  element  has  been  the  externalisation  of  in-house  service 
provision to external service suppliers.  Outsourcing has traditionally taken place 
for the provision of materials and components, whose quota still account for almost 
80% of outsourcing contracts. However, other areas have been increasingly reached 
by these developments (Legler et al. 2009: 53).  In-house subcontracting has been 
initially very widespread for auxiliary activities, such as cleaning, catering or plant 
security.  However,  since  some  time  now,  also  more  central  activities,  such  as 
logistics,  maintenance  and  research  and  development  have  been  outsourced  to 
specialised service providers.  According to a study undertaken by Meissner,  for 
example, German OEMs have outsourced up to 30% of their development activities 
(Meissner 2013: 19). Today, the biggest German engineering service companies for 
the automotive industry count several thousand employees and account revenues 
for several million euro (Meissner 2013: 21).
This vertical  disintegration process has produced the growth of an industry,  the 
industrial services industry, which presents within its ranks giants of  well over 
50,000  employees  worldwide  (Meissner  and  Bochum  2011).  These  companies 
provide  maintenance,  technical  cleaning,  industrial  assembly  (Roland  Berger 
2010). Some of these companies, such as Schnellecke for logistics services,  are 
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specialised on the automotive sector, while other cover broader spectrum of activity 
and encompass different industries.
It is extremely difficult to understand the number of external employees active in 
German automotive plants via subcontracting agreements. According to a survey 
undertaken by the IG Metall among works councillors, “besides the 763,000 stable 
workers,  the  automotive  industry  employs  (…)  250,000  employees  of 
subcontracting companies working in-house” (IG Metall  2013a).  Some data  are 
available for the metal sector more generally. According to an IG Metall survey 
among the works councils of 900 companies in Baden-Wuerttemberg, 73% of the 
companies outsource some activities. According to the works councils, up to 25% 
additional external employees are to be found on companies' premises (IG Metall 
2011a). 
A crucial element in this process is employers' perception of a differentiated value 
for  different  occupations  and  activities  within  metal  and  automotive  industry. 
According to employers, the main point for their use of subcontracting lies in their 
perception  of  the  adequate  wage level  for  employees  performing  “easy”  tasks. 
According to the head of the employers' association of the metal industry in the 
South-Western region of the country,  Suedwestmetall, “especially easier and non-
production activities have become too expensive in our country. If the companies 
did  everything  internally,  paying  these  workers  according  to  the  metalworkers' 
collective agreements, profits would disappear, and thereby also the sustainability 
of our industry and its very well paid core workers“ (Schiermeyer 2013). Again he 
argued  that  “there  are  tasks,  for  which  the  metal  collective  agreement  is  too 
expensive. If a workers does nothing else than control pieces, the current lowest 
wage  level  is  not  justified  anymore.  Also  we  have  seen  an  increasing  use  of 
subcontracting” (Schiermeyer 2013).
Lastly,  another  instrument  through  which  the  industry  reduced  its  vertical 
integration levels has been agency work. Indeed, since the liberalization of this 
form  of  employment  through  the  intervention  of  the  Schroeder's  red-green 
government in 2003, the number of agency workers has shown a steady increase 
(Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit 2013: 6). According to the employers' association of 
the  metal  industry,  Gesamtmetall,  the  metal  industry  employs  205,000  agency 
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workers,  corresponding  to  5.6%  of  the  overall  employment  in  the  sector 
(Gesamtmetall  2012)  and  around  20%  of  all  agency  workers  in  the  country 
(Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit 2013: 8ff.). No definite numbers are available on the 
incidence  of  agency  workers  within  the  automotive  industry.  According  to  the 
German Association of Car Industry (VDA), the car industry employed in 2012 
around 60,000 agency workers (VDA 2013c). According to the IG Metall, instead, 
the number of agency workers is around 100,000 workers (IG Metall 2013a). In 
some companies, such as the well-known case of BMW in Leipzig, agency work 
counts up to 30% of the workforce (Benassi 2013: 8).
According  to  Dudenhoeffer  and  Buettner,  agency  workers  are  mostly  used  in 
production activities (64% of the companies), but almost one out of five companies 
(17%) use agency workers also in engeneering  (Dudenhöffer and Büttner 2006: 
33). Moreover,  according to  the study,  if  agency workers  are  more widespread 
among unskilled activities, representing 17% of all unskilled workers, there is a 
large number of agency workers also among skilled positions. Indeed, 7% of the so 
called Facharbeiter are agency workers (Dudenhöffer and Büttner 2006: 34). The 
fact that agency work is not used solely for low-skill activities, but increasingly 
takes place also in skilled ones, is confirmed also by other studies (Promberger 
2012, Holst et al. 2010, Artus and Rossmeissl 2012).
Agency work has been traditionally considered as an instrument for responding to 
seasonal production peaks or for substituting workers on holiday or maternity and 
sick leave. However, several indicators suggests that this instrument is performing 
other functions in the German context. Indeed, the increased contract tenure46 and 
the growing share of companies with high percentages of agency workers within 
their workforce suggests that agency work has become a more stable component in 
HR management (see Benassi and Dorigatti in progress: 8ff. for a more thorough 
discussion). One important element is, indeed, cost reduction. In Germany, agency 
workers are cheaper than standard workers, because of the lack of a strict equal pay 
clause  in  the  German law47.  In  2009 the  wage  gap between  agency and  metal 
46 According to the statistics provided by the Bundesagenture fuer Arbeit, contract tenure has 
extended over time: while in 2002 the share of agency workers with a contract tenure longer that 
3 months was 44%, this figure increased to 54% 10 years later (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2013: 
18).
47 Since 2003, a reform of the Temporary Employment Act (Arbeitnehmerueberlassungsgesetzt) 
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workers was between 30 and 40% (Weinkopf 2009).  Besides costs deriving from 
different  wage  levels,  a  further  important  reason  relates  to  the  possibility  of 
circumventing the “shadow costs” of a redundancy and, thus, be able to rapidly 
adapt  to  market  fluctuations,  without  bearing  responsibility  for  employees 
(Interview 26).
Among the union's ranks, agency work is mostly interpreted as a cost-reduction 
instrument  and  an  instrument  to  discipline  the  core-workforce  (Interview  26). 
According to the official  position of Gesamtmetall,  instead,  agency workers are 
used as substitutes for vacancies among direct employees (illness or vacation) or to 
respond to  production  peaks.  However,  an interviewee explicitly linked agency 
work to cost reduction (Interview 30).
5.2. Industrial relations under vertical disintegration
Several authors have argued that vertical disintegration has produced an erosion of 
the traditional industrial relations in the automotive industry (Greer 2008, Haipeter 
and Banyuls 2007). First, these processes have triggered a reduction in the field of 
application  of  the  metal  collective  agreement  and  the  deterioration  of  working 
conditions for involved workers. Indeed, employees at subcontractors are paid at 
less  than  direct  employees  at  OEMs.  This  has  happens  through  several 
mechanisms. First of all, OEMs have been usually characterized by a positive wage 
drift (i.e. they pay higher wages than what set in sectoral agreements). According to 
Juergens and Krzywdzinski, at the beginning of the 1990s, the effective income of 
workers employed at OEMs was between 30% and 40% above the level set in the 
sectoral collective agreement of the metal sector (Juergens and Krzywdzinski 2006: 
6). Secondly,  smaller suppliers are  much more likely to  use opening clauses to 
reduce labour standards (Haipeter 2010: 124). Thirdly, they are more likely to exit 
employers association in order not to be subject of the sectoral collective agreement 
has set that agency workers are entitled to equal pay unless otherwise negotiated in a sectoral 
collective agreement (Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit 2013: 5). Immediately after the reform was 
passed, employers sought to exploit this possibility and entered negotiation both with a 
bargaining group of the DGB unions and of the Christian Trade Union Federation (Christliche 
Gewerkschaftsbund, CGB). The latter is well known for undercutting wages and working 
conditions set in DGB collective agreements (Dribbusch and Birke 2012: 6).
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(Ellguth and Kohaut 2008). Lastly, as we have seen, they  can sometimes apply 
different  (and  cheaper)  collective  agreements,  such  as  those  of  the  logistics, 
catering or cleaning industry or the specific agreement for the agency sector.
Thereby, outsourcing presents significant challenges for employees representatives. 
Indeed, outsourcing can threaten the job security of core workers because it opens 
up alternative (and cheaper) solutions for production. At the same time, it can also 
constitute a safe valve for them, since it may enable cost-cutting, without having to 
question  core  workers'  conditions.  How  did,  thus,  employees'  representatives 
respond to these challenges?
5.2.1. Pacts for employment and competitiveness
During the 1990s, these two elements (competition and protection) were somehow 
blurred within employees representatives' responses to vertical disintegration.
As it is well known, at the beginning of the 1990s, the economic viability of the 
German  model  was  constantly  under  attack  in  what  was  defined  as 
Standortdebatte, i.e. the debate on the competitiveness of Germany as a location 
for production. Indeed, critics of the traditional German model identified in the 
high wage costs and high social security contributions German companies had to 
pay the roots of the country's high unemployment and low growth rates (Juegens et 
al.  2006:  9).  Thus,  reforms  were  invoked  both  in  the  structure  of  employment 
protection (e.g. an easing of dismissals) and social security contribution, and in the 
regulation of collective bargaining (e.g. going towards more decentralisation) (Sinn 
2003). Within this debate, the fact that employers relied on vertical disintegration 
as an “exit option” (as we have seen, offshoring, particularly to Eastern Europe, 
greatly increased in the second half of the 1990s, see Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 
2009), further strengthened this argument. Moreover, this neo-liberal approach was 
underwritten by politics.  Indeed,  in  the mid2000s,  the red-green government  of 
Chancellor  Schroeder  adopted  this  point  of  view  as  base  for  reforms  which 
deregulated the labour market and reformed the welfare state.
Several interviewee argued that the presence of such a general consensus towards 
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the idea that employment could be boosted only reducing employers' constraints is 
important to understand the response given by employees'  representatives to the 
issue  of  vertical  disintegration  (Interview 27).  Workers'  representatives,  indeed, 
responded to these challenges through a strongly concessive attitude, which mixed 
concessions on behalf  of the core workforce and segmentalist  attitudes towards 
peripheral  employees.  The  crucial  goal  in  this  first  phase  was  to  secure 
employment.  As argued by Bispinck and Dribbusch, indeed, collective bargaining 
during the 1990s was characterised by the fact that “job security gained priority 
over most other issues on the bargaining agenda both at sectoral and at company 
level” (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011: 26).
At national level, in 1995, the IG Metall advocated a so-called “Alliance for Jobs” 
whereby it  offered wage restraints  in  exchange for job guarantees  (Streeck and 
Hassel 2004).  At plant-level,  instead,  the 1990s were the years of the so called 
pacts  of  employment  and  competitiveness.  Those  pacts  foresaw  an  exchange 
between labour and capital, whereby the labour's side (generally works councils, 
but often also with the union involvement) accepted employers' goal of cost-cutting 
and the capital side guaranteed no forced dismissals and limited job and investment 
guarantees. The car industry was among the most affected by such pacts (Bispink 
and Dribbusch 2011: 45ff., Juergens and Krzywdzinski 2006).
Within these pacts, vertical disintegration played a crucial role in a double aspect. 
On the one hand, as we have seen, it was a “push” factor for the definition of such 
agreements. Indeed, in order to avoid companies to move further segments of the 
production  process  abroad  or  to  national  suppliers,  works  councils  accepted 
concessions on several aspects of the employment relationship (with working time 
being the most widespread) (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2006: 35, Telljohann 2006: 
292, Greer 2008).
On the other hand, however, vertical disintegration became a “bargaining chip” for 
getting allowances from the management. Indeed, outsourcing and agency work 
were often part of employers'  cost-cutting strategies and, thus, entered pacts for 
employment and competitiveness as allowances given by labour in exchange  for 
job  security  guarantees  for  the  core  workforce.  According  to  Jürgens  and 
Krzywdzinski, for example, between 1993 and 2006 the use of agency work was 
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one of the most common concessions made by works councils in the automotive 
industry (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2006). Similarly, Rehder argued that during 
the negotiations of several pacts for employment end competitiveness, employees 
representatives in the automotive industry accepted the outsourcing of certain jobs 
in order to secure employment (Rehder 2003).
These trends towards decentralised and local solutions were further strengthened in 
2004, when the IG Metall signed the so-called “Pforzheimer Abkommen” which 
introduced opening clauses within the sectoral collective agreement of the metal 
industry48. This agreement placed derogations (which during the 1990s assumed a 
“wildcat”  character,  Streeck  and  Hassel  2004)  under  the  control  of  the  social 
partners  (and  especially  of  the  union).  However,  they  kept  the  door  open  for 
concessive agreements, which often entailed a segmentation of the workforce.
Even when not specifically underwritten in pacts or opening clauses, moreover, 
cooperation between employers and works councils at the expense of peripheral 
employees was also visible in the way in which works councils dealt with those 
issues. Several empirical analysis, for example, have shown that, for a long time, 
works councils have used agency work as an instrument to buffer core employees 
and to allow for employers' requests of cost reduction without questioning working 
conditions for core workers (for a review, see Benassi and Dorigatti in progress). In 
several cases, works councils signed collective agreements shifting risks and costs 
from core to agency workers (Weinkopf and Vanselow 2008: 30).
Still, even in this first phase, characterised as it was by an hegemonic consensus on 
derogations  and  by  the  focus  on  job  security  as  the  most  important  goal, 
exclusionary practices were not the sole response given to employers' segmentalist 
strategies. In some cases, indeed,  employees'  representatives at  plant level have 
opposed the use of outsourcing and agency work for avoiding a segmentation of 
working  conditions  at  plant  level.  According  to  an  interviewee,  these  different 
strategies strongly depended from the political orientation of works councils and to 
their commitment to working class solidarity. As he argued,
48 It has to be stressed that one of the main reasons why the IG Metall decided to abandon its 
opposition to the introduction of opening clauses within its sectoral collective agreement was the 
pressure exercised by the SPD-led government. Indeed, chancellor Schroeder threatened the 
union that the government would have introduced such an opening clause by law if the social 
partners would have not find an agreement (Juergens et al. 2006: 14).
138
there were works councils, some of them I even supervised for some time, they have 
strenuously opposed these developments  since the very beginning.  There were works 
councils that opposed these developments with success (…) , there was no agency work. 
The works councils were proud of the fact that we had no agency work. “We do not allow 
something like this to enter our companies”. It was those that were politically strong that  
opposed these developments. But I think there were also those companies, that have let  
themselves been blackmailed and that were, I always argue that, politically very weak, 
badly organised, and perhaps even had works councils,  that  were politically not very 
aware with regard to this issue (Interview 27).
This  confirms  the  findings  of  other  studies  which  have  argued  that  political 
orientation of works councils matter for determining core/periphery configurations 
at  plant level  and works councils  attitudes towards peripheral workers (Benassi 
2013, Artus and Rossmeissl 2012).
5.2.2. Concessions for avoiding outsourcing
Another strategy adopted with regard to outsourcing and vertical disintegration was 
the acceptance of concessions in order to keep work in-house. In several cases, this 
was,  again,  part  of  pacts  for  employment  and  competitiveness.  Indeed,  works 
councils  and the IG Metall  have sometimes resorted to  specific  agreements for 
workers employes in service activities in order to avoid the externalisation of these 
activities. These so called  Dienstleistungstarifvertraege  (service sector collective 
agreements)  envisage a reduction of pay rates and/or an increase in working time 
without  corresponding  wage  increases  for  employees  performing  auxiliary 
functions (such as cleaning and catering). They are negotiated in order to avoid 
outsourcing  and  make  the  provision  of  those  services  by  internal  personnel 
competitive with prices available on the market (Duennemeier 2008). Indeed, this 
model  is  considered  to  be  “a  response  for  (…)  preventing  outsourcing  and 
employers' exit from collective agreement, as well as the division of the workforce” 
(Duennemeier 2008: 139). 
Through this instrument, indeed, employees in service activities remain within the 
boundaries  of  the  company  and  its  workforce  representation  institutions  and 
maintain their entitlement to company bonuses. According to the former head of 
the IG Metall in Baden-Wuerttemberg, “from our point of view, the negotiation of a 
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service sector collective agreement is a hard step, but from the perspective of our 
company, organisational and bargaining policy we see no other alternatives to an 
otherwise creeping outsourcing process” (Duennemeier 2008: 145).
However, such instrument was strongly disputed within the union49, with a large 
part of IG Metall's members and officials opposing the introduction of lower pay 
grades for service workers (Interview 27 and 28).
According to a trade unionist
It is very difficult (…). Since quite a few years now, employers are trying to establish a 
lower pay grade, below the one set in the sectoral collective agreement, at plant-level  
through this instrument of the service collective agreement. The IG Metall never wanted 
to  sign  such  agreements,  because  it  always  argued,  if  somebody is  employed  in  an 
automotive plant,  he should receive the metal  collective agreement. So. But now you 
have these development with subcontracting agreements etc. and now the question is: if I 
define a second pay grade, below the one we agreed at sectoral level, I can perhaps curtail 
this uncontrolled growth of the subcontracted areas, in that the ones in these uncontrolled 
areas, where probably nothing is regulated, fall in this second level below the sectoral 
agreement. This is the core argument. But...It may also be so, but than I have bargained a 
second  pay  garde  below  the  sectoral  collective  agreement,  we  do  not  want  that” 
(Interview 29).
Thus, this strategy was never embraced at national level (Interview 27, Interview 
29).
This view is confirmed also by the employers' side. Indeed, an interviewee argued 
that 
when we discuss this issue here [at Gesamtmetall] (…), our collective bargaining expert 
argue “it makes no sense, the trade union will not go along” (Interview 30).
However,  this  strategy was  undertaken  in  some single  companies  and  in  some 
regions. For example, the IG Metall in Baden-Wuerttemberg adopted this strategy 
as a  way for  avoiding outsourcing (Duennemeier  2008:  144).  Still,  it  remained 
relatively circumscribed. Besides ideological reasons, this was due also to the fact 
that “the implementation of a service sector collective agreement with pay levels 
acceptable  for  the  union  requires  an  adequate  organisational  strength” 
(Duennemeier  2008:  146).  This  was  confirmed  by  several  other  trade  union 
officials,  which  argued  that,  where  employees'  representatives  were  not  strong 
enough, employers simply pursued their outsourcing decisions. Indeed, even if they 
49 Talking with a trade unionist about the position of the IG Metall on the issue of specific 
collective agreements for service activities, I received such answer: “It is very dangerous 
wounds (…) you are insisting on, this issue has not been decided within the IG Metall” 
(Interview 29). 
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reduce them, service sector collective agreements set  pay levels above those of 
rival collective agreements.
Service sector collective agreements are still considered viable options by several 
people within the union. In a presentation held during a strategic meeting on the 
issue of outsourcing and industrial  services,  for example,  even the by the time 
deputy chairman (now secretary)  of  the union,  Detlef  Wetzel,  argued that  such 
agreements constitute instruments for “avoid outsourcing” (Wetzel 2012: 22).
5.2.3. Organising and recruiting
In more recent times, a new strategic orientation seems to have emerged within the 
union, namely that of regulating vertical disintegration through the recruitment and 
organising  of  subcontractors  and  agency  workers  and  the  extension  to  these 
workforce segments of the standards applied to the rest of the industry. According 
to Greer, this strategy was already present in some cases even before. He reports, 
for example, that, after the creation of a supplier park near the  plant in Cologne, 
“representatives from the local IG Metall recruited union activists to take new jobs 
and set up works councils and in some firms won house agreements” (Doellgast 
and Greer 2007: 68). Similar strategies took place at Daimler's supplier park in 
Rastatt.  
However,  this  strategy  has  acquired  increased  relevance  in  more  recent times. 
Indeed, in the last few years, the IG Metall has undertaken initiatives to re-regulate 
work  at  the  periphery  of  the  automotive  sector  and  of  the  metal  sector  more 
generally through campaigns addressing agency work and subcontractors.
Since 2007, the union has undertaken a campaign to affirm equal pay for agency 
workers. This campaign aimed at involving works councils in metal companies and 
to sign ameliorative collective agreements at plant level (Benassi and Dorigatti in 
progress). As a result of this initiative, several hundreds of plant-level collective 
agreements setting better working conditions for agency workers employed in the 
industry were negotiated. Moreover, in the 2012 bargaining round of the metal and 
electro industry the union has signed a collective agreement for the agency sector 
141
defining  bonuses  that  agencies  have  to  pay  for  temporary  agency  workers 
employed in metal companies50. 
These bonuses depend from the duration of the assignment and range from 15% of 
the sectoral wage after 6 weeks of continuous deployment in a metal company to 
50% after 9 months51 (Schumann 2013, see table 8 below for details). 
Table 8. Additional payments agency workers metal and electro industry
After 6 weeks After 3 months After 5 months After 7 months After 9 months
15,00% 20,00% 30,00% 45,00% 50,00%
Source: Schumann 2013
Furthermore,  the  recent  collective  agreement  grants  works  councils  larger 
codetermination rights with regard to the deployment of agency workers and more 
leeway to control their deployment. Lastly, the agreement sets that after 24 months 
of continuous assignment to a metal company, agency workers have to be offered a 
direct position within the company.
This campaign was particularly important because it represented a more inclusive 
attitude of the union towards agency workers, both with regard to their organisation 
and the bargaining policies the union expressed.
Parallel to the campaign on agency work, the union has started to address the issue 
of outsourcing and subcontracting, with a special focus on in-house subcontracting 
and industrial services. The discussion on so called Werkvertraege, understood as 
subcontracting agreements  taking place in-house52 (i.e.  on the OEMs'  premises) 
has,  indeed,  acquired  a  high  relevance  in  the  German  debate  on  precarious 
employment (Koch 2012, Lorig 2012). In-house subcontracting has, indeed, been 
increasingly  seen  as  loophole  used  by  employers  to  circumvent  the  strecter 
regulation of agency work achieved by the union at sectoral level.  This tendency 
has  been  indirectly  confirmed  by  a  seminar  organized  by  the  Centre  for 
50 A similar collective agreement was already signed in 2010 in the steel industry. The agreement, 
however, set a full pay parity for agency workers deployed in the sector (von Borstel 2010).
51 In any case, the sum of the collectively agreed pay and bonuses cannot overcome the 90% of the 
wage level paid to a comparable direct worker (Schumann 2013: 2).
52 Actually, this definition is inappropriate, since Werkvertrag (subcontracting agreement) do not 
encompass solely the provision of services in-house, but may characterize every contractual 
relationship taking place between two companies and implying the delivery of a good or service 
according to the specifications of the contract. Thus, for example, also the delivery of parts from 
a supplier can take place within the framework of a Werkvertrag. However, the current 
discussion mainly understands Werkvertraege as in-house delivery of goods and services. 
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Employment  Relations  and  Labour  Law  with  the  title  “Industrial  services  as 
alternative to regulated temporary agency work” (Rieble et al. 2012). According to 
several  reports  the  initiative  has  been  defined  an  “instruction  manual  to  wage 
dumping” (Bognanni and Pennekamp 2011). Thus, it is seen as an attack against 
the union and its regulatory capacity.
Therefore, the union has been increasingly concerned with the issue and has started 
attempts to regulate it. Goals of the union's campaign are twofold. On the one hand, 
the  IG Metall  wants  to  establish its  presence in  the subcontracting industry by 
organising workers of metal (by now especially automotive) subcontractors and to 
bargain  collective  agreements  in  order  to  close  the  pay gap between them and 
workers in OEMs. On the other hand, the union wants to increase its control on 
subcontracting  processes  via  companies  at  top  of  the  automotive  value  chains. 
Central element of this idea is that works councils should strengthen their habit to 
get involved in the question of the personnel planning (Schwitzer 2012) and extend 
their  representation  domain  on  outsourced workers.  For  doing so,  the  union  is 
asking  for  an  extension  of  works  councils  codetermination  rights  in  order  to 
comprehend also outsourcing decisions. Implicit in this strategy is the idea that it is 
impossible to grant good working condition and to lower dumping risks through 
initiatives starting from the bottom end of the value chain, but that the strength of 
core workers is needed (Wetzel 2011).
In so doing the union wants to establish a new (and more inclusive) concept of the 
company  (ganzheitlich  Betribsbegriff)  which  does  not  encompass  solely  its 
juridical borders, but will set new political ones. As argued by the secretary of the 
organisation, Detlef Wetzel,
Therefore, we need a new, trade-union led, concept of the firm. According to this concept, 
our works councils, union representatives and the IG Metall as organisation would be 
responsible for the whole value chain (and therefore also for the agency workers, the  
suppliers  and  the  service  providers)  not  in  a  legal,  but  in  a  political  sense.  This 
responsibility along the value chain has a strong value-oriented dimension. Through this  
concept we argue that we are responsible for them because we are a trade union (Die 
Mitbestimmung 2011).
The initiative has started with several pilot projects financed through its investment 
fund (Investitionsfond)53. Among them are two of the projects we will analyse in 
53 The investment fund is a special fund created in 2009 by the union which provides economic 
support for organising and recruitment projects (IG Metall 2011: 160).
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the plant level case studies, namely organizing attempts at Audi's supplier park in 
Ingolstadt  and industrial  service  providers  at  Daimler  in  Sindelfingen54 (Wetzel 
2012: 21). Furthermore, the union is producing several information materials for 
sensitising works councils to the extent and consequences of subcontracting (IG 
Metall 2013b) and to explain them their influence possibilities (IG Metall 2011c).
What is particularly significant is that target of this campaign are not just metal-
subcontractors, but also subcontractors performing industrial services, which, as we 
have seen, either belong to the responsibility domain of other unions or have been 
until now tarif-free areas. A particular target have been logistics subsidiaries of the 
automotive sector. Company collective agreements (Haustarifvertraege) have been 
signed  by the  IG  Metall  in  several  logistic  providers,  especially  in  the  Lipsia 
region, which is acting as a pilot region for this strategy. Employees at all the major 
players, such as Schnellecke, Rhenus Logistik and Rudolph Logistik, previously 
represented by ver.di, have started being organised by the IG Metall. In the last two 
years, several new collective agreements have been signed by the union. Working 
conditions are still at a lower level than in the sectoral agreement of the metal and 
electro  industry,  but  these  plant-level  agreements  have produced  significant 
improvements. Indeed, they have reduced working time (from 40 to 37,5 hours per 
week), and increased wages (up to 400 euros per month) and leave days (four more 
vacation days per year) (Schulte 2011, Interview 24, Interview 25).
The campaign is considered as an extension of the agency work campaign. Indeed, 
according to an interviewee, they both insist on the same issue. With the words of 
the responsible for the campaign
This campaign on subcontracting was a logic development, a completion of the campaign 
on agency work, because both insist on personnel planning within the companies. And 
there, it is not sufficient to regulate a segment, e.g. agency work, but one has to look also 
at  the  other  employment  forms  in  the  companies,  what  happens  to  them.  Because 
otherwise...it  does not make any difference for employers how the baby is called, for 
them it is important to get high flexibility and to pay as low as possible. Whether it goes 
through agency work, through subcontracting or through another employment form, this 
does not make any difference for them. The main thing is, that they have low costs and 
can let quickly people go (Interview 26).
A problematic point of the campaign is that it is causing the IG Metall problems 
54 Other projects are the organising project among industrial service providers of BMW and 
Porsche in the Lipsia region, the organising of the Entwicklungsdienstleister at Ford in Cologne 
and at Volkswagen in Wolfsburg, the organising of suppliers and service providers in the 
automotive cluster in Saxony.
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with regard to its  relationship with other DGB unions.  Indeed, the fact that IG 
Metall reclaimed responsibility for the whole metal value chain and, thus, also for 
those service companies which provide services to metal companies, has triggered 
tensions with other unions, and especially with ver.di, the service sector union. In 
some cases, tensions between ver.di  and IG Metall  even ended up in courts for 
defining  the  two  unions'  responsibility  domain.  However,  the  IG  Metall  is 
convinced that this is the right direction and is disposed to carry on the conflict. As 
argued by a trade unionist and by the secretary of the organisation
this is obviously a point (...) [where there are] also (…) conflicts with other unions. If we 
organise a logistic company, this applies the collective agreement of ver.di. And therefore 
there  is  resentment.  But  we  think,  we  have  to  continue.  We  have  to  carry  on  this 
resentment. Because at the end it does not make sense that, due to this resentment, we are  
paralised and remain anchored to our old structures. We have to carry on this conflict (...) 
because without this conflict there is no possibility to progress and we have to progress 
(Interview 28). 
The reality is, that the traditional organisational structures of the trade union are no longer 
compatible with what has taken place in terms of industrial transformations. For me it is 
important, that trade union in manufacturing sectors develop an understanding of how 
industrial services are linked with production and which segments originally belong to 
them. It is a shame for us, if in our value chains there are segments which are lousily 
paid,  that  have no works councils and no collective agreements (Die Mitbestimmung 
2011).
5.2.4. How do trade unionists explain this change?
As we have seen, there has been a move from a tendency to made use of vertical 
disintegration as an instrument to ensure flexibilisation opportunities towards an 
increased  engagement  with  the  issue  of  subcontracting,  aimed  at  organising 
workers employed by external firms and regulate their deployment and working 
conditions. How do trade unionists explain this change?
A crucial element raised in order to explain the union's strategic turn is the issue of 
competition  between  core  and  peripheral  workers.  Indeed,  one  of  the  major 
elements  triggering  the  campaign  on  agency  work  has  been  the  increased 
perception on behalf of the union that agency workers were putting pressures on 
stable  workers'  employment  conditions  (see  Benassi  and Dorigatti  in  progress). 
According to the union, the presence of “a permanent low-wage sector inside the 
firms” (Wetzel in IG Metall 2008: ii) makes core workers develop a “sentiment of 
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substitutability” (Dörre in IG Metall 2007: 8) and produces a disciplining effect on 
them (Holst  et  al.  2010).  Thus,  the  union's  inclusion  of  these  workers  and the 
struggle for equal pay can be interpreted as an attempt to re-regulate the labour 
market in order to protect core workers.  As argued by the former secretary of the 
union at its 21st congress
We  cannot  allow  agency  work  to  keep  creeping  in  stable  jobs.  This  threatens  our 
collective agreements and us all in the long run (Huber 2007).
Similarly,  the  most  important  trigger  of  the  IG  Metall's  new  orientation  on 
subcontracting  is  identified  by  our  interviewees  in  the  fact  that  outsourcing  is 
getting increasingly problematic for core workers. Indeed, the union is recognising 
the fact that outsourcing produces negative consequences not only for peripheral 
workers, but also for core ones. Indeed, according to a trade union document
both  parts  bear  the  consequences:  outsourced  workers  directly  –  through  the  loss 
collective  bargaining  coverage  and  of  income.  The  consequences  on  core  workers 
manifest  themselves in  the long run. Increasing performance pressures  and threats to 
working  condition  set  in  motion  a  vicious  cycle  at  whose  end  are  only  losers  on 
employees' side of employees” (IG Metall 2011c: 36).
What seems to be particularly worrisome for the union and  differentiates current 
outsourcing processes from previous ones, making it unacceptable,  is a change in 
the type of tasks performed by outsourced workers. According to an interviewee
what we had to acknowledge is that it is no longer, as it was in the past, single activities  
to be outsourced – cleaning personnel was no longer directly hired, but through external 
companies, the cafeteria was out. What is new in this in-house subcontracting and what 
concerns us very much is that  these subcontracting agreements increasingly eat  away 
bigger firms' segments. They have entered companies' core areas, such as development 
departments or production (…) It is no longer peripheral areas to be outsourced, also core 
areas are given outside. And also core workers understand that, because they fear for their 
jobs (Interview 26).
In a publication of the IG Metal in Baden-Wuerttemberg, the union describes the 
difference between older subcontracting and subcontracting taking place now in a 
similar manner.
Subcontracting was always present. (…) The difference is that once external companies 
took up activities, which did not require a specific competence and had no specific and 
immediate  connection  to  the  adding  value  of  a  company.  Today,  subcontracting 
agreements  have often the goal,  to  pass core competences to “cheaper” providers,  in 
order to remove responsibility for the workers and to put under pressure the workforce 
(IG Metall 2011a).
Moreover, the union raises the concern that subcontracting is substituting stable 
jobs.  According  to  an  IG Metall  survey among  works  councillor  of  900 metal 
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companies in Baden-Wuerttemberg, in 53% of the companies, outsourcing is used 
to  substitute  stable  workers  (IG Metall  2011a).  Lastly,  according  to  the  union, 
subcontracting contracts (Werkvertraege) are increasingly used as a substitute of 
temporary agency work in order to overcome the regulation achieved by IG Metall 
and the bonus system negotiated for agency workers (IG Metall 2010).
Thus,  according  to  the  union,  both  workforce  segments  bear  the  overlapping 
interest of regulating subcontracting and external employment. Still, this awareness 
has required a great amount of persuasion work on behalf of the union in order to 
make  works  councils  and  core  workers  clear  that  to  regulate  subcontracting 
produces positive results for direct employees.
We had to make them very clear that, what we do today for these other workers, we do it 
not because we are bored, but in order to secure their jobs. We had to say „what you are  
doing for them, you are doing practically also for yourself (…) We always tell „Look, if 
we  raise  their  wages  and  align  them  to  yours,  then  we  make  also  your  job  safer“ 
(Interview 26).
This persuasion work was necessary because there were works councils and core 
workers which were convinced by the idea that  subcontracting can be a  buffer 
against market fluctuations. According to a trade unionist, instead,
where employees of subcontractors are active in the same areas, there it may be possible.  
But also there, this is true only to a certain point, because from this protection it is also  
very easy to move to blackmail. The question is always how many external workers are 
present in a company and how many contracts (Interview 26).
However, trade unions also recognised that solidarity may develop among core and 
peripheral workers.
People  have,  this  was  shown  us  by  the  agency  work  campaign,  a  very  sane 
perception of injustice. And if you are able to pull agency workers and workers at 
subcontractors out of the anonymity, to give them a face, to say „here is an agency 
worke, he works at your place since two years, he does the same things you do, but 
gets half the wage“, then it is very quickly indignation. So one can mobilise also core 
workers (Interview 26).
A last important point raised by our interviewees in order to explain the campaign 
was  the  fact  that  these  processes  are  increasingly  perceived  as  a  threat  to  IG 
Metall's  collective  agreements  and  codetermination  rights,  and  to  the  union's 
capacity to influence working conditions in the sector (Interview 27, Interview 28).
And therefore we have asked ourselves  which value do our collective agreements have if 
large part of the people employed in our firms do not even fall under these agreements, 
but is outsourced under no collective agreement or under a worse one (Interview 26)
We have to react (…) to this increasing segmentation of industrial companies if we do not 
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want to come to a full erosion of interest representation and codetermination“ (Interview 
27).
Politically it is a very big issue for us as organisation, because subcontracting does often 
concern service areas and thereby these areas are separated from the metal industry, from 
our responsibility domain. And thereby the domain of our organisation is scaled down, 
the number of our potential members is scaled down and also the possibility to organise 
them. And thereby in turn also our strength, our power is scaled down (Interview 28)
Both with regard to competition and to the organisational interests of the union, 
what is important to highlight is the fact that the organisational strategies deployed 
by employers are considered to be attacks directed against established standards 
within the industry, works councils' codetermination powers and the IG Metall's 
position. As argued by the former deputy chair of the union, now secretary of the 
IG Metall, “these are wage dumping instruments” (Die Mitbestimmung 2011). This 
perception  strongly  contrasts  with  the  idea,  usually  present  in  the  dualisation 
literature, that these organisational measures were somehow “required” by changed 
economic and competitive conditions. This is very evident in the two quotes below, 
taken from an interview with the head of the IG Metall campaign department.
A political effect, when I move people out of core companies, is that thereby I weaken the 
works councils and I weaken the union. Which employer would not have such a result? 
(Interview 28).
I think that another aspect of these flexibilisation instruments...they concern international 
competitiveness,  it  is  true,  but  even  more  important  these  are  instruments  for  profit-
maximisation. Because a point we have to underline is that in the last years, companies 
have actually gone very well, they have made a lot of money. We had a change, even in  
manufacturing  companies,  they  want  to  achieve  now  extremely  high  profit  margins 
(Interview 28). 
It is beyond the goals of this research project to demonstrate whether employers' 
strategies are marked by the first or second range of goals. However, the fact that 
the union is perceiving these organisational measures as directed against itself and 
the standards it has bargained over time is very important for understanding its 
position. Indeed, this perception rules out the possibility to identify a commonality 
of  interests  between  employers  and  core  workers  which,  according  to  the 
dualisation literature is at the base of cross-class coalitions. Instead, it requires the 
union to act in order to re-regulate the labour market and to close off loopholes 
employers were using for circumventing employment standards within the industry.
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5.3. Plant-level case-studies
We have seen in  the  previous  paragraphs how the  IG Metall's  attitude  towards 
external employment has changed and explored which factors have been related to 
this change. We aim now at looking at how this changing strategy has affected the 
strategic behaviour of plant-level actors. What concerns us is whether and how this 
strategy has translated into new orientations at plant-level. In order to look at this 
question,  we have analysed three companies of the automotive branch. We will 
focus on how employees representatives have dealt with the issue of agency work 
and outsourcing, with a specific focus on in-house outsourcing.
5.3.1. Daimler
Daimler  is  a  multinational  company  settled  in  Stuttgart  which  produces  cars, 
trucks, vans and buses.  In 2012, the Daimler group sold 2.2 million vehicles (of 
which almost 1.5 million passenger cars), totalling revenues of €114.3 billion (plus 
7% with regard to 2011) (Daimler 2012).  In 2012, it  employed a workforce of 
275,000 people worldwide, of which 160,000 in Germany. The Mercedes-Benz Car 
division employs 98,000 workers worldwide and is concentrated in the premium 
segment. In Germany, Mercedes-Bens Car has 17 production sites. This paragraph 
concentrates on the Daimler plants in Sindelfingen and Bremen.
The  Sindelfingen  plant  is  Daimler's  biggest  production  plant  and  the  biggest 
research  centre  for  car  production  (Daimler  2014).  It  employs  around  26,000 
workers, 18,000 of them are employed in direct production. The near Mercedes 
Benz  Technology  Center  employs  8,000  workers  in  R&D activities.  The  plant 
produces annually around 425,000 vehicles (Daimler 2014).
In  Bremen,  Daimler  employs  12,800 workers.  Both  plants  have  a  strong  trade 
union presence:  in Bremen,  70% of the workforce is  member of the IG Metall 
(Interview 20), while in Sindelfingen this share is at around 80% (Interview 19). Of 
the  429 works councillors elected at Daimler during the last elections (in 2010), 
365 belong to the IG Metall (Dribbusch 2012: 125). The Bremen works council is 
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an IG Metall closed-shop: all its 39 members belong to the IG Metall (Interview 
20). In Sindelfingen the IG Metall  has 44 out of 55 seats in the works council  
(Gester  2010).  However,  critical  groups are represented within the Sindelfingen 
works council and they often oppose to the majority's decisions.
Agency work
Discussions on agency work started at  Daimler in 2004, when the management 
started  to  push  for  its  introduction  within  the  company  (Interview  20).  This 
discussion  took  place  as  part  of  negotiations  of  a  pact  of  employment  and 
competitiveness  called  Zukunftssicherung  2012 (Ensuring  the  future  2012). 
Through  the  agreement,  differentiated  concessions  were  negotiated  in  order  to 
contribute to the company's  competitiveness.  Indeed, the agreement allowed the 
company to save 500 million € per year in projected labour costs (Greer 2008: 
191). Basic wages were reduced by 2.79% for all direct employees, while for new 
entrants wages were reduced by 8%. Thereby, a two-tier system was created within 
the company. The agreement also entailed the works council's consent to agency 
work.  However,  this  form  of  employment  was  strictly  regulated.  A maximum 
number of 2,500 agency workers was allowed (this number counts for the sum of 
all agency workers in German plants), with a maximum quote of 4% in the single 
plants. In case agency workers outnumber the 4% quota, the company is required to 
enter negotiations with the works council, which has to express its consent  to the 
extension  of  the  quota.  Usually,  the  counter-concessions  required  by the  works 
council for allowing to extend the quota is either that agency workers get wage 
increases (in the form of additional shift allowances as paid to the direct workforce) 
or the hiring of some of them into the direct workforce (Interview 19). Thereby, the 
works  council  has  been  able  to  negotiate  transitions  from  agency  to  direct 
employment. Lastly, the agreement also entailed provisions to link agency worker's 
pay levels to those set in the metal collective agreement. Indeed, agency workers 
are paid as skilled new entrants (i.e. as workers which have complete the period of 
vocational training) and receive an hourly wage of around €18 (Interview 19). This 
is a much higher wage level than that foreseen in the collective agreement of the 
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agency sector and even to that bargained by the union at sectoral level in the form 
of the above mentioned additional bonuses. Still, a full equal pay is not present at 
Daimler,  since  agency workers  lack  all  over-tariff  bonuses  granted  to  Daimler 
direct workforce. 
It  is  important  to  notice  that  the  agreement  applies  solely  to  agency  workers 
deployed in direct production activities.  No regulation is present with regard to 
agency workers in indirect activities, neither with regard to maximum numbers nor 
pay levels. Thus, they are paid according to the collective agreement of the agency 
sector plus the  additional wage bonuses bargained by the union at sectoral level. 
Here, one can see an indication of what the works council considers as problematic, 
i.e. agency workers in production activities.
In 2010, this plant-level agreement was renegotiated and the maximum quota was 
extended to 8% (Behruzi 2010, alternative 2010). However,  this quota does not 
only  apply  to  agency  workers  in  production  activities,  but  also  to  fixed-term 
contracts. Thus, what was renegotiated was a merger of the two 4% quota already 
existing with regard to these two flexible employment forms. Hence, according to 
the supporters of this new agreement, nothing changed through the new agreement. 
According to its critics, instead, the new quota increased the company's possibility 
to  make use of  agency work,  since the company usually prefers  hiring  agency 
workers  rather  than  fixed-term  ones.  This  was  confirmed  also  by  some 
interviewees, which argued that there are only agency workers in production.
Thus,  the  works  council's  strategy  with  regard  to  agency  work  shows  some 
ambiguity. The quote set by the works council is relatively narrow with respect to 
other  OEMs  (also  if  we  consider  the  new  8% quota),  where  agency  work  in 
production  activities  reaches  peaks  of  up  to  30-40%  (see  Benassi  2013  for  a 
comparison). However, the works council has given its consent to the increase of 
the number of agency workers immediately after the crisis. Moreover, on the one 
hand,  the  chair  of  Daimler's  general  works  council,  Erich  Klemm,  expressed 
criticism against Daimler's post-crisis personnel policies and most of all, against 
the fact that Daimler strongly relied on agency work for managing the upswing. As 
the works councillor argued, this was the problematic “downside” of the company's 
success (Brennpunkt 2010: 2). Indeed, as reported by the journalist Daniel Behruzi, 
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he signed a declaration with other works councillors of automotive companies in 
Baden-Wuerttemberg arguing that
with apprehension,  we have to  acknowledge that  employers  are trying to  cover their  
personnel  requirements  after  the  crisis  through  agency  work  and  other  forms  of 
precarious  employment.  Agency  work  constructs  first-  and  second-class  employees 
within  the companies.  This  is  contrary to  our  self-understanding,  that  equal  working 
conditions for  all  employees constitute a  minimal requirement  for  justice.  We do not 
accept a two-classes society within our companies (…) Works councils and trade unions 
have  increased  companies'  room  for  flexibility  through  collective  and  plant-level 
agreements  (…)  Thus,  we  do  not  need  to  rely  on  modern  day  labourer  to  react  to  
production peaks” (IG Metall 2010: 1).
However,  with  the  acceptance  to  increase  the  quota  for  agency  work,  he  also 
showed its understanding for the company's unwillingness to hire direct personnel. 
As  reported  by  critical  works  councillors,  the  general  works  council  accepted 
Daimler's argument that the company did not know how long the boom would have 
been and, thus, could not hire new direct personnel (alternative 2010: 1).
This ambiguous position was also visible during the crisis. In 2008, Daimler in 
Sindelfingen  employed  around  900  agency  workers,  whose  contracts  were  not 
renewed  during  the  downturn.  The  information  journal  of  the  trade  union's 
representation body represented agency workers as a “crisis buffer” (Brennpunkt 
2010: 8). Indeed,
during the crisis, there were so good as no agency workers within the company; since mid 
2008, the at the time around 2,500 agency workers in the company were send home in 
several waves. Thereby, and through the use of working-time accounts and short-time 
working schemes (Kurzarbeit) it was possible to overcome the crisis without firings of 
direct  employees.  Agency workers buffered the worse effects of the crisis away from 
Daimler-core workers (Brennpunkt Juli 2010: 8).
No judgement was expressed in the article with regard to the evaluation of this state 
of affairs (i.e. whether this buffering function was good or bad), but surely the fate 
of agency workers was not taken into consideration. Moreover, the works council 
did  nothing  in  their  favour  during  the  crisis.  So,  even  if  there  is  a  self-
understanding that agency work is unjust and unequal, it seems that, in exceptional 
times the defence of core-workers gets priority over equality preoccupations. This 
approach of the general works council was contested by the oppositional faction 
within  the  works  councils  and  even  by  some  IG  Metall  works  councillor 
(alternative 2010). 
According to our interviewee, currently agency work is at around 3% at Daimler in 
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Sindelfingen, below the level set in the plant-level agreement. Agency workers are 
mostly  deployed  in  production  activities  (especially  in  the  assembly  of  the  C-
model)  and  in  the  canteen,  but  agency  workers  are  present  also  in  clerical 
occupations  (especially  as  secretaries)  and  in  research  and  development.  In 
Bremen, there are currently 300 agency workers, which is slightly below the 8% 
quota.
According to the two works councillors, the quota is generally hold and has often 
been the instrument through which the works council has pressed for direct hiring 
of agency workers (Interview 19, Interview 20).  Still,  in  recent  negotiations on 
external  flexibility  at  Daimler  and  the  introduction  of  a  social  charter  for 
subcontractors, the company required an increase in the quote of agency workers. 
However,  the  general  works  council  strongly  opposed  this  request  (IG  Metall 
Daimler  2013).  This  was one  of  the  main  reasons why,  as  we will  see below, 
negotiations on the social charter failed.
Subcontracting
According to several sources, Daimler has traditionally been the most vertically 
integrated large German automaker (Greer 2008: 191, Juergens 2003). According 
to the IG Metall, indeed, up until 1996, its vertical integration level was at 42.3%. 
Still, since the end of the 1980s, this level reduced by almost 8% (cit. in Greer 
2008: 187). 
It is extremely difficult to map the extent of subcontracting at Daimler: employees' 
representatives do not have a clear  overview of the issue (according to a  trade 
union official, “even works councillors mostly have no idea on that. This is a big 
problem”, Interview 18) and the management refused to speak about it55. According 
to a works councillor of Daimler's plant in Bremen, the company employs around 
3,000 workers through subcontracting agreements (Interview 20).
According  to  our  interviewees,  in-house  subcontracting  agreements  are  quite 
removed from actual production (Interview 19). This was confirmed also by the 
55 According to an interviewed works councillor, this was due to the fact that, as we will see below, 
Daimler has been under the spotlight for in-house subcontracting over the last year (Interview 
18, Interview 19).
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chair of Daimler's general works council, even if he argued that their number is 
increasing.
In  production,  in-house  subcontracting  agreements  have  played  a  subordinate  role. 
Still,since a couple of years their number is clearly increasing in several plants, especially 
in logistics activities (IG Metall 2013b).
Still, this idea was strongly question by a television report56 broadcast in March 
2013. Indeed, the report scandalized the very poor working conditions suffered by 
workers  employed  by Daimler's  subcontractors  directly at  the  assembly line.  A 
journalist of the broadcasting station  Suedwestrundfunk took up a job as agency 
worker and was deployed by a logistics subcontractor, Preymesser, at the Daimler 
plant  in  Untertuerkheim.  For  two  weeks,  he  worked  side  by  side  to  Daimler 
employees,  packing  engine  components  and  preparing  them  for  being  sent  to 
China.  He  did  the  same  job  Daimler  employees  were  doing  and  was  often 
instructed  by  them.  However,  his  hourly  wage  was  €8.19,  two-thirds  below 
Daimler direct workers. The report raised great debate in Germany and put Daimler 
under the focus of the public opinion. However, the company strongly disputed its 
content,  arguing that the journalist  was not integrated into Daimler's production 
process and, thus, the contract was a legal form of subcontracting.
It is not clear in how far works councillors were unaware of these developments or 
simply tolerated them. As we will see below, however, such media attention has 
triggered a more proactive action on behalf of the union (Interview 18). Still, it 
suggests that, at least in some plants, in-house subcontracting is practised also in 
activities close to production.
In-house  subcontracting  also  takes  place  in  maintenance  activities,  which  have 
been externalised to providers of industrial services. Voith Industrial Services57 and 
WISAG Production Services58 are the biggest players. According to an interviewee, 
56 The title of the report was “Famine wages at the assembly line: how collective agreements are 
cancelled” and was directed by the journalist Juergen Rose.
57 Voith is a multinational company active in the provision of industrial services for several 
industries (construction, chemical, automotive, aerospace, food and beverages, mining, paper, 
etc.) in over 50 countries. Within the automotive industry, Voith provides services ranging from 
technical cleaning and facility management to assembly and engineering services. Worldwide, 
the company employed 43,000 employees in 2012, 17,000 of which (around 40%) are employed 
in Germany. In the same year, the company accounted for €5.7 billions sales (Voith 2013). 
Industrial services represent 21% of the company's overall sales (Voith 2013: 72).
58 WISAG is a multinational company belonging to the AVECO group. WISAG is a holding which 
comprises three companies: WISAG Aviation Service (airport services, passenger services),  
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at  Daimler  sites  in  Stuttgart  (which  comprise  the  two  Untertuerkheim  sites, 
Sindelfingen  and  Carstatt)  Voith  employs  around  1,300  workers.  Only  in 
Sindelfingen, workers employed by Voith for providing maintenance activities at 
Daimler are 700 (Interview 18). They are active especially in technical cleaning 
and  facility  maintenance  (such  as  tribology,  maintenance  of  air  pipes,  etc.). 
WISAG,  instead,  employs  around  800  workers  in  the  four  Daimler  plants  in 
Stuttgart (Interview 18).
With regard to  their  employment  conditions,  workers  at  Voith  and WISAG are 
applied much lower standards than employees at Daimler. Both companies have a 
collective agreement with the construction union IG BAU and their employees are 
paid  according  to  the  collective  agreement  of  the  cleaning  sector59 
(Gebaeudereinigung). With regard to representation structures, employees at Voith 
are represented by a works council. However, according to an interviewee, works 
councillors  are  mostly lower  managers  and,  thus,  the  body works  more  in  the 
interest of the company than those of of the workforce (Interview 18).
Lastly,  there  is  a  large  number  of  subcontractors  providing  R&D  activities. 
According to the head of the general works council, R&D subcontractors employ 
several thousands of workers (Behruzi 2011).
Daimler has been theatre of major counterpositions when the management exposed 
outsourcing plans. However, this was very differentiated in the different sites. For 
example, the workforce and the works council in Bremen have always been very 
critical to the management's outsourcing decisions. Here, the works council has a 
strong wing of leftist activists, which has strongly contested managerial choices. 
According to a works councillor,
there were several confrontations, there were also several strike actions. In Germany this 
is something unusual (…). Therefore one can say this is not a workforce that accepts 
everything (Interview 20).
In 2012, the management put over plans to outsource the internal logistics. The 
company's  workforce undertook several  protest  actions (2,000 workers  went  on 
WISAG Facility Service (catering, cleaning, security and gardening services) and  WISAG 
Industrial Service (maintenance, industrial cleaning, production logistics, assembly). WISAG 
Production Services is a subsidiary of WISAG Industrial Services and provides industrial 
cleaning, assembly and production logistics. The group  employed around 23,000 workers in 
2009, accounting for €0.8 billions (Meissner and Bochum 2011: 25).
59 As we have seen in the previous chapter, the collective agreement of the cleaning industry 
ranges between €1490 and €2518 gross monthly. The collective agreement of the metal and 
electro industry between €2042 and €5257 gross monthly (WSI 2013). 
155
strike) and the management  had to abandon its  plans (Interview 20).  The main 
reason for this opposition was related to the fact that those positions enabled older 
workers to perform lightier activities when they get unable to work at the assembly 
line (Interview 20).
Colleagues are angry, because the concerned jobs gave the possibility to workers with 
bodily limitations to remain employed within the company (Bremen macht Feierabend 
2012).
In 2004, a major question arose with regard to support services,  and especially 
catering, cleaning and security. This took place within the negotiations of the above 
mentioned  pact  of  employment  and  competitiveness,  Zukunfsicherung  2012.  In 
order to avoid outsourcing,  the general works council and the local trade union 
branch,  included in  the  pact  reference  to  a  supplementary collective  agreement 
(Ergaenzungstarifvertrag)  defining  special  provisions  for  indirect  services. 
Activities  covered  by  the  agreement  were  catering,  security,  postal  and 
communication services,  facility management and logistics (Daimler 2004). The 
agreement raised working time for concerned employees from 35 to 39 working 
hours without a corresponding wage increase, and it introduced a new regulation 
(less  favourable  for  workers)  with  regard  to  the  system of  shift  and  overtime 
allowances.  Moreover,  wages  for  workers  employed  in  those  activities  were 
reduced by 20%.
The agreement raised a heavy debate within the IG Metall,  among workers and 
works  councillors  (see  alternative  2005).  Indeed,  the  introduction  of  a  two-tier 
system for  workers  employed in  service  activities  was  disputed  as  a  breach to 
solidarity and equality. According to an interviewee,
There were several actions and strikes within the whole group, but at the end the decision 
was taken. But among the local bodies [the works councils] there were several voices 
opposing it, there was a big campaign, it was almost half half within the workforce. Some 
have  argued,  “yes,  through  this  instrument  we  secure  something,  we  protect  these 
activities from outsourcing”, the others have said, “no, this is only the first step towards 
outsourcing”.  But at  the end the decision was taken by the majority,  but  it  has  been 
proved, that this will not last long (Interview 20).
However, the general agreement set for the whole operations in Germany had to be 
translated in  site-specific  agreements  by the local  works councils  which had to 
identify which service segments would have fallen under the special provisions of 
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the service sector contract. In some cases, such as at the Untertuerkheim site, the 
works council decided not to ally the agreement (Interview 19). Our interviewee 
(the chair of the union representation body of the Sindelfingen plant) did not gave 
other  informations  on  the  reasons  why  the  agreement  was  not  applied  in 
Untertuerkheim60, but ha argued that this decision brought to the outsourcing of 
parts  of  the  activity  segments  which  would  have  fallen  under  the 
Dienstleistungstarifvertrag. 
Respondent: I have to stress that, for example, the site Untertuerkheim decided not to 
apply the service sector contract. Therefore, several parts of the logistics services (…)
Interviewer: were they outsourced?
Respondent: Yes.
Interviewer: Because the works council did not accept this service sector contract?
Respondent: Exactly.
Interviewer: So, the discussion was either service sector contract or outsourcing? 
Respondent: Exactly.
Still, several interviewee point to the fact that this collective agreement did not set 
a  stable  solution  for  those  activities.  According to  a  Bremen  works  councillor, 
“today, the management would better not have this whole service sector contract 
and go directly towards outsourcing” (Interview 20). This was confirmed already in 
2007, when the company presented a plan, strongly contested by the works council 
and  the  IG Metall's  representative  in  the  supervisory board,  to  outsource  plant 
security  and  fire  brigades.  According  to  the  plan,  these  measures  would  have 
affected around 830 employees in Germany and would have ensured cost savings 
of up to 45% (Automobilwoche 2007). Tomas Klebe, the IG Metall's representative 
in the supervisory board, defined the measure a “retreat from a way we have until  
now commonly  gone  through”  (Automobilwoche  2007).  The  company actually 
resigned  the  agreement  for  some  activities  and  outsourced  them  to  external 
companies.  In  Sindelfingen,  this  was the  case  for  some segments  of  the  plant-
security, which have been already contracted out (Interview 19).
60 Attempts to organise interviews with the works council in Untertuerkheim failed, since the 
works councillors refused to talk about the issue. 
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New action on subcontracting
Since march 2013 a new initiative on industrial services was undertaken by the IG 
Metall in Baden-Wuerttemberg as part of the national campaign on subcontracting 
initiated by the union. This initiative aims at establishing the presence of the IG 
Metall  among subcontractors  in  the metal  (and especially automotive)  industry, 
build up works councils  and establish the metal collective agreement along the 
value chain of metal companies. By now, the initiative has mostly concentrated on 
people employed in the two subcontracting agreements Voith and WISAG have 
with  Daimler  (Interview  18).  The  project  was  initiated  in  March  2013  by the 
regional trade union and a trade union official was hired in order to coordinate it. 
The  union  has  established  first  contacts  with  Voith's  and  WISAG's  employees. 
Moreover, the union has developed a working group (Arbeitskreis) made up from 
Daimler's works councillors and members of Daimler's trade union representation 
body (Vertrauensleutekoerper) for  dealing  with the  issue of  working conditions 
among subcontractors (Interview 18). This group should aim to connect employees' 
representatives at Daimler with those at subcontractors and constitute a system for 
ensuring that the former will care about employees at subcontractors. In this sense, 
it constitutes a way to enlarge employees' representatives representation domain.
By now 120 workers at Voith in Stuttgart were organised. The trade union official 
which is responsible for the campaign argued that the next general works councils 
elections61 will be the occasion to present IG Metall lists and to try to define a new 
works councils (Interview 18). 
At Voith, however, this goal is endangered by the fact that, as we have mentioned 
above, the company already has a works council,  which is dominated by lower 
managers.  Furthermore,  the  company  has  traditionally  fallen  under  the 
responsibility domain of the IG BAU, the trade union of the construction sector. 
Competition  is  arising  between  the  two  unions  for  defining  their  respective 
responsibility domain. Our interviewee argued that the presence of the IG BAU is 
sustained by Voith, because they have collective agreements with lower standards. 
However, he argued that the IG Metall is better positioned to defend the interests of 
61 In Germany, works council election take place contemporary at all plants within a general works 
councils election which takes place every four years.
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these workers because it is closely connected to Daimler works council and, thus, 
can act via a higher level. Moreover, he also implicitly referred to the fact that the 
concurrent trade union has never given great attention to the workers. Indeed, he 
argued that, within the 10 months of the campaign, the IG Metall has organised 
more  workers  than  the  IG  BAU.  However,  it  seems  clear  that  between  union 
competition contributes to weaken the union and has become a weapon in the hand 
of  employers  for  strengthening  tendencies  towards  segmentation  of  working 
conditions along the value chain.
Parallel to this action within subcontracting companies, the general works council 
at  Daimler  is  pushing  for  an  agreement  on  subcontracting.  However,  the 
management is reluctant to negotiate over the issue, arguing that this constitute “a 
breach on managerial freedom” (Interview 18). Negotiations started after the above 
mentioned television  report  on low-wage work among Daimler's  subcontractors 
was broadcast. However, the general works council and the management could not 
find  an  agreement  on  the  issue  and  negotiations  broke  down.  Immediately 
afterwards, on October, the 8th, 2013, the company unilaterally dispatched a social 
charter setting minimum standards for employees of subcontractors. According to 
the  charter,  suppliers  have  to  observe  minimum standards  with  regard  to  their 
employees' health and safety. Furthermore, they have to pay at least the lower wage 
level of the sectoral collective agreement of their activity sector, independently of 
whether  they  are  members  of  the  respective  employers  association  or  not 
(Stuttgarter  Zeitung  2013).  An  audit  team  should  randomly  prove  suppliers' 
compliance with the social charter.
This move was strongly contested by the general works council. First, the works 
council argued that the social charters' provision on pay levels (i.e. the oblige to 
pay at least the minimum level of the sectoral collective agreement) were not wide 
enough  to  ensure  a  “fair  and  adequate  compensation”  (Klemm in  Handelsblatt 
2013)  and to  prevent  wage dumping among  subcontractors.  Instead,  the  works 
council  fostered  the  oblige  to  ensure  the  whole  application  of  the  collective 
agreement, respecting workers' correct grouping in wage levels and providing the 
observance  of  yearly  bonuses,  vacation  time  and  other  collectively  agreed 
standards.  Second,  the  works  council  criticised  the  voluntary  character  of  the 
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instrument, which gives to employees' representatives no tools to combat violations 
of the set principles.
The increased engagement of the general works council with working conditions 
among subcontractors was also visible in another episode. In Fall 2013, the works 
council  pushed  for  transforming  1,400  workers  employed  by subcontractors  in 
agency workers. According to the chair of the Sindelfingen works council and chair 
of the company's general works council,  Erich Klemm, this aimed at improving 
their working conditions, by including them within the realm of the works council's 
codetermination and by ensuring that  they receive a pay level corresponding at 
least to the collective agreement for the agency sector bargained by the IG Metall 
in 2012 (IG Metall 2013b).
As  for  the  reasons  triggering  these  new  initiatives,  the  trade  union  official 
responsible for them argued that 
we  also  want,  in  the  long  run,  to  protect  the  core  workforce.  If  we  look  at  a 
department which could be outsourced, here, lets' say, work 100 people. They get €20 
per hour, for example. So. If the department is outsourced to any external company 
and this latter hires people for €10-12. If we are able, as IG Metall at Daimler, to  
negotiate collective agreements for external employees, which go in the direction of 
the sectoral collective agreement of the metal industry, than it is no longer convenient 
for the management to outsource. Because, for example, if  Daimler pays €20 per 
hour and the pay level in the metal industry is €16-17, if we are able to bring pay 
levels at subcontractors at that level, than the management will think about it, i.e.  
whether it makes sense to outsource for 2-3 euro difference (…). Today it is very 
lucrative for employers, because they see, they pay €18 internally and can go down 
to  €9.  One  saves  a  lot  of  money.  Exactly  this  gap  is  what  we  want  to  reduce  
(Interview 18).
5.3.2. Audi
Audi is a premium car producer which belongs to the Volkswagen group. In 2012, 
Audi produced 1.3 million vehicles, with €48.8 million total revenues (Volkswagen 
2012a:  108).  Ingolstadt  is  Audi's  biggest  production  plant  worldwide.  At  the 
location, the company produces the models Audi A3, Audi A4, Audi A5, Audi Q5 
and Audi TT (Audi 2013). In 2012, 550,000 vehicles were produced there.  Audi 
employs in Ingolstadt more than 35,000 workers, 15,000 of which are employed in 
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direct  production.  80%  of  the  workers  are  skilled  workers  with  a  vocational 
training  in  the  relevant  metal  occupation.  Usually they receive  their  vocational 
training directly at Audi. In 2012, the company had 550 trainees.
Audi  is  an  IG  Metall  stronghold.  Indeed  80% of  the  workers  are  trade  union 
members,  but production workers belong by 98% to the union. The union also 
controls the works council. Indeed,  of the 90 elected works councillors during the 
last election round in 2010, 77 belong to the IG Metall (Dribbusch 2012: 125).
Agency work
At time of the interview, Audi Ingolstadt employed around 900 agency workers 
(Interview 14).  Most  of  them (around  700)  are  deployed  in  assembly  activity, 
another 150 in logistics and the rest in other production activities (painting). No 
agency workers  are  present  in  clerical  occupations  or  in  R&D. According to  a 
works councillor, Audi deploys agency workers only to cover production peaks, 
especially at the start of new production models. It is not a structural component of 
the workforce. 
It is very important, that we have agency workers only to cover production peaks. When 
production runs at a normal level, so when we have no additional activities, we actually 
have no agency workers. Or just 10, 20 or so. But in any case, agency work is used only  
to cover production peaks (Interview 14).
Still, the same works council also argued that agency work is used as a flexibility 
buffer.  What  she  excludes  is  that  agency  work  is  used  as  a  cost-containment 
measure.
For Audi, the point is not the cost of agency work. For Audi, the point is the possibility to 
have  a  certain  flexibility,  so  not  having  personnel  ties  when  something  goes  wrong 
(Interview 14).
Agency work first appeared at Audi Ingolstadt in 2003. According to the chair of 
the local IG Metall district, which is also responsible for the plant on behalf of the 
union, before that time Audi never relied on agency work, but made use of fixed-
term contracts  when the  company launched new models  and needed additional 
employees (Interview 15). However, due to the increased number of produced car 
models, the company started considering fixed-term contracts as insufficient. Thus, 
it started employing agency workers. According to the trade unionist, 
At first, we did not even realise that at once in Ingolstadt, on a big industrial space, a 
container appeared, where around 300 agency workers from the East of the country...so 
young skilled workers, were stationed in a container, young workers which then worked 
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at the start of new car models on Audi's assembly line (Interview 15).
The  presence  of  such  a  big  number  of  agency workers,  poorly  lodged  on  the 
company's premises, was the trigger for regulation. Indeed, the union started to care 
about the condition of these workers, to talk to them and to organise them into the 
union ranks. According to the unionist, the difficult situation experienced by these 
workers and the resentment it raised facilitated their organisation (Interview 15). 
The union encouraged agency workers to elect a bargaining commission in order to 
develop the bargaining platform and to start negotiations with Adecco and Tuja, the 
two biggest agencies active in the region, where agency workers were employed 
(Mueller  2011).  The high unionisation  rate  of  Audi's  agency workers  and their 
willingness  to  fight  (even  to  enter  on  strike)  gave  the  union  strength  in  the 
negotiation (Interview 15). Finally, the two agencies gave in.
Crucial points for the workers were, besides wages, home trips and accomodation. 
The  final  collective  agreement  set  compensation  for  home  trips  and  regular 
vacation days on the week end in order to be able to get back home. Furthermore, it 
was one of the first collective agreements in the country linking agency workers' 
compensation to the collective agreement of the metal and electro industry.  The 
agreement was renewed in 2007 after the stipulation at national level of the new 
collective agreement for the agency sector. The new agreement maintained the link 
between the pay of agency workers and pay standards in the metal industry by 
defining a system which is very similar to the one negotiate by the IG Metall in  
2012  at  national  level.  Indeed,  agency workers  are  paid  according  to  a  bonus 
system: Adecco and Tuja pay according to the sectoral collective agreement of the 
agency sector plus a bonus which increases progressively with the length of their 
tenure62 (IG Metall 2007). Moreover, the agreement sets that agency workers at 
Audi will enjoy pay increases deriving from the yearly collective bargaining rounds 
of the metal and electro-industry. Thus, their pay is fully anchored to that of direct 
employees.
Furthermore, the chair of the IG Metall union representation body at Audi argued 
62 According to the collective agreement, agency workers employed at the assembly line earned 
€13.70 until the third month of assignment, €14.43 afterwords. Agency workers assigned to non-
assembly activities, but in support functions get €12.51 independently from the duration of their 
assignment.
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that the introduction of additional wages on part of Audi also forced agencies to 
raise their general wage levels, because otherwise they would have not fine people 
to employ (Mueller 2011: 30). Moreover, until today the union has been able to 
organise the vast majority of agency workers employed by Audi.
Parallel  to the IG Metall  collective agreements with the two agencies, the Audi 
works council negotiated in 2003 a plant-level agreement with the company. It is 
important to note that regulation of the issue at Audi in Ingolstadt has always seen 
the union and the works council work side by side. The plant-level agreement set 
different  points.  First,  it  defined  the  areas  to  which  agency  workers  could  be 
assigned,  namely  only  to  production  activities.  Indeed,  according  to  a  works 
councillor
we said, there can be agency work solely in car production areas, at any place where employees  
work at  cars.  We do not want agency work in technical  and development activities,  no agency 
workers  in  the quality control,  in  no specialistic  field.  Because we envisage these jobs for  our  
colleagues, which can also be further trained accordingly (Interview 14).
Secondly, the agreement introduced a maximum quota for agency workers set at 
5%. Moreover,  it  sets  that,  when the number of agency workers overcomes the 
quota, the company is obliged to hire external employees. Normally, it is the same 
agency workers who are employed. Through this instrument, the works council has 
been able to ensure the permanent hiring of several hundreds of agency workers 
(the last collective hiring of agency workers took place in March 2013, when 350 
agency workers were hired by Audi “under pressure of the works council”, Audi 
Betriebsrat 2013) during the last decade. Indeed, even if the plant-level agreement 
does  not  entail  regulation  with  regard  to  transition  form  agency  to  direct 
employment63,  the  works  council  usually  ensures  that,  after  a  period  of  time, 
agency  workers  enter  Audi's  direct  workforce  (Interview  14).  On  the  works 
council's  page  within  the  company's  website,  the  permanent  hiring  of  agency 
workers into the core workforce is counted as “a success and a milestone” in the 
yearly appraisal of its activities (Audi 2014). Thus, agency work has become an 
important recruiting mechanism for Audi near the apprenticeship system (interview 
14).
63 Currently the maximum assignment time for agency workers is set by the IG Metall collective 
agreement at sectoral level. After 24 months of continuous assignment, agency workers have to 
be hired permanently.
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Through  this  agreement,  the  Audi  works  council  has  been  one  of  the  first  in 
Germany to regulate the issue of agency work (for a comparison with other OEMs 
see Benassi 2013). Moreover, the chair of the local IG Metall district considers the 
company  a  sort  of  vanguard  in  the  debate  on  equal  pay  for  agency  workers 
(Interview 15).
Even if the trigger of regulation has been the indignation for very poor working 
conditions for agency workers, an interviewed works council also recognised the 
beneficial effect a stricter regulation has also for core workers. Indeed, according to 
her, agency workers may constitute a threat to core ones, especially with regard to 
performance benchmarks.
Agency workers are very hard-working people, and obviously they go hard, because they 
always have in mind the possibility to become members of Audi's workforce. And this is 
somehow also a threat for our members, because they have to keep up with that. A worker 
with a stable employment relationship, if she is ill, she probably remains at home, while  
an  agency  worker  comes  to  work  even  if  she  is  ill,  because  she  will  be  probably 
perceived negatively if she misses a week (Interview 14).
Thus, ensuring better working conditions and more protection to agency workers 
also means reducing this threat (Interview 14).
In 2009 the plant-level agreement on agency work was renewed and a provision 
related to  pay levels  of  agency workers  was introduced.  Indeed,  the  agreement 
states that agency workers at Audi have to be paid as new hires directly employed 
by the company. So, they are grouped in the wage group 4, which corresponds to a 
pay of €16,30 per hour. Still, several elements distance agency workers from a full 
equal pay. Indeed, they do receive only a limited yearly bonus, no shift allowances 
and no participation in the company's profits or in its pension scheme.
The commitment of the local IG Metall and of Audi's works council for agency 
workers was visible also during the recent crisis. Fearing massive layoffs, in 2009 
the  union with  the  support  of  the  works  council  negotiated  an  agreement  with 
Adecco and Tuja for ensuring agency workers fired from Audi some forms of job 
security. The agreement rested on three pillars. First, half of the agency workers at 
the time employed by Audi (i.e. around 400 workers) would have the possibility to 
be  hired  by a  transfer  company,  whose aim would have  been to  provide  them 
qualification measures and their re-placement to other companies. Agency workers 
transferred to the new company would have been entailed to a job guarantee of 4 
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months and got 75% of their last net income at Audi. Second, another 200 agency 
workers would have had a job guarantee of 2 months at their employing agency. All 
other agency workers and the ones which did not accept these measures would 
have been entitled with a  compensation (its  level was set  in  a  third of a gross 
monthly wage per every year of employment) (IG Metall 2009).
According to the chair of the IG Metall Ingolstadt district, Johann Horn, 
we have been able to assert a fair wage for agency workers at Audi not only in good 
times. Also in times of crisis agency workers have to be treated fairly – for this stands the  
IG Metall (IG Metall 2009).
According to Horn, this result was possible thanks to the high unionisation rate of 
agency  workers  at  Adecco  and  Tuja  and  the  support  of  the  IG  Metall  union 
representation body at Audi.
Subcontracting
As all major OEMs, Audi has undertaken significant restructuring processes in its 
value chain. According to an analysis of the company's balance sheets produced by 
the  IG Metall,  in  the  four  year  between 1994 and  1998,  Audi  has  reduced  its 
vertical integration level by 4%, from 35.2% to 31.5% (cit. in Greer 2008: 187). 
Since the mid1990s,  the engine manufacturing has been substantially moved to 
Audi's  new  plant  in  Gyoer,  Hungary  (Juergens  and  Krzywdzinski  2006:  13). 
Moreover, there has been an increased tendency to purchase components within the 
Volkswagen group.
On  the  contrary,  on  Audi's  premises,  there  are  no  in-house  subcontracting 
agreements for production-related activities. Indeed, all auxiliary functions (such as 
maintenance and logistics, but also catering) are still performed in-house. Solely 
cleaning and construction activities are given to external companies (Interview 14). 
Instead, on-site subcontracting takes place mainly in highly-skilled activities, i.e. in 
R&D (Interview 15).  According to  the head of  the local  union,  indeed,  several 
thousands of engineers are employed through subcontracting agreements at Audi's 
R&D department (Interview 15). Engineering service companies have normally no 
works  council  and  do  not  apply  a  collective  agreements.  Their  employment 
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conditions are widely differentiated: some of them earn more than Audi's direct 
employees, but several other have much lower pay (Interview 15).
Outsourcing decisions, especially those related to the allocation of production in- or 
outside the company, are mostly dealt with within the company's subcontracting 
commission.  This  is  a  joint  committee  composed  by managers  and  employees 
representatives.  According to an interviewed works council,  the main parameter 
guiding  employees'  representatives  action  within  this  body is  the  full  capacity 
utilisation at the company's two German sited (Interview 14). Indeed, as argued by 
the works councillor
first  of  all,  to  the  fore  is  the  full  capacity  utilisation  of  the  plants  Ingolstadt  and 
Neckarsulm. We have a capacity level, so in Ingolstadt, of around 600,000 cars. They 
have to be produced annually, and therefore, even if something is cheaper somewhere 
else, first of all we have to ensure the capacity utilisation in Ingolstadt. This stands also in 
the agreement we have negotiated with the management (Interview 14).
The  works  councillor  refers  to  the  employment  security  guarantee 
(Beschaeftigungssicherungsvereinbarung)  negotiated  several  times  at  the  plant 
since  1993  in  exchange  for  working-time  flexibilisation  and  wage  restraints 
(Juergens  and  Krzywdzinski  2006:  14).  This  employment  security  clause 
guarantees a minimum amount of car to be produced at the plant. If this is not 
reached, outsourcing cannot take place. Still, this clause has never been a major 
problems,  neither  for  the  works  council,  nor  for  the  company's  outsourcing 
decisions. Vertical  disintegration processes have taken place within a context of 
massive growth of the company. Indeed, Audi moved from employing in Germany 
less than 34,000 workers in 1991 (Juergens and Krzywdzinski 2006: 13) to around 
50,000  today  (Volkswagen  2014).  Thus,  outsourcing  processes  have  never 
endangered occupation levels at the plant.
In  the  mid  2000s,  a  major  counterposition  took  place  with  regard  to  support 
services  inside  the  plant.  Indeed,  the  company  advanced  plans  to  outsource 
industrial services (such as catering, IT, facility management) to an autonomous 
subsidiary. According to a publication produced by the union representation body at 
the plant, with this move the company wanted to increase those workers' working 
time  to  39  hours,  reduce  their  wage  levels  below  the  standards  of  the  metal 
industry, and remove them from the Audi bonuses system (wir 2005: 4). According 
to what reported, in the company's plan, outsourcing would have involved around 
166
6,000 workers.
The managerial request started a fierce counterposition between the management 
on the one hand, and the works council and the IG Metall on the other (wir 2005). 
According to the former chair  of the general works council, Xaver Meier, “from 
then on, we had to fight hard for an alternative” (wir 2005).
The result of this fight was a new company-level agreement negotiated in 2005 by 
the  general  works  council  of  Audi  and  the  company and  called  “Future  Audi. 
Effort,  Success, Participation”, which, besides several other measures, entailed a 
service sector contract (Dienstleistungstarifvertrag) negotiated by the company and 
the  regional  union.  The  collective  agreement  had  to  be  applied  to  employees 
working  in  catering,  security,  facility  management,  administrative  services  and 
transport  logistics (Audi 2005).  This involved around 1,500 workers in the two 
plants.  Goal  of  the  agreement  was  “to  achieve  competitiveness  and  economic 
feasibility  as  well  as  the  maintenance  and  the  re-incorporation  of  jobs  in  the 
industrial services areas” (Audi 2005).
In order to reach these goals the working time of workers employed in the above 
mentioned  activities  was  increased  from  35  to  37  hours  per  week  without  a 
corresponding wage increase. In exchange, the company committed itself “not to 
outsource  any  of  the  industrial  services  areas  mentioned  in  the  plant-level 
agreement or significant sub-portions of these areas in new companies or in any 
other manner” and “to proof whether areas falling in the above description, which 
have been outsourced in the past, could be re-internalised within a company of the 
Audi group” (Audi 2005).
According to our interviewees, this supplementary agreement remained in force 
until 2011. After that, employees in the concerned activities returned to a normal 
working time as a request of the union and the works council. As argued by an 
interviewee
it was a hard conflict, but fortunately, we have been strong enough and have been able to 
bring everybody back to the normal working time (Interview 15).
On the contrary, no extension of regulation has been bargained at plant level with 
regard  to  external  subcontractors.  According  to  an  interviewee,  the  company 
applies the Volkswagen social charter, which requires suppliers to ensure minimum 
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standards for their  employees (Interview 14).  Interestingly,  this  social  charter is 
now one of the bases of the new organising campaign undertaken by the union in 
the supplier park (see below for further details). Lastly, according to the chair of the 
local union, the IG Metall and the works council are trying to bargain a regulation 
for  subcontractors  in  R&D activities  (Interview 15).  Negotiations  are  currently 
undergoing,  but  the head of  the  local  union seems to  be very confident  to  the 
possibility to get an agreement (Interview 15). Still, due to the negotiation process 
and the fear of possibly endangering it, he provided no further information.
The supplier park
The  most  wide  ranging  initiative  with  regard  to  subcontractors,  is  the  new 
campaign undertaken by the IG Metall in Ingolstadt for organising the company 
settled within Audi's suppliers park (Gueterverkehrszentrum, GVZ). The park was 
constructed in 1995 as a joint initiative of Audi and the city of Ingolstadt64. It is 
located in the immediate nearness of the Audi assembly plant in Ingolstadt and was 
established  in  order  for  Audi  to  have  the  most  important  sequential  suppliers 
located close to the factory. According to the head of the local IG Metall branch, 
the construction  of  the supplier  park did not  take place  as  a  consequence  of  a 
specific  outsourcing  wave  at  Audi,  but  was  more  an  attempt  to  redefine  the 
company's supply chain (Interview 15).
Today, 30 to 35 companies are settled within the park and they employ around 
4,000  workers.  The  park  counts  some  large  companies  employing  up  to  800 
workers,  and  several  small  companies  employing  5  to  10  workers,  sometimes 
working inside the premises of larger suppliers. Audi also has a site in the suppliers' 
park.  It  employs 1,500 workers. Settled companies are divided between logistic 
providers and assemblers.  Logistic providers employ around 1,500 workers and 
their duties are mostly to stock pieces and modules provided by suppliers in their 
halls and deliver them just-in-time to Audi. Among them are well known logistic 
specialists for the automotive sector, such as Schnellecke, Scherm Tyre & Projekt 
64 Investors and owners of the supplier park are IFG Ingolstadt, a company owned 100% by the 
city of Ingolstadt, LGI GmbH, its subsidiary jointly owned by IFG Ingolstadt and Audi.
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Logistik,  and  Hansmann.  Production  companies,  instead,  employ  around  900 
workers. They perform production functions  and build modules  like fuel  tanks, 
front-end modules, door trims, and tyres (IFG Ingolstadt 2014). These modules are 
then delivered “just-in-sequence” to Audi (Interview 16).
The interconnection between the supplier park and Audi's plant is well expressed 
by this quote taken from the company's informative site on the supplier park.
The  material  delivery  takes  place  through  electrical  hoists  which  drive  the  material 
directly to the assembly line around 2,500 times a day over the 415 meters long bridge  
encased in the supplier park (Audi 2013).
Companies settled in the park generally have poor working condition, and a weak 
or  non-existent  trade  union.  Moreover,  only  a  minority  of  them  has  a  works 
council. This is particularly true for service companies, which also present a very 
high share of unskilled and migrant workers. Indeed, according to our interviewee, 
wage  levels  are  particularly  low  for  employees  of  logistics  providers,  while 
workers in production companies are generally paid at levels comparable to those 
of the metal industry.  Still,  even those production company which apply an IG 
Metall  collective  agreement,  do  not  apply  the  sectoral  one,  but  have  specific 
company level agreements. Other production companies, instead, do not apply any 
agreement, but orientate to its wage levels for compensating their workers.  
Even though the park exists already since 1995, trade unions have still a scarce 
representation within the park. Before the beginning of the campaign, a trade union 
was  present with  an  official  trade  union  representation  body 
(Vertrauensleutekoerper)  solely three  of  these  companies,  all  performing 
production functions. According to an interviewee this was due to the fact that the 
supplier park had not a clearly planned development, but grew over time. Thus, at 
the beginning, workers employed there were quite few, and their number increased 
over the years (Interview 16). Still, the head of the local trade union also admitted 
“we  have  somehow  slumbered  over  this  development,  we  have  not  really 
understood it” (Interview 15). 
A first  initiative  to  regulate  working  conditions  inside  the  suppliers  park  was 
attempted  jointly  by  several  unions  belonging  to  the  DGB in  the  mid  2000s. 
However, due to difficulties to coordinate and the scarce commitment by some of 
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the unions, this initiative did not bring to great results and was abandoned in the 
subsequent years (Interview 15).
Two years ago, the IG Metall claimed responsibility over the whole suppliers park 
as activities belonging to the Audi value chain and therefore pertaining the metal 
sector. A union official has developed a project for organising the suppliers park, 
build works council and bargain collective agreements. First goal of the project for 
the IG Metall was to establish itself as the recognised representative of the workers 
within the park. For doing so the union has started to carry on weekly information 
hours  within  the  park  and  monthly  information  initiatives  (on  topics  such  as 
working  hours,  collective  agreements,  works  councils),  and  has  organised  a 
working  group  composed  of  works  councils  and  union  representatives  of  the 
already organised companies. This working group operates in strong connection 
with Audi employees' representatives, thereby representing a first attempt to define 
a common platform and representation structure (IG Metall 2014). Until now, the 
union has been able to recruit around 300 workers in the park. One major victory 
has been the election of a works council in the biggest logistic provider settled in 
the  park,  Scherm  Logistics,  which  employs  800  workers.  This  victory  is 
particularly significant because the company had a strong anti-union attitude and 
has constantly tried to hinder a works council  election (Interview 14).  A works 
council is currently under construction at Schnellecke and Hansmann, two logistics 
companies.  Moreover,  the  IG  Metall  will  take  the  chance  offered  by  the  new 
general  works  councils  election  in  2014  to  call  for  elections  at  the  largest 
companies and to present its candidates (Interview 16). Within the realm of the 
campaign,  negotiations  for  a  collective  agreement  are  undergoing  in  two 
companies. The next step of the campaign will be to establish a social charter of the 
supplier park setting minimum standards for all  employees within the park and 
functioning as a  base for  the negotiation of collective agreements  in  the single 
companies (Interview 15).
Moreover, the campaign is also trying to strengthen the responsibility of Audi for 
its supply chain. According to the trade union official in charge of the campaign, 
this takes place with reference to the social charter named “Declaration on social 
rights  and  industrial  relations  at  Volkswagen”.  This  charter  is  an  International 
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Framework Agreement (IFA) signed by the Volkswagen group, and the company's 
European works council, World works council and the International Metalworkers' 
Federation the in 2002, which applies to all Volkswagen operation in the globe and 
was renewed in 2012 in order to include first tier and logistic suppliers65. According 
to the charter “Volkswagen supports and expressly encourages its contractors to take 
this declaration into account in their own respective corporate policy. It views this as 
an  advantageous  basis  for  mutual  relationships”  (Volkswagen  2012b).  Beyond 
reference to ILO conventions (such as the ban  of forced and child labour and the 
commitment to equal opportunities), the charter sets principles related to employees' 
health and safety, working hours, freedom of association, and fair compensation66. 
Particularly the two latter points will be relied on new campaign on the supplier 
park. According to the trade unionists which is leading the campaign,
we are currently working to take off this charted from the shadows and to bring it to the 
public  discussion,  with  the  request  that  also  in  the  supplier  park  works  councils  are 
elected and collective agreements signed. So that we can start this process as part of this 
social charter (…). Also with regard to how Audi has to deal with the supplier park and 
which responsibility it has to take for its suppliers (Interview 16).
The use of the International Framework Agreement (IFA) to push the recognition of 
works councils and collective agreements in Germany is particularly relevant, since 
IFAs are normally considered useful mostly for developing countries. 
According to the head of the local, the initiative was undertaken because the union 
did  not  want  to  have  such  a  big  number  of  workers  without  any  collective 
agreement and any co-determination structures (Interview 15). According to him 
this is problematic also because 
this has side-effects also on other companies within the local. Because wage levels are  
generally pushed down, codetermination gets weaker, because you have such big areas 
without codetermination, and therefore other companies may take example and possibly 
follow it (Interview 15). 
According to him, direct competition with Audi employees is however not present. 
65 According to an interviewee, this process was initiated by the Volkswagen works council, 
thereby signaling a more active approach of Volkswagen's employees representatives with regard 
to the issue of subcontracting (Interview Daiker).
66 With regard to compensation, the charter sets that “the compensation and benefits paid or 
received for a normal work week correspond at least to the legally valid and guaranteed 
minimum. In case legal or collective bargaining regulations are not existent, branch specific 
tariff compensation and benefits are used as an orientation that are customary to the respective 
location and ensure an appropriate standard of living for the employees and their families” 
(Volkswagen 2012b).
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This is due to the fact that employees at Audi are very well organised. Still, the 
official  in  charge  of  the  campaign  highlights  that  these  conditions  produce  a 
sentiment of “precariousness” also among stable employees 
I would not say there is a direct threat for core workers at Audi, I think that the works 
council and the union representation body can control these processes, what is inside and 
what is given to external companies. But the negative effects are those that develop in the  
head of the people. They know there are other people, also in the supplier park, that do  
their same job for much less money or even for the half of the money. It is so, as I said, a  
sentiment that develops (Interview 16).
5.3.3. ZF Friedrichshafen
ZF Friedrichshafen is a first-tier supplier for the automotive industry. It is active in 
the design and manufacturing of  driveline and chassis technology especially for 
cars and commercial vehicles, but also for boats, helicopters, and other vehicles. ZF 
is  among  the  top  10  companies  on  the  ranking  list  of  the  largest  automotive 
suppliers worldwide (ZF 2014). In 2012 ZF accounted revenues for €17.3 million, 
€5.8 millions in Germany (ZF 2012: ). Worldwide, the company employs almost 
75,000 workers in  121 production sites in 26 countries. In Germany, ZF employs 
43,000 workers (ZF 2012: 12). Friedrichshafen is the company's historical seat, the 
seat of its research and development centre. In Friedrichshafen ZF employs around 
9,000  workers,  2,500  in  R&D,  3,500  in  direct  production  and  the  rest  in 
administrative activities (Interview 21). 
Agency work
At time of the interview, ZF employed 60 agency worker in production activities 
and 220 in the R&D department. According to the company's CEO, agency work is 
not a big issue for ZF, since around 2-3% of the company's German workforce are 
agency workers (Novak 2013).
In  the  year  2011,  the  local  union  branch  bargained  a  firm-level  collective 
agreement on flexibilisation instruments. Among other issues, the agreement also 
deals with the issue of agency work, identifying when agency workers can be used, 
how long they can remain within the company, how many agency workers ZF can 
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employ, and how they are to be paid. As for the first point, agency work can be 
used solely for “accomodating temporary fluctuations in demand or for handling 
incoming work tasks of a merely transient nature” (ZF 2011: 4). Thus, according to 
the  agreement,  agency  work  cannot  be  a  stable  component  of  the  company's 
personnel policy. This is confirmed also by the fact that agency workers can remain 
within  the  company  solely  for  a  limited  period  of  time.  Their  maximum 
deployment time is different for workers employed in production activities and for 
workers employed in R&D. Indeed, employees grouped between wage groups E1 
and E10 (generally corresponding to production workers) can be deployed for a 
maximum of six months, while employees categorized between the E10 and E17 
wage groups (usually in R&D) can be deployed for a maximum of 24 months. 
According to our interviewee, this is due to the fact that the company has no R&D 
projects lasting less than two years (Interview 21). This differentiation, however, 
make also clearly visible where the works council identifies the problematic aspect 
of agency work, namely for those workers employed in production activities. A 
quota is  set  at  maximum 380 workers.  If  the company wants  to  overcome this 
quota, it has to get the agreement of the works council. In case of a refusal, a joint 
committee composed by members identified by the two parties, decides whether 
the deployment of additional agency workers is admissible according the function 
assigned to this instrument by the collective agreement, i.e. to cope with production 
peaks. 
Lastly, the agreement sets agency workers' compensation. Indeed, agency workers 
employed by ZF are entitled to additional payments with respect to what set in the 
collective agreement of the agency sector. Hourly wages range from 13,02 to 28,50 
€ per hour. This is also slightly above what bargained at national level by the IG 
Metall. Wage levels  slightly above the wage level corresponding to the highest 
possible Branchenzuschlag (which range from €12.29 to €27.30). 
According to the works council's deputy chairman, Achim Dietrich-Stephan, “this 
agreement  had to  be negotiated longly” especially with regard to  the pay issue 
(Wex  2011).  Moreover,  for  gaining  these  positive  elements  on  agency  work, 
employees representatives exchanged concessions on internal flexibility, allowing 
the company to increase the number of job contracts with more than 40 hours per 
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week above what set in the collective agreement67. Thus, the protection of agency 
workers came at the expense of concessions for core ones. 
Subcontracting
According  to  a  works  councillor,  ZF  employs  around  800  workers  through 
subcontracting  agreements.  They  are  employed  mainly  in  logistics  activities, 
facility  management,  light  maintenance  and  IT.  The  works  council  has  no 
information  on  wage  levels  and  the  presence  of  collective  agreements  among 
subcontracting companies. Catering, instead, is carried out through an autonomous 
subsidiary belonging to the ZF group, ZF Gastronomie Service.
According to a works councillor a major outsourcing wave took place in the early 
1990s as a consequence of the state of crisis in which the company was involved at 
that  time.  Several  indirect  activities,  most  of  all  craft  activities  such  as  the 
locksmith's  and  carpenter's  department,  were  outsourced  as  an  instrument  for 
cutting costs and increasing the company's competitiveness. According to a works 
councillor  “all  these  outsourcing  measures  took  place  for  increasing  the 
competitiveness of ZF” (Interview 21). This outsourcing wave took place with the 
consent of the works council,  as part  of the company's  social  plan (Sozialplan) 
(Interview 21).
In 2000, the company outsourced IT-services, together with the canteen and a part 
of the maintenance activities. During the phase of outsourcing, the works council 
had an interest in clearly separating those activities that had to be carried out by 
subcontractors and those to be performed internally. Moreover, the works council 
wanted to keep more skilled activities in-house. Thus, only “easier” maintenance 
activities were outsourced, while the more demanding and skilled activities were 
kept in-house as an explicit request of the works council (Interview 21). According 
to a works councillor “we have set only the boundaries, what do the subcontractors 
and what do our people. This was important for us” (Interview 21).
With  regard  to  catering  activities,  the  decision  to  construct  an  autonomous 
67 According to the metalworkers' collective agreement, up to 18% of a company's workforce can 
work longer than 35 hours. This share was set at 70% at ZF.
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subsidiary belonging to the ZF group was, again, a consequence of works council's 
requests. At time the outsourcing process took place, indeed, the works council did 
not want the canteen to be given to an external company, in order to be able to keep 
influence  over  these  employees'  working  conditions.  Today,  ZF  Gastronomie 
Service employs around 80 employees,  which are represented by the ZF works 
council.  Moreover, even if the company applies the collective agreement of the 
catering industry, the works council has bargained an additional agreement which 
sets that employees are paid around 10% more than the collectively bargained wage 
levels (Interview 21).
During the crisis, some subcontracting agreements were canceled (especially in the 
maintenance activities) in order to prevent the core workforce to enter a short-time 
work scheme (Kurzarbeit) (Interview 21). Thus, external employees were used as a 
buffer to protect core workers. However, the interviewed works councillor argued 
there are relatively few areas in which such buffering is possible (according to him, 
solely maintenance activities, which are relatively few). Subcontracting, thus, does 
not represent a buffer from market fluctuations.
With  regard  to  subcontracting  activities  not  taking  place  in-house  (such  as 
components  or  parts  production),  managerial  decisions  are  discussed  within  a 
subcontracting committee. As in the case of Audi, this subcontracting committee is 
jointly  composed  by  works  councillors  and  management  representatives.  It 
discusses make or buy decisions, i.e. what the company does in-house and what is 
given outside. According to an interviewed works council 
about subcontracting (…) there are always cases when the company comes and says "we 
cannot reach the price targets of our customers. We have offers form external companies, 
that can make this production 30-40% cheaper”. Then there are actually cases, when we 
say “Ok, thereby can we do the rest and the product has still a survival opportunity”.  
Then we are ready to accept, if there are no direct problems with our workforce (...). In 
the  long  run,  this  may mean that  that  work  is  gone.  But  this  has  usually economic  
reasons, that, I would say, have not to do with profit maximisation, but with the fact that  
only in this way we have a possibility to survive. So, for example, at the case department, 
where we make the cases  for  the gear  box,  (…) there we operate as  follows: it  was 
approved that we make 50% of the cases and the rest is done by external companies, 
outside ZF, that simply have a better cost-structure. And in the combined costing is the  
case competitive (Interview 21).
The works councillor did not specify what exactly constitutes a more conform cost 
structure,  but  we  can  suppose  that  wage  levels  are  part  of  it.  Still,  the  works 
councillor does not consider this kind of subcontracting as problematic. Indeed, 
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according  to  him,  “this  takes  place  outside  the  plant.  More  crucial  is  when 
subcontracting takes place in-house” (Interview 21).
New action on subcontracting
The works council is getting increasingly involved into the issue of subcontracting. 
As part of the collective agreement on the use of flexibility instruments, the works 
council  has  obtained  information  rights  on  subcontracting.  According  to  the 
agreement “the works council in Friedrichshafen will be informed by ZF at least 
twice a year on the number and the content of subcontracting agreements taking 
place at the Friedrichshafen site. There is agreement between the social partners 
that  no  “concealed”  agency  work  can  take  place  through  subcontracting 
agreements” (ZF 2011). This latter point seems to be of particular importance for 
the works council. Indeed, both the works council and the local trade union which 
has signed the agreement fear that subcontracting agreements may constitute an 
instrument  to  circumvent  regulation  over  agency  work.  According  to  Lilo 
Rademacher,  the  local  IG  Metall  official  in  charge  of  representing  ZF  (which 
signed  the  flexibilisation  agreement)  „after  the  introduction  of  legal  and 
collectively  bargained  regulations  on  agency  work,  many  companies  try  to 
circumvent it through subcontracting agreements” (Mommsen 2014).  
Still,  the  works  council  argued  that  this  information  right  has  been  widely 
neglected by the company, which has informed only once (in 2011) over the stand 
of in-house subcontracting. Another problem with regard to the effectiveness of this 
regulation, is that the managerial interface of the works council, which normally is 
constituted  by  the  personnel  department,  often  has  no  competence  on 
subcontracting  agreements,  since  all  decisions  run  through  the  purchasing 
department. Thus, it is not an adequate point of reference.
As for the reasons of the works councils' involvement in the issue, the interviewed 
works councillor argued that it is becoming a “political issue” for the union and, 
therefore, also for the works council.  According to him, “for some time, we had 
the issue of  agency work and of bad working conditions.  Afterwords,  we have 
regulated the issue of how ZF employs agency work. However, you still have a 
176
two-classes society within the company if subcontractors employ workers at very 
bad conditions. This topic has simply gained more sensitivity, both in the public 
opinion and among the workforce. They even argue to the works council “Great, 
we have regulated agency work, but the company XY, which makes here the service 
XY for us, they have employees, which get €7.90 per hour. What will you do about 
that?”” (Interview 21).
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Table 9. Wage segmentation and works councils' strategies at analysed metal companies
Daimler Audi ZF
Position in the 
value chain
OEM OEM First-tier supplier
Employees 26,000 Sindelfingen
12,000 Bremen
35,000. 9,000.
Pay setting Regular workers Sectoral agreement + bonuses
Industrial services: service sector contract 
(longer working time 40h, and lower wages, 
20% below)
Sectoral agreement + bonuses Sectoral agreement + bonuses (around 12% 
yearly wage)
Subsidiaries None None ZF Gastronomie: collective agreement of 
the catering industry, but with increased 
wage levels (by around 10%).
Agency workers According to the metal collective agreement 
(agency workers paid as skilled new-
entrants, around €18 per hour)
According to the metal collective agreement 
(agency workers paid as skilled new-
entrants, around €16,30 per hour)
According to own regulation (higher than 
the sectoral wage bonuses, €13.02 – €28.50)
Subcontractors Other collective agreements (not specified) Other collective agreements (not specified)
Supplier park: orientation to the metal col-
lective agreement (production companies), 
other collective agreements (logistics com-
panies)
Other collective agreements (not specified)
External 
flexibility
Agency work Moderate use (currently 3-5% in 
Sindelfingen, around 8% in Bremen)
Moderate use (5%) Moderate use (around 4%)
Subcontracting Limited in-house (around 800 in 
Sindelfingen), extensive for R&D
Extensive for R&D, very limited for 
production activities, supplier park
Moderate in-house (around 800) and only 
for peripheral activities
Works Agency work Acceptance Only for covering production peaks and Only for covering production peaks and 
council's
position 
vacancies vacancies
Subcontracting Opposition to outsourcing (service sector 
contract since 2004)
Acceptance for subcontracting, but request 
of regulation
Opposition to outsourcing (service sector 
contract 2005-2011)
Acceptance for subcontracting, but request 
of regulation
Acceptance of outsourcing for more cost-
effectiveness (1993), but only for peripheral 
activities
Acceptance for subcontracting, but request 
of regulation
Regulation Agency work Maximum 8% (if overcome negotiation 
with the works council)
Pay according to the metal collective 
agreement since 2004
Works council's pressure for direct hiring 
after some time
Maximum 5% (only in production 
activities)
Pay according to the metal collective 
agreement since 2003
Works council's pressure for direct hiring 
after some time
IG Metall agreement on employment 
security during the crisis
Maximum 380 agency workers (around 4%)
Pay according to own regulation (higher than 
the sectoral wage bonuses, €13.02 – €28.50)
Maximum assignment: 6 months in 
production, 24 months in R&D
Subcontracting Transformation of subcontracting 
agreements in R&D into agency work for 
better regulation
IG Metall campaign on industrial services
IG Metall campaign in the supplier park
Regulation currently taking place for R&D 
subcontractors
Information rights on subcontracting 
agreements (2011)
5.4. Conclusions
The chapter has shown the responses given by employees' representatives in the 
automotive sector to vertical disintegration processes. As already stressed, we have 
concentrated  mostly on  segmentation  processes  taking  place  in-house  or  in  the 
immediate nearness of the OEMs premises.
As we have described in the chapter, the strategy of the IG Metall towards these 
processes has started to change since the second half of the 2000s. The union has 
moved away from a tendency to leave the regulation of this issue at plant level and 
increasingly engaged with the issue. Indeed, since the start  of the campaign on 
agency work in 2007, the union has made the regulation of the periphery of the 
labour market a crucial  element in its  bargaining agenda. Equal pay for agency 
workers  has  been  a  crucial  point  in  the  2012  bargaining  round  and  efforts  to 
improve working conditions among subcontractors have become a priority for the 
union. Moreover, the IG Metall has embraced a new, more encompassing concept 
of  its  representation  realm,  one  which  includes  not  only  workers  employed  in 
automotive companies, but all employees involved in the automotive value chain. 
Thus,  the union has progressively opened up its  boundaries in order to include 
agency workers and workers employed by subcontractors.
Another  significant  point  is  how this  strategy materially operates.  Indeed,  what 
seems to be particularly innovative is the attempt to move up the value chain also 
with regard to responsibilities for working conditions. Taking into account the fact 
that  new  inter-organisational  relationships  developed  through  outsourcing  and 
subcontracting have somehow questioned the figure of the employer (since it is not 
only the direct employer that influences the employment relationship, but also the 
contractor through the subcontracting agreement, see also Grimshaw and Rubery 
2005),  the union is  trying to  get  influence on working conditions  of peripheral 
employees  by  acting  through  the  contractor.  Thus,  besides  attempts  to  directly 
organise subcontractors and negotiate with them, the IG Metall is pushing for the 
involvement of works councils in contracting out companies and the negotiation of 
plant-level agreements setting rules on working conditions among subcontractors. 
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As we have seen, at the base of these efforts is a new concept of the firm that does  
not  stop  at  a  firm's  boundaries,  but  extends  to  encompass  other  economic 
relationships. Thereby, it  seems that the IG Metall is adapting its organisational 
model to the changed organisation of production processes.
As  for  the  reasons  of  this  changing  strategy,  our  interviewees  have  mainly 
highlighted two elements. First, both with regard to the agency work campaign and 
the campaign on subcontractors, a fear that peripheral employment could pose a 
threat  to  core  workers.  The  growth  of  an  unregulated  periphery,  indeed,  is 
considered to be detrimental for core workers' employment conditions. Moreover, 
the changing nature of these employment forms (massive growth since the Hartz IV 
reforms with regard to agency work and closer to OEMs' core business with regard 
to subcontracting) explains why this strategic turn is taking place now. Indeed, up 
until the point in which both were marginal phenomena, relatively separated from 
the core workforce, a strategy of exclusion could turn beneficial for core workers, 
since it did not affect them and, conversely, might protect them by constituting a 
buffer.  Now that  it  is  getting  closer  to  the  core  of  automotive  companies,  this 
unregulated periphery is getting problematic for core workers, triggering regulation 
efforts.  A second  reason  expressed  by  our  interviewees  was  that  this  growing 
periphery is increasingly problematic also for the union, since it endangers the IG 
Metall's power position, by opening up “exit options” for employers and reducing 
its representation realm. Moreover, the role of employers have been highlighted. 
Indeed, these organisational measures are considered an attempts by employers to 
circumvent regulation and, thus, an attack against the union.
A very important point has been to look at  the plant level.  Indeed, as we have 
highlighted in previous chapters, a part of the literature is pointing to the existence 
of differentiated interests between trade unions and works councils, exacerbated by 
the  growing  power  attributed  to  works  councils  as  a  consequence  of 
decentralisation processes (Pulignano and Doerflinger 2013, Hassel 2012). These 
accounts raise two problematic points. First, regulation at lower levels might entail 
more  segmentalist  strategies  targeted  to  protect  the  core  workforce.  Second, 
inclusions attempts on behalf  of the union might not get implementation at  the 
plant  level,  because  of  works  councils  using  peripheral  employment  as  an 
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instrument to protect the core workforce (Pulignano and Doerflinger 2013).
Still,  a  strategic  orientation  pursuing  segmentation  in  order  to  protect  the  core 
workforce was hardly visible visible in our case studies. Indeed, in all our cases, 
works councils attempted, if not to block, at least to milder the negative effects of 
segmentation (see table 9 above for a comparison).
This was especially true with regard to agency work. In all three cases the works 
councils (in close cooperation with the local IG Metall) have negotiated plant-level 
agreements  setting  relatively  low  quota  (among  5%  and  8%  of  workers  in 
production), and created a connection between the pay level for agency workers 
and the metalworkers' collective agreement, thereby pushing towards equal pay. In 
two cases  (Daimler  and  Audi),  a  strict  regulation  was  achieved  right  from the 
beginning, far before the union started its campaign. On the contrary, at ZF, the 
agreement on flexible employment (which, as we have seen, entails provisions both 
with regard to agency work and subcontracting) was negotiated as part of the works 
council's  engagement  with  the  IG  Metall's  campaign  on  agency  work  and 
subcontracting.
With regard to subcontracting evidence is more mixed. Employees' representatives 
have been much more careful in dealing with outsourcing measures entailing the 
transfer of employees. Thus, at both Audi and Daimler, the works council opposed 
to  the  outsourcing  of  service  activities  (cleaning  and  catering).  However,  they 
accepted a segmentation of working conditions for these employees in the form of 
service sector collective agreements. Still, what seems to emerge from these two 
cases,  is  that  the works council  adopted such a strategy in order to  keep those 
activity  segments  within  their  representation  realm  and  to  ensure  them  better 
working conditions they would otherwise have had on the external labour market. 
Moreover, it took the strength of the works councils to keep these groups in-house, 
since, according to our interviewees, managerial preferred option would have been 
to  proceed  to  a  wholesale  externalisation.  What  seems  interesting  is  that  this 
solution was strongly contested among works councils and the union. This suggests 
that  within  the  IG  Metall  ranks  there  is  still  resistance  towards  hypothesis  of 
segmentation.
This  regulation  attempts,  however,  took  place  only in  cases  where  outsourcing 
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implied  the  transfer  of  co-workers  to  external  companies.  When subcontracting 
came  as  part  of  new  companies  entering  activity  fields  previously  carried  out 
internally,  but  without  implying  a  transfer  of  personnel,  it  was,  instead, 
substantially neglected. Thus, works councils have neglected segmentation entering 
their plants through this channel. Only recently works councils are attempting to 
define rules on outsourcing processes and to take care of in-house subcontractors. 
This,  is,  however,  more  a  product  of  the  new  IG  Metall's  campaign  on 
subcontracting, than an autonomous initiative by the works councils.
Surely, episodes in which works councils gave priority to the core workforce were 
not  absent.  This  was  particularly  true  within  crisis  situations.  At  Daimler,  for 
example, works councils did not care about agency workers during the downturn, 
developing  a  crisis  management  strategy focused  exclusively  on  core  workers. 
Moreover,  after  the crisis,  the general  works  council  accepted a very contested 
extension  of  the  agency work  quota  for  enabling  the  company to  manage  the 
upswing without increasing its direct headcount. However, we have also seen that 
in  other  cases,  such  as  Audi,  the  union  and  its  representatives  at  Audi  have 
developed  an  inclusive  approach  to  their  crisis  management  and  developed 
initiatives to protect agency workers.
This suggests that the construction of solidarity between different workforce groups 
is  a  difficult  political  effort,  one  which  is  always  subject  to  be  redefined  and 
questioned. As we have seen, in our cases, the inclusion of peripheral employees 
came  as  a  consequence  of  an  ideological  commitment  to  equality  by  works 
councils. As argued by our interviewees, for politically engaged works councils 
with  strong connections  with the  union (as  those in  our  cases),  dualisation has 
difficultly been an option. When confronted with employers' vertical disintegration 
strategies which promoted segmentation, they have attempted to milder it. Still, this 
commitment  might  be  endangered  when  material  interests  between  different 
workforce groups are perceived as contrasting. Thus, ideology per se is not always 
able  to  prevent  employees'  representatives  to  accept  segmentalist  strategies. 
However,  what  seems  to  be  changing  within  the  union's  ranks  is  exactly  this 
perception. Indeed, the union is developing an effort to show the threat coming 
from  an  unregulated  periphery.  Even  if  direct  competition  between  core  and 
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peripheral workers was not present in our cases (possibly due to the strength of 
employees'  representatives  which  have  blocked  the  entrance  of  subcontracting 
agreements to core areas of the company), several interviewee have raised the issue 
of core workers experiencing a perception of precariousness due to the presence of 
insecure  workers  (Interview 16,  Interview 18).  Thus,  the  possibility  to  insulate 
oneself through the construction of a buffering periphery seems to be less viable.
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Chapter six
The chemical and metal cases: a comparative perspective
As we have seen in the previous chapters, vertical disintegration processes have 
produced  a  segmentation  of  working  conditions  within  companies.  This  has 
happened  in  slightly  different  ways  in  the  two  industries.  Within  the  chemical 
industry,  the massive  outsourcing of  support  functions  (triggered by employers' 
willingness to cut costs) has produced a deterioration of the employment conditions 
of workers in those functions and progressively opened up the gap between the 
standards these workers are applied and those applied to workers in production 
companies.  Moreover,  pressure  on  wages  has  been  further  exacerbated  by  the 
exposure  of  service  companies  to  competition  with  cheaper  external  service 
providers belonging to other industries. Less important have been, instead, both the 
issue  of  agency  work  and  of  in-house  subcontracting,  which  are,  however, 
acquiring new relevance in more recent times.
Within the metal industry, instead, the direct expulsion of service functions from 
production companies into autonomous subsidiaries has been less dramatic. In all 
analysed  companies,  several  auxiliary activities  (such as  catering,  security,  and 
logistics) are still provided in-house, often, as we have seen, due to works councils' 
resistance to vertical disintegration. However, outsourcing threats have triggered 
concessions  with  regard  to  the  employment  conditions  of   workers  in  support 
functions, producing segmentation within metal companies' workforces. Moreover, 
subcontractors applying other collective agreements are diffused within automotive 
companies, especially in the realm of industrial services, and they do usually apply 
much lower standards in comparison to those applied to to the direct workforce. 
Similarly,  the increased reliance on agency work has produced the growth of a 
workforce segment with different terms and conditions of employment.
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Even if through different processes, thus, the consequence of vertical disintegration 
in both industries has been that formerly unitary structures (such as a chemical 
production  site  or  a  metal  company)  now  host  a  multiplicity  of  employment 
conditions  within  their  borders.  Furthermore,  these  processes  have  generally 
produced  a  polarisation  in  working  conditions  between  employees  performing 
“core” functions and those employed in support activities68.
The  research  question  lying  at  the  heart  of  this  dissertation  concerned the  role 
played by employees' representatives within these processes. As we have seen in 
the first chapter,  indeed, the literature has formulated diverging hypothesis with 
regard to how trade unions and works councils deal with segmentation.
Highlighting the presence of differentiated interests between different workforce 
groups,  the  dualisation  literature has  argued that,  hardly pressed by managerial 
requests  of  cost  cutting,  workers'  representatives  in  core  firms  tend  to  allow 
segmentation to take place (via the acceptance of subcontracting and agency work) 
in  order  to  protect  the  core  workforce.  This  approach  highlights  an  increased 
predominance of company loyalty over working class solidarity which expresses 
itself  in particularistic  (and  segmentalist)  styles  of  interest  representation.  The 
emergence  of  such  a  tendency  is  favoured  by  the  loosening  of  institutional 
connections between different levels of employees' interest representation (namely 
trade  unions  and  works  councils)  via  instruments  of  collective  bargaining 
decentralisation  (such  as  opening  clauses  and  pacts  of  employment  and 
competitiveness) (Pulignano and Doerflinger  2013).  According to  this  accounts, 
segmentation  is  thus  triggered  by  employers,  but  employees  representatives 
(especially at plant-level) act as consenters of these tendencies.
On the contrary, discussions based on the power resource approach have argued 
that  it  is  the  weakness  of  employees'  representatives  to  explain  the  spread  of 
segmentation. In these accounts, vertical disintegration has been an instrument of 
“institutional avoidance” (Doellgast et al. 2009: 363, Jaehrling and Mehaut 2013) 
which has enabled employers to circumvent regulation. According to this approach, 
employees' representatives have been increasingly been unable to close off these 
68 It is important to highlight that it is difficult to draw a clear boundary between core and 
peripheral activities, since, as we have seen, outsourcing has progressively affected activities 
traditionally considered as core for production companies, such as research and development.
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loopholes and this has favoured an increase of segmentation.
6.1. Employees' representatives between inclusion and exclusion
Through the case-studies we have presented in the previous chapters, this research 
has tried to disentangle how employees' representatives have dealt with processes 
of vertical disintegration. We now present a comparative account of the strategies 
adopted  in  the  two  sectors.  From our  case  studies,  a  differentiated  picture  of 
inclusion and exclusion emerges. This is true both with regard to the two industries 
and to the different “peripheral” workforce groups we have analysed. For the sake 
of clarity, we have grouped the responses given by employees' representatives to 
employers'  segmentation  strategies  in  the  two  industries  with  regard  to  three 
different  workforce  groups:  agency  workers,  transferred  workers  and  new 
subcontractors.
Agency workers
The  most  clear  difference  between  the  response  of  employees'  representatives 
within the two industries has taken place with regard to agency work. Both the IG 
Metall and the IG BCE are progressively including agency workers within their 
representation realm. Indeed, they have tried to close the gap in working conditions 
between direct  and agency workers through the definition of sectoral  collective 
agreements which envisage pay bonuses for agency workers assigned to metal and 
chemical companies.
However, both the process leading to these agreements and the situation at plant 
level strongly differ in the two sectors. In the metal sector, the negotiation of a 
sectoral  collective  agreement  on  pay  bonuses  was  the  final  result  of  a  more 
encompassing strategy. Indeed, since 2007 the IG Metall has engaged in a very 
confrontative media campaign,  aimed at  raising public  attention to  the issue of 
agency  work  and  at  thematising  the  injustice  involved  in  the  poor  working 
conditions  these  workers  are  exposed  to.  Moreover,  the  campaign  aimed  at 
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sensitising  works  councils  and  at  pushing  them  to  include  agency  workers, 
enlarging their understanding of a works council's representation realm beyond the 
boundary of  workers  directly employed by a  company.  Furthermore,  they were 
pushed by the union to engage in the regulation of agency work at  plant  level 
through the  definition  of  plant-level  agreements  which  aimed at  improving  the 
employment conditions of agency workers and at progressively closing up the pay 
gap between core and agency workers. Instead, the chemical union never adopted 
such strategy and the definition of the sectoral collective agreement was a (albeit 
very important) unique moment.
Thus, differences in the strategic approaches of employees' representatives in the 
two  industries  were  clearly  visible  at  plant-level.  Indeed,  agency  workers  in 
chemical  companies  were  substantially  excluded  from  works  council's 
representation. Chemical works councils' rarely got in contact with agency workers 
and did not try to represent their  interests. In some cases,  such as maintenance 
companies  as  Tectrion  and  Bilfinger  Maintenance  Sued,  agency  work  was 
explicitly used as a buffer which allowed the company “to breath” and manage 
production  peaks  without  endangering  job  security  of  the  core  workforce 
(Interview Adam). In these cases, agency work represent a significant share of the 
workforce  (in  both  cases  far  above  10%).  Moreover,  in  none  of  the  analysed 
chemical companies (with the sole exception of Clariant) the works councils have 
bargained plant-level agreements on agency work. According to our interviews, this 
situation is  rather  common in chemical  companies in Germany and reflects  the 
scarce attention given by chemical works councils to the issue.
On the contrary,  agency workers in  the analysed metal  plants were much more 
integrated and works councils considered themselves as the representatives also of 
this  workforce  group.  Moreover,  in  all  cases,  works  councils  have  negotiated 
specific plant-level agreements setting pay levels, quotas, and transition patterns. 
This differentiated pattern of inclusion has very material consequences for agency 
workers69.  Indeed,  as  we  can  see  from table  9  below,  wage  levels  for  agency 
69 Pay levels of agency workers strongly vary according to their place of assignment. Agencies 
belonging to the two employers' associations BAP and IGZ apply the sectoral collective 
agreement negoatiated with the DGB special bargaining group for the agency sector. However, 
as we have seen, agency workers in metal and chemical companies are also entitled the pay 
bonuses negotiated by the IG Metall and the IG BCE with the same employers' associations. 
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workers are much lower in the analysed chemical plants in comparison to metal 
ones. Indeed, while both the chemical and the metal unions have negotiated similar 
pay bonuses for agency workers at sectoral level, works councils in several metal 
companies have further improved wages for agency workers. As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, for example, works councils at Audi, Daimler and ZF have 
negotiated  much  higher  minimum wages  for  agency  workers  assigned  to  their 
companies than those set at sectoral level. In these cases, pay levels for agency 
workers usually come close to equal pay, even if, as we have already highlighted, 
agency workers are not entitled to all  the bonuses system direct workers profit 
from.  Thus,  negotiations  at  plant-level  (and,  thus,  the  orientation  of  the  works 
council in this regard) make a significant difference for the economic situation of 
agency workers.
Table 9. Pay levels of agency workers (according to their place of assignment)
Assignment place Source of regulation Pay level (minimum-
maximum)
Agency sector DGB collective agreement with BAP(1) and 
IGZ(1)
€8.50 - €18.89
All analysed chemical 
companies
IGBCE collective agreement with BAP(1) and 
IGZ(1) (agreement on additional benefits)
€9.78(2) – €18.89
Metal companies (with no 
plant-level regulation)
IG Metall collective agreement with BAP(1) and 
IGZ(1) (agreement on additional benefits)
€9.78(2) - €28.34(3)
Audi Plant-level agreement Minimum €16.30
Daimler Plant-level agreement Minimum around 
€18
ZF Plant-level agreement €13.02 – €28.50
(1) Employers associations of the agency sector
(2) Lower wage-group after 6 weeks of continuous assignment
(3) Higher wage group after 9 months of continuous assigment
Source: Interviews, Jungvogel 2013, Schumann 2013.
Several observations have to be introduced here. First, as we have already stressed, 
agency work is a more marginal phenomena in the chemical industry than in metal 
one. Indeed, in most our cases, agency workers were just a handful. This might be 
an explanation for a reduced activism on behalf of works councils with regard to 
Lastly, in several companies, works councils have negotiated plant-level agreements further 
improving wages for agency workers. Thus, depending from the activism of sectoral or plant-
level representatives, agency workers enjoy significantly different employment terms.
189
this issue. Still, it does not seem a particularly convincing one. First, even in those 
few cases in which agency workers have a high incidence on the workforce (such 
as  the  two  maintenance  companies,  Bilfinger  Maintenance  Sued and  Tectrion), 
works councils did not bargain plant-level agreements, but limited themselves to 
control the assignment of agency workers and the fact fact that they were applied 
pay bonuses (and, thus, that agencies were part  of the employers'  associations). 
Secondly,  one could argue that,  exactly for  the fact  that  agency work  does not 
constitute  a  significant  flexibility  or  cost-saving  opportunity  for  employers, 
workers' representatives should have little to lose in regulating the issue and, thus, 
have more incentives and less obstacles in doing that. However, this was not the 
case. Thus, we can argue that the regulation of agency work and the reduction of 
segmentation does not seem a priority for works councils in the chemical industry.
Secondly, we have to stress that, as we will see more clearly further on, our cases in 
the  automotive  industry are  not  representative  of  the  orientation  of  automotive 
works  councils  as  a  whole.  Indeed,  our  interviewee  often  represented  their 
companies  as  forerunners  and  best-practices  within  the  industry  (Interview 15, 
Salerno). Indeed, segmentalist  strategies were identified by other studies also in 
metal  and  automotive  companies  (Artus  and  Rossmeissel  2012,  Benassi  2013, 
Pulignano  and  Doerflinger  2013).  Lastly,  even  within  analysed  automotive 
companies, the defence of agency workers was always at risk of being subordinated 
to the protection of the core workforce,  which surely remains the first  point of 
reference for works councils. An example of this, is the way in which the Daimler's 
works council has dealt with the issue of agency work during and immediately after 
the crisis, when agency work was substantially considered a buffer for avoiding 
dismissals among core workers. However, we can still say that in the metal sector, 
agency  work  has  (at  least  partially)  been  integrated  into  works  councils' 
representation domain, while it has been much less so in the chemical industry.
The defence of internal workers exposed to outsourcing
In both our industry case-studies, employees representatives have shown a strong 
interest in defending internal workers exposed to outsourced threats and in both 
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cases this goal has gone hand in hand with the acceptance of concessions on their 
terms and conditions of employment.
As we have seen in the chapter devoted to the chemical industry, the maintenance 
of the integrity of the union's representation domain during processes of vertical 
disintegration has been the key objective of the IG BCE and of the chemical works 
councils. Indeed, employees' representatives have ensured that all newly grounded 
companies remained within the responsibility domain of the chemical industry and 
did  not  shift  to  other  collective  agreements.  For  doing  so,  employees' 
representatives have accepted the use of flexibilisation instruments entailed within 
the chemical collective agreement (such as opening clauses and specific plant-level 
collective agreements). Thereby, they have accepted the segmentation of working 
conditions among different workforce groups and different companies. Still, they 
have  avoided  those  companies  to  fall  within  the  representation  realm of  other 
unions and, potentially, a much stronger deterioration and differentiation of their 
employment  conditions.  By  setting  higher  standards  than  those  set  in  other 
collective  agreements  (even if  lower  than  the  chemical  one),  these  instruments 
aimed at reducing an even stronger polarisation of working conditions in service 
and production companies.
In the metal case, employees' representatives have adopted similar instruments in 
order to prevent the externalisation of auxiliary functions. Indeed, both at Audi and 
at Daimler, works councils (with the support and the active engagement of the local 
IG Metall) have accepted to negotiate measures aiming at reducing the costs of the 
internal provision of these services in order to block their outsourcing. Thereby, 
employees'  representatives  have  bargained  lower  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment in order to block outsourcing. Again, the acceptance of segmentation 
was geared towards avoiding greater segmentation to take place through vertical 
disintegration.
Still,  as  we  have  highlighted,  within  the  metal  industry this  strategy has  been 
strongly contested  and it  has  never  been embraced at  national  level.  This  may 
signal the presence of an ideological opposition to such forms of segmentation. 
However, in some cases (such as at Daimler plant in Untertuerkheim), opposition 
to service sector contracts had the consequence that the company relied on other 
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instruments (namely outsourcing without  the transfer  of  employees)  in  order to 
achieve  their  goals  of  cost  cutting.  Thus,  if  not  accompanied  with  an  active 
engagement of employees'  representatives on the issue of external  employment, 
such ideological opposition to segmentation had the paradoxical consequence of 
letting workers performing those functions even worse off.
An important  difference between the two cases is  that,  in  metal  plants,  service 
sector collective agreements aimed at avoiding outsourcing, while at chemical ones 
outsourcing  was  never  blocked.  This  is  important  for  one  main  reason:  the 
separation of service activities from production companies opens up the possibility 
to circumvent regulation though outsourcing, since these companies compete with 
external providers for getting contracts from production companies. This has two 
consequences, which have the potential to undermine the IG BCE strategy. First, 
subcontractors  not  covered  by the chemical  agreement  can enter  the  park,  thus 
questioning its collective bargaining unity (which, as we have seen, was a goal of 
the union). Second, since subcontractors available to chemical companies do not 
apply  homogeneous  standards  to  their  workforces,  service  companies  applying 
chemical collective agreements are pushed into spirals of continuous concessions in 
order  to  be  competitive  against  companies  which  apply  cheaper  collective 
agreements. Thus, the reduction of working conditions might be a never ending 
process. 
Another major difference between the two sectors lies in the social dynamics on 
which such negotiations were based and, particularly,  on the role of employers. 
Within the chemical industry, indeed, employers manifested an interest in keeping 
the  collective  bargaining  unity  within  chemical  parks  for  avoiding  the  risk  of 
conflict deriving from the entrance of other (more militant) unions. Thus, they gave 
preference to the use of flexibilisation instruments over a complete outsourcing, 
even if more costly, in order to keep peaceful labour relations within the parks.
On the contrary, within the metal industry, the definition of service sector collective 
agreements  took place  only in  companies  with  strong and politically conscious 
works  councils  (Duennemeier  2008,  Interview 27,  Interview 17).  Where  works 
councils  were  not  strong  enough  or  were  politically  weak,  employers  simply 
resorted to outsourcing. As argued by an interviewee, 
192
in those cases, where we were politically strong, we have regulated the issue through the 
works  councils.  And  this  is  for  me  crucial:  were  we  were  strong  enough,  we  have 
regulated this issue, and where we were not strong enough, it has developed. Namely, that 
employers have simply outsourced (Interview 27).
This was very clear in the case of Audi. There, the definition of a service sector 
collective agreement required the works council to mobilise the workforce and to 
exercise conflict. Thus, service sector collective agreements can be interpreted as 
ways to reduce segmentation.
New subcontractors
Lastly, we have reviewed initiatives geared towards new subcontractors (i.e. those 
subcontractors have not developed from the transfer of workers from  production 
companies). As we have seen, these groups of employees have been generally out 
of the sight of employees' representatives. Indeed, at our analysed plants, up until 
few years ago there were almost no plant-level agreements dealing with the issue of 
external  employment  through  subcontractors.  The  sole  examples  of  regulation 
concerned  the  effects  outsourcing  processes  had  on  internal  employees.  For 
example, when discussions on the outsourcing of maintenance activities took place 
at  ZF,  the  company's  works  council  clearly  identified  those  realms  where 
outsourcing could take place (i.e. in easier maintenance activities, such as facility 
management) and those where it could not (i.e. maintenance activities within the 
production process). Even when the company foresaw structures for dealing with 
“make or buy” decisions, outsourcing was often considered problematic only if it 
affected employment levels  within the companies.  Since this  was often not the 
case, works councils mostly remained inactive. Indeed, as argued by an interviewee 
It  has  not  been  so,  that  core  workers  have  been  kicked  out  or  have  been  sent  to 
subcontracting companies. In our industry, especially in co-determined companies where 
there is a works council, it is a more creeping process. People retire or exit the company 
for other reasons, and the position is not re-occupied by internal employees, (…)  but is 
given to external companies (Interview Iwanowski).
In  such  situations,  employees'  representatives  have,  thus,  often  not  acted  and 
external subcontractors have remained outside the representation realm of the two 
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unions.
Still, as we have seen in the previous chapter, things are currently changing in the 
metal industry. The IG Metall has started a campaign on subcontractors which aims 
both at regulating working conditions at subcontractors of metal companies. This 
should take place in two ways. On the one hand, subcontractors are to be organised 
within the IG Metall and representation structures have to be constructed in order 
for  employees  to  express  their  voice.  On  the  other,  works  councils  of  metal 
companies  have  to  strengthen  their  control  over  outsourcing  decisions,  by 
bargaining  collective  agreement  extending  their  influence  capacity  and  setting 
better working conditions for people working at subcontractors. This new initiative 
entails an enlargement of the representation realm of the union and of metal works 
council.  Indeed, this campaign is based on a value chain approach according to 
which workers employed within the metal value chain have to be represented by 
the IG Metall.
Summing up, it is interesting to note that our cases show some recurrent patterns 
with regard to the inclusion or exclusion of different peripheral groups. In both 
industries, vertical disintegration has been mostly dealt with when it implied (or 
threatened)  the  transfer  of  internal  workers.  In  these  cases,  employees' 
representatives  have  tried  to  protect  workers  involved  not  only in  the  form of 
transition agreements (as identified in the first chapter), but also with regard to the 
coverage of new plants or the identification of instruments for avoiding the transfer. 
Even if, as we know from the literature, this can not be taken for granted (often 
employees' representatives have solely ensured working conditions for transferred 
employees  and  not  for  transferred  “functions”,  Caprile  2000),  this  can  be 
considered the form of vertical disintegration which requires less adaptation with 
regard  to  a  union's  boundary  setting,  because  it  concerns  workers  which  have 
already been part of the union. This might be explanation for the more inclusive 
attitude shown by employees' representatives in both cases.
Including agency workers and external subcontractors, instead, required a process 
of  boundary  enlargement.  Indeed,  these  two  groups  were  “outside”  unions' 
traditional  representation realm (they were  “the others”  as  often argued by our 
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interviewees).  As we have seen, this inclusion has taken place in differentiated 
ways in the two industries. The chemical union (and most of all chemical works 
councils) are still treating agency workers and external subcontractors as outsiders. 
Instead, the metal union and the metal works councils have progressively enlarged 
their representation boundaries, even if the inclusion of agency workers has proved 
to be easier that that of new subcontrators. This might be due to the fact that agency 
workers are usually closer than subcontractors,  since they are involved into the 
company's  labour  process.  Thus,  they  might  be  more  easily  recognised  as 
metalworkers and, thus, more easily includes.
Even if the two cases show some common patterns, thus, we can argue that the 
metal union is displaying a more inclusive strategy towards peripheral employees. 
The IG Metall has progressively engaged with the issue of agency work and is now 
turning  to  the  organisation  of  subcontractors.  The chemical  union,  instead,  has 
mostly  looked  at  those  segments  of  chemical  companies  which  have  been 
outsourced and limited itself to protect those workers' employment conditions. In 
both cases, however,  a progressive redefinition of representation boundaries has 
taken place.
6.2. How can we interpret trade unions' and works councils' 
strategies?
It is important, now, to look at in how far the hypothesis we have presented in the 
first chapter are able to account for these differences. As we have stressed, three are 
the  factors  which  might  influence  trade  unions'  and  works  councils'  behaviour 
towards  peripheral  employees:  ideological  orientation,  members'  interests 
(expressed in this case as the presence or absence of competition between core and 
peripheral  employees),  and organisational  interests.  From our  cases,  a  complex 
interplay between ideological motivations and material and organisational interests 
seems to emerge.
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6.2.1. The metal case: organising peripheral employees for avoiding 
competition
As we have already argued, we can highlight a turning point with regard to how 
employees'  representatives  in  the  metal  sector  have  dealt  with  the  issue  of 
peripheral employment. As we have seen, indeed, up until few years ago, this issue 
was mostly left at the plant level. Here a great deal of variance was visible70. In 
some cases, agency work was considered a buffer for core workers. Hence, works 
councils  did  not  engage  with  the  issue  or  bargained  very  loose  quota,  which 
allowed  a  great  deal  of  flexibility  to  employers  (Benassi  2013,  Pulignano  and 
Doerflinger 2013, Wassermann and Rudolph 2007). In other cases, instead, agency 
work was regulated, and equal pay provisions and quota were introduced in order 
to reduce segmentation with regard to core workers, and limit employers' use of the 
instrument.  According  to  our  interviewees,  this  depended  from  the  political 
commitment  of  works  councils  and  its  closeness  to  the  union  (Interview  27, 
Interview 28, Interview 15, Interview 17). Indeed, for more politically conscious 
employees'  representatives  (i.e.  those  which  were  more  committed  to  ideals  of 
equality and working class solidarity and were considered IG Metall's strongholds), 
segmentation has never been acceptable. These works councils have attempted to 
milder  negative  effects  of  employers'  segmentation  strategies  by regulating  the 
deployment of agency work at plant level and opposing to outsourcing. Our case-
studies are examples of this stance: both at Audi and at Daimler agency work was 
regulated very early (even before the Hartz reforms favoured its boom) and, most 
of all, the equal pay principle was introduced right at the beginning.
This differentiated approach at plant-level suggests two observations. First, it has 
not been the ideology of the metalworkers' union per se to prevent the adoption of 
segmentalist strategies, but rather the political commitment of plant-level actors to 
ideals of equality and their closeness to the union. Indeed, a sectoral tradition of 
working  class  orientation  has  not  been  sufficient  to  prevent  employees' 
representatives to  adopt exclusive strategies when the material  interests  of their 
70 Our case studies comprise only metal companies where works councils actively engaged with 
the issue of agency work in a very early phase (Audi and Daimler) or where it did not play a 
significant role until very recently (ZF). However, we have been able to rely on other studies 
(Artus and Rossmeissel 2012, Benassi 2013, Promberger 2012, Pulignano and Doerflinger 2013, 
Weinkopf and Vanselow 2007) in order to develop the following observations.
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members were at stake. However, these ideals were not overall abandoned, as our 
cases show, and they are still important in defining works councils approaches in 
some cases.
Second, the working-class orientation traditionally embodied by the IG Metall is 
not able to account for the changing behaviour shown by the union over time. As 
we have seen, up until the late 2000s, the IG Metall left the regulation of both 
agency work and subcontracting at plant level and did not question (or politically 
sanctioned) those cases in which works councils adopted segmentalist strategies. In 
more recent years, instead, the union has adopted a more activist approach with the 
aim of influencing works councils  activities  and re-gain control  over  the issue. 
Thus,  ideology does  not  explain  the  current  change of  strategy taking place  at 
national level and we need an alternative explanation.
What emerges from the sectoral case-study is that the whole rhetoric surrounding 
the two recent IG Metall campaigns is based on two issues: first, the pressure posed 
by peripheral employees on core workers; second, the threat posed to the union and 
its  collective  bargaining  capacity.  Indeed,  since  the  mid  2000s,  the  IG  Metall 
started portraying the spread of agency work and of subcontracting agreements as a 
strategy for weakening both the union's collective  agreements and core workers’ 
standards.  External  employment  has  been  described  as  an  instrument  for 
circumventing regulation, dismissal protection and collectively bargained standards 
and,  thus,  the  capacity  of  the  union  to  set  employment  conditions  within  the 
industry  (IG Metall  2012).  Moreover,  these instruments have been portrayed as 
detrimental for core workers, because they function as benchmarks over which core 
workers' performance is evaluated. This often has a disciplining effect. The latter 
point is clearly exemplified by the quote below taken from an interview with the 
trade union official responsible for the national campaign on subcontracting.
There are very nice management methods, in which production results and cost factors 
are displayed on a blackboard and then all core workers can see every day what was  
produced by external employees and at which cost, and what they have produced and at 
which cost. This has a strong disciplining effect. And therefore in such companies will be 
surely more difficult, when you enter a negotiation for the collective agreement and you 
come to the question „would we like a wage increase: yes or no?“, then employees will 
worry about that and say „yes, a wage increase would be good, but what I do, they do it 
for much less, than I rather remain quite“ (Interview Iwanowski).
The  disciplining  mechanism,  thus,  runs  through  the  following  idea  which  is 
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conveyed to core workers:  “YOU should be grateful  for what  YOU still  have” 
(Iwanowski  2008:  6).  It  is  important  to  highlight  that,  within  the  IG  Metall's 
rhetoric,  members'  interests  and the  interests  of  the  union  overlap.  Indeed,  for 
example,  the  disciplining  mechanisms  described  above  also  weakens  the  IG 
Metall's capacity to act, since workers are considered less likely to strike.
Another  crucial  point  is  that  core/periphery  competition  and  the  pressure  it 
produces  do  not  arise  from  a  simple  quantitative  increase  in  the  number  of 
peripheral employees, but more from the perception of what employers want to 
achieve  with  this  personnel  strategy.  Indeed,  if  we  compare  the  relationship 
between  core  and  peripheral  workers  in  the  two sectors  we note  that  in  those 
chemical companies where agency work has a strong numerical incidence on the 
workforce (such as the two maintenance companies, Bilfinger Maintenance Sued 
and Tectrion), works councils do not perceive agency work as threat, but instead as 
an instrument that protects the core workforce (Interview Adam). Thus, the role of 
employers in this regard is fundamental. According to the IG Metall, employers are 
strategically relying on external employment in order to circumvent regulation and 
to  weaken  the  core  workforce  (Interview  28,  Interview  27).  As  argued  by  an 
interviewee,
there are industrial companies (…) that strategically decide to hire subcontractors. And 
their  goals  are  often  to  limit  the  power  of  works  councils  and  to  reduce  their  co-
determination possibilities, to reduce wages and increase working times, and to exclude 
those workers from plant-level agreements (Interview 28).
This  observation  is  important  for  understanding  the  strategic  orientation  of  the 
union.  Indeed,  the  idea  of  a  cross-class  coalition  between  employers  and  core 
workers  at  the  expense  of  peripheral  ones  (as  the  one  hypothesised  by  the 
dualisation literature) is viable only if the latter are used as a buffer. If,  instead 
employers  are considered to make use of these instruments for weakening core 
workers and the union, an alliance with employers is not a viable option. Thus, 
instead of triggering a closure of employees' representatives and a strengthening of 
cooperation with employers  aiming at  protecting the internal  labour  market  (as 
suggested by the dualisation literature, but also by older accounts on the effects of 
the crisis over corporatist interest representation in Germany, Streeck 1984), these 
conditions triggered the union to underlie the common interests between core and 
198
peripheral employees and to highlight that the defence of core workers requires to 
close off loopholes by regulating the external labour market. Inclusion can then be 
considered as an attempt to defend the interests of core members and of the union 
itself (see Benassi and Dorigatti in progress).
Two points have, however, to be raised with regard to the issue of competition. 
These come from the fact that, in our cases, we did not find evidence for arguing 
that  recent  inclusive  attitudes  with  regard  to  subcontractors  derive  from  the 
presence of competition between core and peripheral workers. Indeed, within the 
analysed  plants  an  actual competition  (such as  the  one  experienced by several 
service  providers  in  chemical  parks)  between  the  core  workforce  and  external 
subcontractors was not highlighted by our interviewees. What they stressed is a 
sense of “precariousness” arising among core workers by a difficult external labour 
market (Interview 16). However, in all three cases, this seems not to be the trigger 
of the new campaigns. Engagement with subcontracting, as well as with agency 
work  at  ZF,  came  not  so  much  from  internal  problems,  but  from  the  strong 
commitment  of  plant-level  representatives  to  the  union's  political  line.  Indeed, 
works councillors at Audi, Daimler and ZF are strongly involved into IG Metall 
activities (i.e. their engagement was triggered from the outside). With this regard, 
two hypothesis can be formulated.
First, competition may not be present in these companies but it is actually taking 
place  in  others.  This  may  be  plausible  because  several  interviewees  have 
highlighted the difference of their companies with respect to other metal plants. 
Indeed, these companies' high organisation levels and the strength of their works 
councils  insulates  the  internal  from the external  labour  market  and reduces  the 
pressure arising from segmentation (Interview 16, Interview 17, Interview 15).
The second hypothesis is that competition is still not perceived as a problem by 
plant-level actors and is mostly a concern of the union, which, on the one hand, is 
fearing competition might arise and, on the other, is fearing for the union itself. The 
salience of this issue within the IG Metall's rhetoric may, thus, lie in the necessity 
for the union to persuade works councils of the utility of these campaigns and of 
the fact that they are, at the end, in the interests of their members. Indeed, both the 
campaign on agency work and the one on subcontracting had a strong top-down 
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character, since they were initiated and pushed by the national level. Moreover, the 
union had to work a lot on works councils in order to win them for the campaigns. 
The  necessity  to  persuade  works  councils  was  underlined  both  in  IG  Metall's 
publications and by our interviewees.
At the beginning this was an issue with agency work. Agency workers were “the others”.  
And there were several companies, several workforces, that, under the continuous fire by 
employers, have also argued “Yes, we need agency work to be flexible”. And in the end 
quasi for having thereby their peace. However, through the campaign we have been able 
to make it very clear, that there can be no peace, if you have here a workforce that earns 
very well and nearby another one which earns the half. (…) We had to work very hard in 
several companies in order to convince and to make clear that all workers sit in the same 
boat. We have succeeded in several companies. Surely there are always some that say, “at 
our company it is eventually very good, that we have this buffer”. I think we will have the 
same debate, perhaps even a little more difficult, with the issue of subcontracting. But,  
again, we already have some exercise in that, to enlarge the sight and to see not only the 
core workforce, but also the peripheral one and to recognise that the two have a common 
interest.  And that  one jumps far  too short  if  he simply says  “we have to  keep some 
cheaper workers or more flexible workers, so that nothing happens to us”. Because at the  
end, this is evidently false. But we are working on that (Interview 28).
At the beginning of the campaign it is important to sensitise works councils and union 
representatives  on the  issue  of  subcontracting.  As  a first  step it  is  important  to  raise 
attention among works councillors: “look who enters your company! Ask questions to the 
management: who works here? What is given outside?” (IG Metall 2012: 9).
The centrality of competition and of members' interests (albeit differently framed) 
in the union's discourse, thus, may be a reflection of its necessity to speak in a way 
that motivates all works councils to act.
6.2.2. The chemical case: exclusive solidarity
As we have seen in the third chapter, the chemical union and the works councils 
responded to employers' segmentation strategies according to the traditional system 
of the chemical partnership: they accepted employers' restructuring measures (even 
if  sometimes  with  doubts  on their  economic  viability)  and attempted  to  reduce 
negative consequences for all  chemical workers by ensuring that they remained 
within the representation realm of the chemical union. 
Here, again, we see the role of inherited traditions in shaping the response given by 
employees' representatives. This took place in two different veins. On the one hand, 
a common identity as chemical workers was at  the base of the union's  and the 
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works councils' semi-inclusive attitude in that it ensured not only that transferred 
workers kept their individual rights, but that all plants deriving from the dissolution 
of former chemical conglomerates remained part of the industry.  Indeed, service 
sector workers and service companies coming out from chemical companies were 
recognised as belonging to the chemical industry and as sharing the same chemical 
identity as production companies. Thus, it was a primary union goal to keep these 
segments  within  the  chemical  union's  representation  domain  and  ensure  that 
chemical parks remained an IG BCE monopoly.
On the contrary, however, the strong reference to the chemical industry produced 
that external subcontractors as well as agency workers were perceived as outsiders. 
Thus, they did not enter the union's and the works councils' domain. It is not that 
employees'  representatives  did not  show any concern with regard to  how those 
workers were paid and to the fact that they were subject to much worse working 
conditions,  but  they  remained  outside  the  responsibility  domain  of  plant-level 
employees representatives and their representation was not considered a duty of 
employees' representatives.
Hence,  employees'  representatives  actually  redefined  the  boundaries  of  their 
representation  realm,  moving  from  the  representation  of  chemical  industry  to 
include also services provided to the chemical industry, but only in so far as the 
new areas of inclusion were actually already represented by the union as deriving 
from  the  outsourcing  of  specific  functions.  Thus,  chemical  parks  are  in  the 
paradoxical  situation  where  you  have  service  subcontractors  of  the  chemical 
industry doing the same activities but belonging to different unions (and in some 
cases having no union representation at all). As we have seen, this is producing 
significant  problems  for  workers  and  employees'  representatives  in  service 
companies covered by a chemical collective agreement, but this is at the moment 
not  triggering  any  new  initiative.  Instead,  competition  with  cheaper  external 
providers is dealt with through a social partnership approach, by ensuring workers' 
contribution to the company's competitiveness via derogations.
The  sole  cases  in  which  employees  representatives  expressed  their  interest  in 
regulating the issue of agency work and subcontracting were those cases in which 
these employment forms were producing negative effects for the core workers. As 
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we have seen, an example of that was Aliseca, Lanxess subsidiary for maintenance 
services, where agency work is a significant component of the workforce. Here, 
agency work is considered by the works council as potentially substituting stable 
jobs positions. Thus, the works council is asking for regulation. Still, according to 
the information newspaper published by Lanxess' works council in Leverkusen, the 
envisaged platform mostly focus on the limitation of the use of agency work (to be 
restricted to the coverage of transitory personnel shortages). Even if the requests of 
the  works  council  include  also  some elements  which  should  close  the  distance 
between core and agency workers (such as the participation to training and same 
access to social spaces), they do not include equal pay or any wage improvement 
above the sectoral pay bonuses (Der Betriebsrat 2013: 11).
However,  in  most  of  the  plants  agency  workers  and  subcontractors  are  not 
considered as problematic aspects for the core workforce and, thus, are in no need 
of regulation. Indeed, they mostly represent marginal phenomena, clearly separated 
from the activities performed by chemical workers. As we have highlighted, the 
only overlapping takes place with regard to service companies belonging to the 
chemical sector. However, employees' representatives in production plants do not 
see as part of their duties, of their responsibilities and of their possibilities to solve 
this issue, even if they clearly consider it as problematic. On the contrary, those 
service companies, even if still organised by the chemical union, seem to occupy a 
subordinate position in the definition of the union's strategic agenda. Even in those 
cases in which peripheral employment is quantitatively more significant, such as in 
maintenance  companies,  it  is  not  considered  as  an  instrument  to  weaken  core 
workers and their collective representation. Thus, it is accepted as a way to protect 
core workers.  Here,  we need to point to a last  element evidenced by our case-
studies, i.e. the fact that the specific sectoral identity also influenced employers' use 
of segmentation strategies. As we have seen, indeed, chemical employers have been 
disposed  to  avoid  pursuing  more  extreme  segmentation  strategies  in  order  to 
safeguard  the  presence  of  the  IG BCE as  the  sole  representative  of  the  park's 
workforce. This, even if to adopt this stance required to pay an economic price, 
since employment conditions set by the chemical collective agreement and other 
collective agreements signed by the chemical union are much higher than those of 
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other industries. This is recognised also by employees representatives, which relate 
the fact that chemical parks have maintained their collective bargaining unity even 
after  massive vertical  disintegration processes not  only to their  own action and 
strength, but also to employers' willingness (Interview 1, 2, 10, 12). Ideals of social 
partnership which have characterised the sector since the 1970s, thus, are still alive 
and continue to characterise actors' strategies. This is rather different than in the 
metal  industry,  where,  perhaps  even  too  emphatically,  the  at  the  time  of  the 
statement  vice-secretary  of  the  union,  Detlef  Wetzel,  argued  that  “the  social 
consensus  of  the  old  Federal  Republic  has  been  broken.  The  capital  side  is 
questioning  once  valued  mechanisms  to  find  compromises.  The  base  of  social 
partnership has become more and more fragile (Wetzel et al. 2008: 3)”.
6.3. Conclusions
The comparison between the metal and the chemical case has given us important 
insights with regard to the factors explaining trade unions' behaviours in cases of 
labour  market  segmentation.  We have seen  that  both  identity  legacies,  material 
interests  and  organisational  interests  are  important  for  explaining  the  strategies 
adopted by employees' representatives towards peripheral employees and that they 
cannot  be  analysed  without  looking  at  employers'  behaviour.  Indeed,  ideals  of 
equality have been important in explaining the inclusive attitude adopted by some 
metal works councils towards peripheral employees and especially towards agency 
workers.  Such  motivations  play  a  much  weaker  role  in  the  chemical  sector, 
implying that the stronger working-class orientation historically displayed by the 
metalworkers' union is a significant factor. In the chemical industry another type of 
identity played a role, namely the sectoral, social-partnership identity. This, indeed, 
ensured  that  employees'  representatives  maintained  a  commitment  to  keep  all 
outsourced services under their representation domain and that employers avoided 
restructuring measures that would have produced the entrance of other unions into 
the park.
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Still, we have seen that identity commitments have to be balanced against material 
and organisational interests and, in some cases, have actually been overturn when 
pressures  over  employees'  representatives  became  stronger  and  plant-level 
representatives were not politically strong enough. In some cases, also within the 
metal  sector,  the  imperative  of  protecting  the  core  workforce  has  trespassed 
equality preoccupations and favoured the adoption of segmentalist strategies. Thus, 
even  if  important,  employees'  representatives  commitment  to  equality  does  not 
explain alone their behaviour towards peripheral employees.
The  relationship  between  the  core  and  the  periphery  seems  to  be  another  key 
element  for  explaining  the  two  unions'  strategies  and  particularly  IG  Metall's 
trajectory.  Indeed, while in the past the union let  the regulation of this  issue at 
plant-level and even accepted works council's exclusive approaches, the increased 
pressure exercised by peripheral employment on core workers is pushing the union 
to strengthen its activities and to develop campaign concepts aimed at regulating 
the periphery of the labour market. On the contrary, the fact that the core/periphery 
structure  within  the  chemical  sector  does  not  question  working  conditions  of 
chemical employees favours the neglection of this issue by their representatives. 
Thus,  core  workers'  material  interests  are  crucial  in  understanding  employees' 
representatives strategies. However, they do not always trigger exclusive strategies 
and labour-management coalitions, but may also trigger the inclusion of peripheral 
groups into trade union's agenda.
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Conclusions
This  dissertation has been moved by the interest  in exploring the role  of trade 
unions (and employees' representatives more generally) in increasingly segmented 
labour  markets.  As we have  already stressed,  over  the  last  years,  a  debate  has 
developed between two different approaches to the issue. On the one hand, there 
are scholars who have represented trade unions (especially in continental political 
economies) as the defenders of the better off among workers and have considered 
them increasingly unable (and even unwilling) to give adequate protection to the 
weakest segments of the working class (Palier and Thelen 2010, Hassel 2014). On 
the  other  hand,  we  find  accounts  arguing  that  segmentation  and  increased 
inequalities  among  insiders  and  outsiders  are  primary  the  result  of  employers' 
strategies and the sole responsibility of labour is to be too weak to oppose them 
(Korpi 2006).
What our research project has shown is that both approaches are inadequate for 
explaining  the  behaviour  of  employees'  representatives  in  segmented  labour 
markets and the reasons guiding this behaviour.
Contrary to what commonly argued by the power resource theory, as we have seen, 
it is not enough that trade unions are strong in order for them to limit segmentation. 
Indeed,  this  effect  is  strongly  dependent  on  the  willingness  of  employees 
representatives to act in an inclusive way towards peripheral employees. Even if all 
our cases concerned companies where works councils and trade unions have still a 
relatively stable  power  position,  not  all  of  them have acted  in  order  to  milder 
negative  effects  of  vertical  disintegration:  While  in  some  cases  employees 
representatives  were  able  to  significantly  improve  working  conditions  for 
peripheral  employees,  in  other  they have  not  used  their  power.  Thus,  our  case 
studies  confirm the fact  that,  under  difficult  economic conditions  and faced by 
more aggressive employers'  requests,  employees  and their  representatives might 
adopt exclusive orientations and attempt to “save” themselves even at the expense 
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of other workers. Underlying the fact that core workers' representatives may have 
an  ambiguous  position  towards  segmentation  is  a  very  significant  contribution 
given  by  the  dualisation  to  theories  of  industrial  relations  and  of  trade  union 
behaviour, something which was neglected in previous power resource approaches. 
Thereby,  indeed,  the  dualisation  literature  has  pointed  out  some  of  the  most 
significant  risks  the  labour  movement  if  facing  and  the  difficulty  to  practice 
solidarity in the current economic, social and political situation.
However,  our  research  has  also  confirmed  our  starting  argument  according  to 
which  the  dualisation  literature   has  developed  a  too  mechanistic  relationship 
between union action and its members' interests. This for two broad reasons. First, 
this literature completely overrides other possible motives for explaining the action 
of employees' representatives, such as identity legacies or organisational interests. 
As  we  have  seen,  instead,  identity  has  been  an  important,  even  if  not  all-
determining, element for explaining the behaviour of employees' representatives at 
plant-level.  Indeed,  the political  commitment  to equality has been the driver of 
inclusive  strategies  by  some  works  councils  in  the  metal  sector,  while  this 
preoccupation seems to be much less relevant for employees' representatives in the 
chemical one. Surely, we have shown that the stronger working class ideology of 
employees' representatives in the metal sector did not impede that several works 
councils adopted segmentalist strategies, nor triggered an active intervention (with 
the consequent deployment of resources) on behalf  of the union. Still,  we have 
observed a  difference at  workplace level  between politically stronger  and more 
conscious works councils and weaker ones and this made us argue that the political 
orientation of employees' representatives still plays a role in their behaviour.
A second limitation of the dualisation literature is that it portrays the interests of 
core and peripheral workers as always being opposed. According to this approach, 
indeed, core workers have an interest in allying with employers, consenting to their 
segmentation demands, and to exclude peripheral employees. We argue that this is 
based on a fault reading of current labour market dynamics, one that considers core 
and peripheral labour markets as clearly separated and disconnected. Moreover, it 
seems based on the idea that  employers  in  core sectors  of  Coordinated Market 
Economies are always sustaining coordination with labour for reasons of economic 
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efficiency.  However,  we  have  seen  in  our  cases  that  both  these  premises  are 
questionable.  Indeed,  within  the  metal  sectors,  the  new  strategic  orientation 
developed by the union with regard both to  agency work and subcontractors is 
based on the perception of a growing competition taking place between core and 
peripheral  workers  and  to  the  fact  that  employers  are  intentionally  using  this 
competition to question established standards for the core workforce. Thus, under 
certain conditions, the interests of core and peripheral workers may overlap and 
push core workers' representatives towards the inclusion of the latter (see Benassi 
and Dorigatti in progress). However, we have also shown that the extent to which 
this  happens  strongly  varies  across  sectors.  Indeed,  while  in  the  metal  sectors 
employers  have  adopted  more  aggressive  segmentation  strategies,  which  have 
increasingly  been  perceived  by  the  IG  Metall  as  attacks  against  its  position, 
employers' strategies in the chemical sectors are not considered as directed towards 
the goal of weakening the union and the works councils' position. As we have seen, 
this  widely explains the different orientations presented by the two unions with 
regard to peripheral employment.
This observation has two broader implications for the literature.
First,  it  questions  the  idea  that  the  core  labour  market  is  insulated  from  the 
peripheral and that core workers are unaffected (or even benefit) from peripheral 
employment. What our research clearly shows is that core and peripheral labour 
markets may indeed interact and permanent workers be exposed to pressures by the 
external one. Thus, we need different and more complex account of the dynamics 
between  core  and  peripheral  labour  markets.  A promising  direction  for  further 
research is,  thus,  the identification of the factors shaping different relationships 
between core and peripheral labour markets in different sectors. As we have seen, 
for  example,  the  pure  numerical  incidence  of  peripheral  employment  does  not 
necessarily produce negative effects on core workers. Indeed, within the chemical 
sector,  the  significant  incidence  of  agency  work  in  some  companies  was  not 
perceived  as  a  threat  by employees  representatives.  An important  factor  which 
might shape this relationship are employers'  strategies and their  motivations for 
relying on peripheral employment. Further research should, thus, investigate the 
political  dimension  of  labour  market  segmentation  and  highlight  how  actors' 
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strategies constantly redefine core/periphery configurations.
Secondly, but consequential, there is a need to recast theories looking at employers' 
behaviour and their willingness to sustain coordination with labour. As we have 
already stressed in the introduction, theories referring to the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach  have  argued  that  employers'  in  core  sectors  of  Coordinated  Market 
Economies are willing to sustain coordination with labour  for reasons of economic 
efficiency, such as the goal of sustaining workers' commitment and their investment 
in  skills  (Hall  and  Soskice  2001).  However,  our  two  case  studies  show  that 
employers in Germany are doing that in different extents. Thus, further research 
should analyse the determinants of employers' behaviour, looking at which social, 
economic and political factors influence their behaviour.
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Interview list
Site Interview 
number
Company Position Date 
Industriepark 
Hoechst
Interview 1 InfraServ Hoechst Chair of the works council 19/10/12  
23/05/13
Interview 2 Sanofi Chair of the works council 19/10/12
Interview 3 InfraServ Logistics Chair of the works council 22/05/13
Interview 4 InfraServ Logistics Works councillor 22/05/13
Interview 5 Bilfinger Maintenance 
Sued
Chair of the works council 23/05/13
Interview 6 Bayer Crop Science HR and site coordinator 27/09/13
Interview 7 Bayer Crop Science Works councillor 23/09/13
Interview 8 Clariant Deputy chair of the works 
council
23/09/13
Interview 9 IG BCE Hessen-
Thüringen 
Chair of the local union 
(Hessen-Thüringen)
12/07/13
Chempark 
Krefeld-
Uerdingen
Interview 10 Currenta Chair of the works council 29/10/12 
26/05/13
Interview 11 Currenta Management 26/05/13
Interview 12 Bayer Material Science Chair of the works council 12/09/12
27/09/13
IG BCE Interview 13 IG BCE Hannover Industrial policies 
department
12/07/13
Audi Interview 14 Audi Works councillor 05/11/13
Interview 15 IG Metall Ingolstadt Chair of the local union 
(Ingolstadt)
10/10/13
Interview 16 IG Metall Ingolstadt Responsible campaign GVZ 
Ingolstadt
06/11/13
Daimler
Interview 17 IG Metall Bade-
Wuerttemberg
Deputy chairman local union 
(Baden-Wuerttemberg)
23/07/13
Interview 18 IG Metall Bade-
Wuerttemberg
Responsible campaign 
industrial services
27/11/13
Interview 19 Daimler Sindelfingen Head of the workplace union 
representative body 
08/10/13
Interview 20 Daimler Bremen Works councillor 31/07/13
ZF 
Friedrichshafen
Interview 21 ZF Friedrichshafen Works councillor 18/04/13 
14/06/13
Interview 22 IG Metall Assistant of the works 
council
14/06/13
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Interview 23 ZF Friedrichshafen Manager (Head of the 
purchasing department)
14/06/13
Schnellecke
Interview 24 IG Metall Official (in charge of 
Schnellecke)
13/05/13
Interview 25 Schnellecke Sachsen Chair of the works council 13/05/13
IG Metall Interview 26 IG Metall Official (in charge of the 
industrial services 
campaign)
26/01/12
Interview 27 IG Metall 
(headquarters)
Official (responsible for 
industrial services)
15/09/12
Interview 28 IG Metall 
(headquarters)
Head of the campaign 
department
15/09/12
Interview 29 IG Metall Eisenach Head of the local 03/07/13
Gesamtmetall Interview 30 Gesamtmetall Member of the executive 
board (education and 
national economy)
20/03/13
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